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ABSTRACT 
 
The dissertation explores the intertwining of video art practices and the 
ontological implications around the central themes and questions posed, in part, by 
Martin Heidegger. The essay evaluates his respective approaches to technology and 
“becoming” in relation to a number of central questions including the rapid dissolving of 
the boundaries and distinctions between video and cinema. I look at video installations by 
Dan Graham as they allow for interaction between the mediation of the image and the 
immediacy of the physical experience of the viewer, and I look at important precedents 
for the role of bodily performance in relation to video art. In response, I demonstrate why 
a philosophy of video is necessary. Finally, I also investigate the new paradigms of video 
production and distribution as they contrast with traditional practices and video’s dialogic 
relations. In the context of this research I then suggest the paradigm shift of video as a 
democratized medium. 
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Video is a present-time medium. Its image can be simultaneous with its perception by/of its 
audience (it can be an image of its audience perceiving). 
Dan Graham 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At the core of my research lies a simple, yet fundamental question: what is video? 
Or in other terms, what are the essentia of video? How can we reformulate the new 
paradigms of the medium? How has the aesthetic discourse changed from video art in the 
’60s to video practices nowadays? How do we locate the tenets of exchange between the 
artist and the viewer—between content and production—under the rubric of the moving 
image?  
This dissertation will explore and evaluate some of these important questions by 
means of a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology: a manner of inquiry, a pursuit 
of the matter. And as Heidegger himself suggested, method here is not one piece of 
equipment of science among others but rather the primary component out of which is first 
determined what can become object and how it becomes object. 
Further, my avoidance of a psychoanalytical Lacanian path is deliberate. There is 
no question that Lacanian thought has influenced video and media theory, particularly in 
his conception of the mirror stage. According to Lacan, language serves as a method of 
representation by which the subject claims identity after being forced to separate from an 
imagined identification with the mother (or equivalent figure). This moment of 
separation—which, in Freudian terms is brought to conclusion in the oedipal scenario—is 
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enforced by an intervention on the part of the father (or equivalent figure) whose phallic 
presence signifies territorial rights to the mother. Identification is a multilevel process 
and concerns both the viewer and the subject viewed. It is a popularly held notion that in 
performance art pieces, audience members identify with the artist through the art form’s 
chief material: the body. With respect to video, however, this process does not mean that 
an answer is at hand or even that, by asking the question, we have foreseen the entire 
scope of the query. Thus, my contribution in this paper is to pose or position the question.  
In Chapters I and II, I illustrate how the boundaries and distinctions between 
video and cinema are fast dissolving. As point of departure, I investigate Heidegger’s 
essay on the question concerning technology: how such inquiry leads to a question of 
video, its practice, and our perceptions. Then I suggest how video art and its more 
general, popular practice, undermines the tension between structures, between low and 
high art, due to the flow of its content and ongoing practices. I look at video installations 
by Dan Graham as they allow for an interaction between the mediation of the image and 
the immediacy of the physical experience of the viewer, and I look at important 
precedents for the role of bodily performance in relation to video art. Video also supports 
an inversion in the hierarchy of culture and values, where anyone can become an artist 
without former training. Finally, I discuss how video can be understood as a medium 
where visuals become identical in the digital code and can only translate “intermedially,” 
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yet as quoted forms of their media. This includes examining the different theoretical ideas 
developed by McLuhan, Higgins, Derrida, and a few others. From all these ideas on 
medium and content we will begin to provide an analytical framework that can be applied 
to a new media context. 
Chapter III presents a conceptual framework for my dissertation as it relates to the 
temporal qualities of video. This chapter shows a four-movement investigation between 
1) chronological time according to Einstein, 2) lived time, 3) Bakhtin’s space-time, 4) 
and time according to Heidegger. 
In Chapter IV, I demonstrate why a philosophy of video is necessary, and 
following Beuys’s concept of social sculpture, where he suggests that “every human 
being is an artist,” I intend to demonstrate why this problematic issue makes video an 
ideal medium in which to consider deep concerns about the question of creative freedom 
and expression.  
Finally, continuing this engagement with existing theory in Chapter V, I return to 
the dialogical and democratized potentialities of video. In contrast with that, I point to 
Tacita Dean’s recent commission for the Tate Modern as such installation suggests an 
opposed reading to the claim that in video anyone can be an artist. In this last chapter I 
propose that in video, the viewer is granted powers to move from the I see position to that 
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of I create. That is also to say that the viewer potentially becomes an artist. My critique 
ends with a look at the Egyptian pavilion at the 54th Venice Biennale. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE IN-BETWEENNESS OF VIDEO 
 
I.I. LOCATING THE PROBLEMATIC:  
WHAT IS VIDEO? 
 
More than three decades since his death, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
continues to exert great influence on contemporary theories. In his influential essay, first 
given as a lecture in 1955, “The Question Concerning Technology” (TQCT), Heidegger 
suggests that the foremost distinctiveness of technology, which he characterizes as “the 
realm of revealing,” is that everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately at hand: indeed, to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further 
ordering.1 Technology is a challenge that exploits and places over nature the 
unreasonable demand of a supply of energy that can be extracted and stored as such. And 
he concludes his essay by saying, “Because the essence of technology is nothing 
technological, decisive confrontation must happen in a realm that is akin to the essence of 
technology. Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection upon art, for its part, does 
not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth.”2 Heidegger dodges the instrumental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Martin Heidegger, Basic writings : from Being and time (1927) to The task of thinking (1964) 
(San Francisco: Harper, 1990), "The Question Concerning Technology" 318. 
2 Ibid., 340. 
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definition of technology and suggests a more humanized, refined theorization of  
“technology as a form of revealing.”  
In TQCT, Heidegger seems to shift his fundamental ontology and analysis of 
being (Dasein) toward a more cultural-historical project, conceiving of world-disclosing 
as Dasein receiving a succession of clearings: technology understood as Enframing 
(Gestell) and the related notion of nature as standing reserve are the determinants of 
modern scientific culture. At first glance, Heidegger’s work is notoriously difficult to 
penetrate, but it is essential to a phenomenological method. For him, the importance of 
practical engagement is essential, even a prerequisite, in any relation to and within the 
world. That is, Heidegger firmly stands opposed to the notion that Dasein primordially 
confronts a world of objects in and of themselves, as understood by early Greek 
philosophers. Rather, he imagines Dasein as continually absorbed in practical activity. 
This kind of being toward the world is one that lets us encounter entities within-the-world 
purely in the way they look. Dasein—being: each of us constituted by our own 
temporality—illuminates and interprets the meaning of being in the horizon of time. 
In the following essay I will argue for the possibility of video as another answer 
to Heidegger’s question as it relates to technology and truth. Video as a medium not only 
allows for technological potentialities but also artistic expressions, free from the traps of 
technological determinism. Video, as the embodiment of technology and art, frees us 
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from the technologically circular confines pointed out by Heidegger. In this sense, such 
technology allows anyone to become an artist. Now, just as the essence of “tree” is “not 
itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees,” so the essence of 
technology is not itself something technological.3 Borrowing from Heidegger’s assertion, 
I suggest that the essence of video is not video itself. This, in turn, might lead one to ask: 
Would the question about video also be a question about truth and freedom?  
Unarguably, we live in an era of technology and information overload. The racing 
tempo of our century greatly affects all aspects of our lives. The question of video, then, 
elicits more than just a tension between art and technology; such inquiry also points 
toward a participatory medium where the resolution between art and technology resides 
in the creation (revealing) of being itself. Technology, art, and normal life activities have 
become intrinsically fused, so that the artist’s output is, in the largest sense, a compilation 
of living experiences. What I am primarily interested here are the conditions of video’s 
relationality and the possibility for thinking technological and artistic production as they 
are articulated within the respective works of Heidegger, Bakhtin, Derrida, and video 
artists such as Dan Graham, Vito Acconci, Bill Viola, and others.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid., 311. 
4 Relationality is a concept that enables us to understand reality as plurality and unity at the same 
time, or rather, to posit that reality is a unity of plurality. It enables us to intervene controversially 
in the debate on art institutions and their audiences, restoring political density to a concept used to 
defend a soft, pseudo-articulation of the artistic and the social that creates a simulation of 
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In video, there is no single author, no artistic genius.5 There is no hierarchy; there 
are no predisposed outcomes. The conditional situation determines the final form. There 
is no attempt to recreate or represent an authorial insight; there is no interior. The 
conventional linear, part-by-part reading logic is eliminated.  
In art video installations, attention to the process and experience of visibility 
transcend the limits of representation toward a poetics of seeing and becoming. Video is 
relative when seen beyond the sensory eye of the body, with the eye of consciousness. I 
am also prompted to investigate, at an elemental level, how video’s mediated relationality 
is experienced in each of those lines of thought. Likewise, in the work of each artist, there 
is a focus upon drawing out (or withdrawing) the conditions in which the subject finds 
him/herself in relation to being in the world. According to Margaret Morse, “the process 
of installing suggests a temporary occupation of space, a bracketed existence enclosed by 
a matching process of breaking down the composition into its elements again and 
vacating the site.” Thus, installation implies a kind of art that is temporal, ephemeral, and 
never to be utterly severed from the subject, time, and place of its enunciation.6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
participation by trivialising and making a spectacle of the concept of antagonism as constitutive 
of the social (Joseph Kaipayil, Relationalism: A Theory of Being [Joseph Kaipayil, n.d.]). 
 
5 Or at least, no artistic genius per classical, romantic notion. 
6 Margaret Morse, “Video Installation Art: The Body, the Image, and the Space-in-between,” in 
Illuminating Video: An Essential Guide to Video Art, ed. Doug Hall and Sally Fifer (New York: 
Aperture in association with the Bay Area Video Coalition, 1990), 154. 
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I.II. VIDEO AND THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 
 
Of all the philosophers, theorists, and thinkers we will encounter in this essay, 
none has had a greater impact than Heidegger, as he posits Dasein, which is always 
already in the world. He undermines the centrality of the subject as the ontological point 
of departure, and suggests an understanding where all existing things come to be—to 
have meaning—through Dasein’s being-in-the-world. He suggests that self and world 
belong together in the single entity—Dasein—and says, “self and world are not two 
entities like subject and object … but self and world are basic determination of Dasein 
itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world.”7 In Heidegger’s view, this 
fundamental union of the self and the world, as expressed by Dasein’s being-in-the-
world, successfully destabilizes and overthrows the Cartesian division between object 
and subject. Thus, it is important to realize at the outset that for Heidegger, being is not a 
substance or a process. Being, in early Heidegger, is that on the basis of which beings are 
already understood. Generally speaking, in some sense technology is responsible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Martin Heidegger and Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 297. 
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forming and controlling the human position in today’s worldview. Technology has 
mastered and dominated beings in various ways.8  
For Heidegger, technology is in essence nothing other than an understanding of 
what it means to be. What is fundamental for him is that technology has to do with the 
way we broadly understand Being. He is not interested in the object or materiality, but 
technology as a mode in which we think of Being, as a possible way we understand what 
it takes for something to be. In that sense, technology is then a philosophical and 
ontological event; and so technology is what makes Dasein be Dasein. Technology 
allows Dasein a place where Being is understood. More specifically, technology is our 
mode of revealing in response to the looking upon of being, utilized in the discourse of 
truth. As he suggests, that realm for the essence of technology “is the realm of revealing, 
of truth.”9 Here we see how Heidegger refers to technology as the theoretical event or 
way that makes known the essence of things; thus technology is also a mode of seeing the 
form/idea in advance. Thus, technology is primarily a way of looking or understanding: a 
disclosure of truth, not a way of doing, in the sense of manufacturing or instrumentality.  
There is a sense in which, for Heidegger, technology is the supreme danger to 
man. The essence of technology, in Heideggerian terms, is the utmost danger, since it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Heidegger's essay "The Age of the World Picture" in Martin Heidegger, "The Question 
Concerning Technology" and Other Essays, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 157. 
9 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 318. 
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hinders us from having an appropriate understanding of our own being. Thus the essence 
of technology, in the sense of the understanding of Being that makes it possible, is such 
as to exclude other ways of understanding Being, for instance, those involved in creating 
and engaging with works of art. It is not just understanding Being, but understanding 
being in “its own manifoldly interlocking paths” that makes us human.10 
This formational aspect of technology is also a fundamental idea for another 
German thinker and media theorist, Friedrich Kittler. Insofar as the load of modernity in 
Heidegger’s thinking exceeds the faintly nuanced possibility of the incessant aspect of 
media, Heidegger’s deep understanding of the historicity of modern technology functions 
as an overture to Kittler’s statement that some medium “heretofore had not ceased not to 
write itself” in the modern culture.11 In the context of Heidegger’s acknowledgment of 
the continuity of media, Kittler’s statement can also be read as presupposing the 
condition that media has endlessly inclined to write itself, yet only in the modern culture 
was that made reality. In Kittler’s anti-humanist maxim, “media determines our 
situation,” such a condition is expressed through the spatiality of the objects within it and 
also through our temporal, mediated experiences, which can be determined only in 
relation to such objects, their context, and their representations—although Kittler 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., 322. 
11 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 26. 
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originally uses three object-examples in his text: gramophone, film and typewriter. 
Although not directly mentioned in Kittler’s book, video, an emerging medium, is 
perfectly part of his critique as well.12 Such objects delineate a horizon determined by the 
medium that reveals it; thus media and technology do not only determine our situation, 
but are our situation, our being-in-the-world. Such an assertion leads us to believe that 
for Kittler, Heidegger’s technological concern has already happened. 
Echoing Kittler’s concern, if in literature everything is programming, how exactly 
does it proceed? Obviously, it involves the production, circulation, and consumption of 
texts. Interpreting those texts, that is, isolating and forcing them to reveal something 
beyond the materialities and orders of communication that produced them in the first 
place, will be of little help. Instead, “discourse analysis begins by simply registering them 
as material communicative events in historically contingent, interdiscursive networks that 
link writers, archivists, addresses, and interpreters.”13 
We know that Kittler is highly influenced by the ideas of Nietzsche, Foucault’s 
analysis of discourse, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology, as apparently Kittler subscribes to the Hedeggerian position and suggests that 
man has already been trapped by modern technology, moved toward a digital 
convergence due to the advent of computers and digital technology. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., xxxix. 
13 Ibid., xxii. 
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Heidegger's horizon is much wider and deeper, the penetration of his questioning and 
thinking broader than Kittler’s. What Kittler comes back to, though, is that such techno-
medial-horizon is essential for this condition. He says, “The media of the present 
influence how we think about the media of the past or, for that matter, those of the 
future.”14 But Heidegger’s position on modern technology disseminates a distinctive 
modernity of technology and a historical ontology that are sharply contrasted with the 
ancient practices.  
Such temporal tension becomes visible, for instance, in the paradoxical 
chronological mode of future anteriority that, for Kittler, characterizes our present 
moment as a gap in which we await the inevitable digital convergence of information. 
Similarly, it informs Kittler’s distinctions between programmable and nonprogrammable 
computing in conditional jumps: “IF a preprogrammed condition is missing, data 
processing continues according to the conventions of numbered commands, … THEN the 
program itself determines successive commands, that is, its future.”15 Surprisingly, this 
tension locates Kittler’s position opening on the side of the hermeneutic divide, since it 
necessarily features the anticipated future (technical differentiation) through the negation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., xii. 
15 Ibid., 258. 
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of the present and the extensive correlation of media with bodies; “computers themselves 
become subjects.”16 
But I must also emphasize that we belong to a horizon of our own context, a 
condition already pointed out by Heidegger, who also places an emphasis on the 
movement of life, its motion and kinetic energy. This intricacy is particularly practical in 
the discourse on the newness of the new media in modern and postmodern cultures. For 
instance, I would be very interested to find the parallel discussion between Heidegger and 
contemporary media theorists such as Lev Manovich, Nicholas Negroponte, and Mark 
Hansen in recounting the newness of new media in a specific period. Although they 
might differ in emphasis, they all grasp the point where human culture and technology 
converge for the first time in history. Thus, trapped by the overwhelming self-awareness 
of modernity, Heidegger exaggerates the uniqueness of the modern sciences. 
For many, technology can be mistakenly seen only as the expansion of our 
capabilities by other means, or our control over the environment. In TQCT, Heidegger is 
concerned with the questioning of the essence of modern technology—not just any 
technology, for it is modern technology that poses the problem that he understands as 
something different than ancient, preindustrialized forms of technology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 258 
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Essence (Wesen), in Heideggerian terminology, is not a purist category, but 
implies an examination of how a term like technology withstands change, how it 
maintains its course through history, and how it is attained in present-day technology. For 
Heidegger, the essence of technology is not itself technological but rather is a “mode of 
revealing.” In his contrast with modernized agricultural practice, the former relationship 
of the peasants to the land was one of care and respect, one where they did not challenge 
the soil. They were stewards of the land: cultivating it, harmonized in relation to its 
patterns, letting the produce naturally grow. On the other hand, modern technology 
harnesses the land as a simple resource, focused on exploiting its maximum productivity 
at minimal expense. Modern technology, in contrast to the ancient way, challenges the 
land, forcing it to yield more. Nature is thus revealed as a pure resource, or what 
Heidegger calls standing-reserve. Such objects are exploited for all the energy or utility 
they can yield and are left to stand there until they are to be challenged for more use 
again. Thus, Heidegger’s intention in questioning technology is to help us escape the 
chains of technology and to be free, not by neglecting technology but through a better 
understanding of its essence and meaning. He wants to bring to light our relationship to 
its essence.  
The technological problem that troubles Heidegger is that seeing everything in the 
world as merely preprogrammable resource dominates the consciousness of modern 
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humanity. Among the diverse modes of revealing demonstrated in his thought, the one 
corresponding to modern technology is differentiated in excluding the other modes of 
revealing; it is understood as enframing—Gestell. The essence of modern technology, he 
writes, “shows itself in what we call enframing. But simply to point to this is still in no 
way to answer the question concerning technology.”17  
However, I want to make it clear that Heidegger is not opposed to scientific 
knowledge, nor he is suggesting it not to be true, as it, too, is indeed a mode of revealing. 
But Heidegger resists the preconception that this is the only mode of truth; it should not 
have the sole determination of truth. Some objects of the world really do have the 
potential of being resources, causalities, objects of scientific knowledge exhibited merely 
in relation of cause-effect coherence. In a similar way, they can be appreciated 
aesthetically, poetically, or religiously, since all of these modes of revealing are also 
truth.  
At the end of his inquiry, Heidegger concludes that technology was once closely 
related to the term téchnē with a broader practice of poiēsis.18 The term “technology” is 
made up of two parts: téchnē (derived from the Greek for craft or art) and logia (“study 
of something”). Thus, “technology” may be interpreted as “the study of crafting”: 
technology brought forth and revealed that which was true and beautiful through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 328. 
18 The Greeks call the act of bringing something to appearance “poiêsis.” 
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poetics of the fine arts. It is in the realm of the arts, therefore, that we can carry out the 
questioning of technology in the anticipation of revealing the truth, a capability that 
modern technology habitually conceals through the order it imposes on the world.  
Heidegger does focus on Plato and Aristotle’s analysis of téchnē and learns from 
them. But what made the difference for him? What led to the breakthrough that provided 
Heidegger with the clue for deeper understanding of the question concerning technology, 
moving him away from the traditional lines of thought? A key to understanding 
Heidegger’s thinking in relation to technology is a grasp of how the ancient Greeks 
understood it. Téchnē is primarily theoretical, not practical. Téchnē is essentially a matter 
of seeing or knowing, not doing or making, and what téchnē sees is Being, the essence of 
beings.  
In fact, this behavior (Dasein’s behavior in-the-world that creates an opening) was 
initially analyzed by the Greeks’ understanding of the word téchnē. Here we see the 
Greek intuition about the nature of being consequently conformed in its essential 
structure with Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. In TQCT, Heidegger makes a point by 
referring téchnē back to another Greek word: episteme (knowledge). For him, téchnē is 
(and is linked to) episteme. “Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense.”19 So 
téchnē is also a matter of knowledge: understanding and being expert in it. What, then, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 318. 
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for Aristotle, is the difference between téchnē and episteme, between téchnē and 
knowledge, pure and simple? As Heidegger says, they differ with respect to what they 
reveal and how they reveal.20 Episteme discloses what is unchangeable, téchnē what is 
changeable. Téchnē, in contrast to episteme, is knowledge of changeable things; its 
objects come and go and change in various ways. Thus, téchnē cannot be considered 
knowledge in the most proper sense. For Heidegger, “téchnē is a mode of aletheuein 
[truth].”21 In particular, its objects are not the changeable things of nature, not 
manufactured or manipulated, nor defined by its use of materials that come and go, but 
rather by the things that come and go due to the role téchnē plays through the craftsman 
who possesses it. This person discloses what does not yet exist concretely, and that 
disclosure is subject to change, since the thing may turn out differently than it was 
envisioned. This is how Heidegger expresses the object of téchnē as a mode of aletheia, 
where truth happens. 
Heidegger’s point, however, is not that technology’s close relationship to art in 
ancient Greece has simply been lost. Rather, he argues that the relationship between art 
and technology, so visible in the Greek téchnē, has always been basic to technology, to its 
“essence,” even when the conception of technology has been explicitly posed (as it is in 
the modern, instrumental conception of technology) in contrast to art, to the aesthetic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 319. 
21 Ibid. 
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sphere. Video, with its emphasis on issues of representation, style, and design, seems to 
signal a reemergence of this repressed aesthetic aspect within the conception of 
technology. Thus, for Heidegger, the mode of representation involved in the Greek 
téchnē is a form of revealing that is noninstrumental, and thus more closely related to 
artistic production (poiesis) than to the production of modern technology, which regulates 
and secures the world in instrumental terms. While the world is at a standstill, set in 
place, in a kind of Enframing, so the emphasis in téchnē is on setting it free, on revealing, 
allowing the world to be brought forth in noninstrumental terms. 
Thus, for the purpose of my argument, video is absolutely central to Heidegger’s 
question and to our account of relationality and representation—freedom, world, art, real-
time, real-space imagery technology—and offers a crucial link between revealing and 
becoming. Video reveals without being constructed or manipulated. This is because video 
is a hybrid, heterogeneous media technology. As Sean Cubitt observed in his study of 
video, there is “no essential form of video, nothing to which one can point as the primal 
source or goal of video activity.”22 Instead he suggests a more holistic practice where 
“video works across a plurality of relationships.”23 Video therefore occupies an 
ambiguous, intermediate position in our topology of technology as revealing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Sean Cubitt, Videography: Video Media as Art and Culture (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1993), xv. 
23 Ibid., xv. 
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With the availability of portable camcorders, first released in the late 1960s, there 
was a significant chain reaction, as a small but significant group of early users, artists, 
and documentary activists held up the video camera as model for participatory control in 
media making. Video was faster, more reproducible and thus more distributable than 
film. Indeed, much of the rhetoric voiced by early champions of the Internet had 
previously been expressed by video artists. Video promised individual empowerment and 
potentially global audiences, much like the Internet. Politically motivated video artists 
and activists appropriated and critiqued the generic flow of imagery offered by the mass 
media. If we look at technology as also suggesting a transcendence of the materiality 
which is used to comprise it, video imagery elements and apparatus can be seen to 
produce an effect that goes beyond the mere technological parts.  
In 1875, during one of his experiments while trying to improve the potential 
features of the telegraph, Alexander Graham Bell inadvertently connected two moving 
drums and solenoids with wire. The outcome was beyond his expectations. For the first 
time, a human voice was transported, almost magically it seemed, to a remote location. 
But the discovery’s importance went beyond the technological potential of voice 
transmission. The way in which people would be able to stay in touch and communicate 
was greatly at play. Similarly, Gutenberg just did not create the press with moveable 
type, making possible the printed book. Consciously or not, he initiated a revolution 
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against the domination of content and information. Books were now available to 
anyone—a democratizing of sorts.  
With both Gutenberg and Bell, and later with the Internet, a new era in 
information access was born. When modern technology presents and reveals itself in such 
a transcendental way, the outcome transcends the conglomeration of its individualized 
parts.  
Neither technology nor “technicity,” seen as objects, is what interests Heidegger. 
Such experience of transcendence also takes place in art, which is suitably considered as 
another form of technology. When materials such as wood, glue, finishes, and strings are 
assembled, the result is astounding: an acoustic guitar, a piano, or what have you. When 
such instruments are played in just the right way, there is enchantment of another genus: 
harmony. This harmonic agglomeration goes further than mere sound. As a form of 
transcendence, it evokes an unmediated relational cognitive response, evoking emotion in 
the listener. Likewise, all of the arts share similar goals of communicating from artist to 
audience. The communication process is not solely of ornate, embellished data, but also 
includes the other important elements within the phenomenological spectrum such as 
ideas, feelings, and experiences. This, then, approaches the Greek meaning of 
tekhnelogia, referring to art as a key manifestation of technology.  
Having established the conceptual links between art and technology, and as we 
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seek a poiēsis of video, we are advised by Heidegger to consider “what comes to 
presence in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological. So long as we 
represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it.”24 
Poiēsis is a non-challenging form of revealing in which objects “look upon man” rather 
than being produced by him in an ordered and structured form of visibility. It remains 
outside a system or does not belong to a “whole,” a totality that subordinates and orders 
its parts—and so it happens in video. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 337. 
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I.III. VIDEO IS NOT 
 
Although the common understanding that video is located in between television 
and cinema, and before I attempt to elaborate on what video is, I would like to suggest 
some thoughts about what video is not. For that, we must turn our attention to the 
misleading, inaccurate, traditional, technological definition, and how video relates to its 
next of kin, cinema. 
 
I.III.i Origin of the Moving Image 
 
Ever since precinematic experimentations with hand and puppet shadows, and 
later on, throughout British photographer Eadweard Muybridge’s motion studies and the 
Lumiére brothers cinématographie, moving pictures have captivated audiences. Such 
experimentations involved two major technical challenges typifying cinema as we know 
it today. First, they photographically represented spatial reality in a two-dimensional 
surface—that is to say, they did this very accurately by means of a mechanical process on 
a flat surface projection. Second, they also reproduced time—or at least the illusion of 
movement, motion, and events—as accurately as they depicted the shape of things. In 
short, the essence of cinema was established: a film camera recorded images on an 
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acetate roll, and a film projector displayed it on a screen. Amongst other difficulties and 
dissolutions, the cinematic process expanded with ever more private and public 
showings, and it reached its pinnacle theatrical performances.25 From those moments on, 
the duo of camera-projector has indisputably influenced our viewing of the world, and 
artistic expression in film was destined to not only continually be part of our sense 
experiences but also to engage us intellectually.26 
Fast-forwarding through history, in video, both the producer’s and the spectator’s 
perceptions are brought into engagement through the technologically mediated 
experience. Mediated experiences increasingly dominate our lives, as movies and 
television already confuse the real and the mediated. New media technologies are 
blurring those lines even more, and virtual reality is becoming increasingly realistic. As 
the borders between what is real and what is mediated become faint, the sense of 
presence and awareness of consciousness increases. Today, video experience is 
inherently located within new media trends. Of course, we do not have to blindly accept 
such trends. In The Language of New Media, Lev Manovich suggests that in new media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cinema did not just face technological challenges. The Lumiére brothers referred to cinema as 
"an art with no future" and the activity became a target for various kinds of cultural and social 
criticisms. 
26 Sergei Eisenstein, Film form  Essays in Film Theory, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt  Brace, 
1949).     Eisensteinian theory suggests that cinema should be understood rationally, that is, a 
cinema which is bound by the spectators' intellectual understanding and interpretations, beyond 
emotional identification. 
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all objects (graphics, moving image, sounds) are reduced to numerical representations or 
those that can be defined using a computerized mathematical function.27 This reductionist 
process turns data into a numerical representation called digitization. Conversely, Jay 
David Bolter and Richard Grusin call the process of representing one form of media in 
another form of media remediation. Bolter and Grusin suggest that remediation is a 
defining characteristic of the new media.28 However, in contrast to these authors, one of 
the chief purposes of this study is to locate video in the split between technology, media, 
and human activity, and to suggest that video experience functions in digitized 
environments grounded by the concept of immediacy. 
 
I.III.ii Film and Language 
 
Poststructuralists attempted to condense film to a text to be read rather than an 
object to be apprehended. They failed to account for the fullness of exposure and 
connection with the materiality of film or to engage productively with the visual 
encounter that is in film production. In her book The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience, Vivian Sobchack proposes that “film presents and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 22. 
28 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
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represents acts of seeing and hearing as both the original structures of existential being 
and the mediating structures of language.”29 For her, the primordial language is not just 
systematic and regulative but systematic and constitutive, emerging from the process of 
being-in-the-world and the expression exercised by the lived body as its materiality and 
finiteness share the surface of the world it dwells in: that is, both the material disposition 
and the finite situation that primarily signify through the lived choices of existential 
movement and gesture. From the first, embodied existence inflects and reflects the world 
as always already significant. Thus, long before we consciously and voluntarily 
differentiate and abstract the world’s significance for us into ordinary language, long 
before we constrain wild meaning in discrete symbolic systems, we are immersed in 
language as an existential system. In the very movement of existence, in the very activity 
of perception and its bodily expression, we inaugurate language and communication.  
This thesis will have to await future development, but when looking at cinema 
through a linguistic prism, it is difficult to avoid changing back and forth between two 
positions: cinema as language, and cinema as infinitely different from verbal language. 
Perhaps, as Christian Metz has suggested, “It is impossible to extricate oneself from this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton  
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 11. 
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dilemma with impunity.”30 Film is not language, it is quasi-language; or, one could also 
argue, it borrows from language. And so, under the sign of the moving image, an entire 
conception of the relationship between language and cinema becomes apparent. What is 
interesting about cinema, as many have insisted, is that it is an art that, more than any 
other, is firmly established in the social and cultural substance and layers of an era. 
Without question, cinema changed the idea of art through confronting the new challenges 
of showing or rendering movement and time, participating in a distinctive manner in a 
larger aesthetics of duration, connected not simply with new technologies or new forces, 
but also with new ways of thinking, new questions and paradoxes, and new political uses. 
Through history, we know that cinema has already demonstrated how the world 
reveals itself in a flow of images and how this world of events is in a state of continuous 
change and transformation. In the past, the borderline separating cinema and video was 
easily identifiable, in part due to technological and apparatus differences, and formally 
throughout the practice of completely unique aesthetics, visual techniques, and viewing 
experiences. Even today, with apparent overlaps due to emerging technology, cinema has 
still managed to remain distinct from video. Cinema offers us a world beyond our reality: 
constructed, elsewhere, independent; whereas video offers us a means of structuring 
cultural and personal conditions on a daily basis, intertwined with our world. Cinema is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), 44. 
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distanced from us in time and space—what we see on screen has already happened at a 
time and place when we were not there. Television generates its reality effect from 
always seeming to be live, because it always opens onto the possibility of continuous live 
transmission.31 Video, as medium, is linked to the recreation of immediate time-space to 
an extent that cinema and earlier visual practices such as photography and painting are 
not. 
A shallow, and—why not say it?—a very superficial definition of video that is 
solely based on technological determinism suggests that video is the recording of images 
on magnetic tape. Such a definition has its roots in the early development of the medium, 
derived from broadcasting television. In 1952, Charles Ginsburg and other engineers 
from Ampex started the early developments of a videotape recorder (VTR). Four years 
later Ampex made a public presentation introducing Mark IV, the first successful video 
recorder.32 With this invention, Ginsburg revolutionized television broadcasting by 
developing a system that used a rapidly rotating recording head to apply high-frequency 
signals onto a reel of magnetic tape. The recorder made possible instant replay, reducing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Raymond Williams calls the continuous transmission of broadcasting "flow" and its 
development in commercial broadcasting "programmed flow." As Williams acknowledges, this is 
not particular to television, because it is also applicable to radio. See Raymond Williams, 
Television: Technology and Cultural Form, New ed. (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2003), 88–96. 
32 Albert Abramson, The History of Television: 1942 to 2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 
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production time by many hours and allowing for both rapid editing and increased 
flexibility in presenting news and other programs. In 1957 Ginsburg won an Emmy for 
his outstanding contribution. He was also inducted into the National Inventors Hall of 
Fame in 1990 for leading the research team at Ampex Corporation in developing this 
video tape recorder. In 1956, CBS was the first network to use VTR technology. NASA 
has used Ampex recorders and magnetic tape for all space missions since 1958, and in 
1960 Ampex received an Oscar for technical achievement.  
But the limitations of such a purely technical definition chain us to the wall of the 
allegorical Platonic cave, offering a somewhat distorted, unfulfilling, superficial, and 
inaccurate description of the medium. A depiction projected as cast shadow, solely based 
on the medium’s technological features, places the viewer’s experience outside of 
consideration and rejects any possibility for viewing participation. Poststructuralists 
reserve particular enthusiasm for the idea that it is viewing that produces meaning under 
the rubric of context. Where cinema had followed the path of textually based notions of 
subjectivity, the advances in television studies, especially the early work of Marshall 
McLuhan, began to ask questions of the social reader: not the one who would become a 
consumer, who selected but did have not control, with the on-off switch as the only 
option; but the active and engaged viewer who actually sat in front of the TV set.33 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Margot Lovejoy, Postmodern Currents: Art and Artists in the Age of Electronic Media 
(Englewood Cliffs  NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 109. 
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Understanding Media, McLuhan suggested that if we took into consideration that old 
prints and woodcuts, like the modern comic strip and comic book, provided very little 
information about an object’s aspect in space or at any particular moment in time, the 
viewer (or reader) was compelled to participate in completing and interpreting the few 
hints provided by the bounding lines. The woodcut and the cartoon are similar to the TV 
image, with its very low degree of data about objects, “and the resulting high degree of 
participation by the viewer in order to complete what is only hinted at in the mosaic mesh 
of dots.”34 Within this context we welcome the expansive assertion by McLuhan that the 
content of a medium is its users. A media theory for radical, democratic communication 
must provoke a questioning of the metaphysical “distinction that has set up our separation 
between content and effect, or dialectic and rhetoric.”35 If passive consumers were to 
become active citizens and producers, they would have to take charge of this untapped 
technological potential, install themselves as producers, and thereby bring 
communications media, which just in the recent decades has served the name, into their 
own control. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media:  The Extensions of Man, 1st ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), 179. 
35 This holds for McLuhan, and in the same sense holds for Angus. See Ian Angus, 
(Dis)figurations: Discourse, Critique, Ethics (London, New York: Verso, 2000), 135. 
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Undoubtedly the question of the capacity of audiences to actively make sense of 
television has become a foundation of media education theory and practice. There is, 
however, another more utopian version of the technological-deterministic ideology, 
whose most impressive exposition is to be found in Gene Youngblood’s Expanded 
Cinema (1970). Published with a preface by Buckminster Fuller and greatly inspired by 
McLuhan’s notion of the global village, Youngblood’s enthusiasm is clearly infectious as 
at the very end of his book, he concludes:  
 
We are making a new world by making a new language … there is only 
one real world: that of the individual. There are as many different worlds 
as there are men. Only through technology is the individual free enough 
to know himself and thus to know his own reality. The process of art is 
the process of learning how to think. When man is free from the needs 
of marginal survival, he will remember what he was thinking before he 
had to prove his right to live. Ramakrishna said that given a choice 
between going to heaven or hearing a lecture on heaven, people would 
choose the lecture. That is no longer true. Through the art and 
technology of expanded cinema we shall create heaven right here on 
earth.36 
 
It would not be fair to impose on Youngblood, who is too much within the 
ideologies of his time. However, it is interesting to point out here that television is 
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fundamentally an uninteresting, outmoded, old habit. At this point, it is important to 
realize that we are susceptible to a technological encroachment; video, although 
technologically-based media, offers remarkable potential artistic freedom that is available 
to any individual. 
Despite the heterogeneous intentions of artists such as Dan Graham, Vito 
Acconci, Bill Viola, and a few others who turned to the potential of video technologies—
especially the portable camcorders introduced into North America in the late 1960s—
these artists’ use of the media necessarily took place in relation to the parent technology: 
broadcast television. Many of these early producers and artists saw themselves 
conducting an act of profound social criticism, one specifically directed at the domination 
of groups and individuals—and perhaps all of mainstream Western industrial and 
technological culture—by the world of television. In Decoys and Disruptions, Martha 
Rosler suggests that such an act of criticism was performed through a technological 
medium, one whose potential for interactive and bilateral communication ironically 
appeared boundless. Video artists, then, were positively engaging not only with the 
attitude of the mass audience but also with the particular silencing of artists as producers 
of living culture in the face of the vast mass-media industries, “the culture industry versus 
the consciousness industry.”37 For her, as a reflection of such contention, the early uses of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Martha Rosler, Decoys and Disruptions: Selected Writings, 1975–2001 (Cambridge  MA: MIT 
Press in association with International Center of Photography  New York, 2004), 54. 
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portable video technology represented a direct critique of the institutions of art in 
Western culture, regarded as another structure of domination. Thus, video posed a 
challenge to the institutions of art, to the forms and channels of delivery, and to the 
passivity of reception built into them. Not only a systemic, but also an ideological 
critique was implicit in video’s early use, for the effort was not to enter the system but to 
transform every aspect of it and to redefine the system out of existence by intertwining 
art with social life and making audience and producer interchangeable: a tessellation of 
sorts.  
Like language, video practices are subject to their own historical and cultural 
revival, accrued from external inorganic forces such as the physicality of the art form, 
ideas, concepts, and narrative significance. In his seminal work (published 
posthumously), Course in General Linguistics, Saussure introduces his unique insight 
into the phenomenon of language. He sees that language is a “self-contained system 
whose interdependent parts function and acquire value through their relationship to the 
whole.” Saussure’s intention was to change the postulation that the function of language 
was to represent ideas and the view of language as a passive collection of names assigned 
to preexisting concepts. In his definitions, “language is not a function of the speaker; it is 
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a product that is passively assimilated by the individual.”38 Thus, if “language is a social 
fact,” so is video.39 
The approach to philology of French philosopher Jacques Derrida suggests that 
writing is “free play” and operates on absences.40 It can be cut free from its sender and its 
addressee. But for Derrida “writing also inaugurates life.”41 In the writer’s absence, a 
third party can decipher writing, identify its marks, and use it. The meaning of a text can 
shift from the writer’s intentions and be reinterpreted, taken apart, and examined for 
implied meanings.  
Ever since Derrida, in the mid-1970s, introduced evocative linguistics concepts in 
his book Of Grammatology, the term “deconstruction” has functioned in contemporary 
philosophy, literary criticism, and the social sciences to describe practices in architecture, 
design, art, and fashion.42 Nonetheless, deconstructionist practices have also suggested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Repr.). (New York,  Toronto, and  
London: McGraw-Hill, 1966). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Derrida's work centered on challenging unquestioned assumptions of the Western philosophical 
tradition and also, more broadly, Western culture as a whole. By questioning the fundamental 
norms and premises of the dominant discourses and trying to modify them, he attempted to 
democratize and politicize the university scene. Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and 
Practice (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), 22. 
41 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1st ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 
142. 
42 Ibid., 10. 
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content often arbitrarily instilled or have been accused of willy-nilly connotations. 
Although schooled in the continental tradition of philosophy (at the École Normale 
Supérieure in Paris), Derrida’s influential writings and thoughts not only caused a tidal 
wave in the fields of linguistics and contemporary philosophy, but also fostered many 
contributions related to thought, language, and identity. His theories suggested a 
“decentralization” of textual forms within the various possibilities for meanings, and he 
was particularly interested in the association of signs and the correlation between what a 
we want to say and the signs used to express our thoughts.  
Iterability is the capacity of signs, texts, utterances, and other forms of 
communication to be repeated in new situations and placed into new contexts, continually 
producing new meanings that are interpreted partly differently from and partly similar to 
previous understandings. A key term for our discussion, video iterability, is of great 
significance, because it shows that communication is fluid and indeterminate. And if we 
adapt from Derrida’s thoughts, as he suggests, that writing must therefore be repeatable, 
video in the same sense is then repeatable-with-difference. We can only repeat 
identifiable marks, and to identify marks, we have to be able to repeat them. We could 
not identify or read a writing we could not repeat; it would not be legible. It is this very 
possibility of iterability that allows us to differentiate between particular speech acts. In 
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other words, if we could not cite, quote, repeat, or reinterpret the phrases we use every 
day, then we would not be able to understand what is being said in each instance. 
Video iterability is then the condition of its own impossibility; it cannot be taken 
as a guaranteed, mastered passage of meanings. Iterability undermines preconditions as a 
final governor of meanings; it implies repetition elsewhere. Thus, this deconstructive 
term suggests that all texts undermine their own logic and have multiple meanings 
conflicting with each other. It entails instability and indeterminacy everywhere; it seems 
to support the notion that social structures are contingent and social meanings ever-
shifting.  
In 2007 the Guggenheim Museum organized the exhibition Richard Prince: 
Spiritual America, which showed how this postmodern artist incorporated icons of 
culture in his work. In some paintings and photographs, the “banal” was shifted into a 
higher form—an appropriation resulted as change of context; the raw force of a 
stereotypical well-known Marlboro cowboy (Figure 01), for example, was transformed to 
stimulate new aesthetic values. Like Prince, various fine artists created their own 
transformations of “low art” into “high art” during the 1980s.  
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Figure 1 
Richard Prince,  Untitled (cowboy) (1989), at the Guggenheim. 
(Photo: © Richard Prince/Courtesy of Guggenheim Museum) 
 
Many of these appropriations functioned from the bottom up, meaning that there 
was an inversion in the hierarchy of culture and values when artists viewed ordinary 
commercial ads, pulp fiction, or other ready-mades as sources to be isolated for 
admiration. Thus, in order to reiterate their critical view of contemporary expression, 
artists could find a place to speak from within a newly leveled culture and not position 
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themselves outside or above it, as in the modernist strategy of autonomy or critical 
distance from mass culture. If the opposition between commercial manufactured products 
and fine art works parallels oppositions found in language, then these conditions of 
spacing—différance among linguistic signs as a parallel to différance among cultural 
categories—can be mapped onto a series of value judgments loaded with social 
connotations and oppositions: lower-class/upper-class, downstairs/upstairs, 
elevate/denigrate, and hell/heaven, to name just a few. The conflict between these 
oppositions is not a matter of content but of structure.  
Low art and high art is a structural opposition, a pattern or conceptual casing, 
whose value shifts from situation to situation. What is high in one setting can be low in 
another, what was once considered mechanized production process became artifact, as 
exemplified by the elevation of Prince’s appropriation of kitsch to the status of high art.  
In the span of a few years, style can cycle from current chic to dated convention 
to camp nostalgia to neoconservative revival. Video art and its more general practice also 
undermines such structures due to the flow of its content and its ongoing practices. 
Through history we know that cinema has already demonstrated how the world reveals 
itself in a flow of images and how this world of images is in a state of continuous change 
and transformation. Therefore, video technology causes a broad deterritorialization of 
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these flows.43 Here, deterritorialization comes to be the effect producing change, a 
transformative force indicating a creative potential of assemblages, it frees up the fixed 
relations while exposing them to new associations.  
In his critique of visual culture and reading of Derrida’s Of Grammatology, W. J. 
T. Mitchell suggests that “a general condition of iterability—the repeatable acoustic 
image in one case, the visual image in the other—undermines the privilege of both visual 
art and literary language, placing them inside a larger field that, at first, seemed merely 
supplementary to them.”44 I also believe that the scenario here is not predicated on simply 
borrowing the concept and trying to adapt it into a new definition, but rather to 
understand iterability as it marks the points of what can be actually replaced or repeated: 
dialecticized. What is important for Mitchell is that “writing, not so accidentally, stands 
at the nexus of language and vision, epitomized in the figure of the rebus or hieroglyphic, 
the painted word or the visible language of a gesture-speech that precedes vocal 
expression.”45 Again, iterability seems to offer an inversion of hierarchy between the 
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visual field and language.  
Besides the transformations of the painterly image, modern art developed other 
forms of art beyond painting as an answer to the crisis of representation that photography 
caused for painting. These new forms of art, from object art to media art, from body art to 
installation art, still carry forth phenomenological impulses, but at the same time 
impulses to transcend the “visual” object. But a question about video inevitably runs 
parallel to the question of medium, since video’s mediated perceptions still reside 
between the installations and the viewer’s performative acts: What, then, is this medium? 
What is video? 
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CHAPTER TWO: VIDEO IS 
 
Video is a present-time medium. Its image can be simultaneous with its perception by/of its 
audience (it can be an image of its audience perceiving). 
Dan Graham 
 
A complex question now hovers in our minds. The technological medium in 
question, most considerably, is a node of juncture where philosophical, cultural, and 
aesthetic discourses mingle with mechanical techniques and media forces. Each of them 
is understandable not simply as the material object in question, or as part of a history of 
technology, but for the way in which it is embedded in much larger assemblage of events 
and powers. Yet many video artists and media theorists have already suggested a few 
formulations as they attempted to define video; it is not enough to just describe the 
dialectical relation between the mechanical innovations and artistic practices. For my 
research and argument, video has a tripartite meaning.  
First, from art/tapes/22 we learn that it is important to stress video as distribution 
of ideas and not an object. I am leniently receptive to this idea in particular due to its 
potential for free expression. The Florence-based studio was key to the conception and 
spread of video as an art practice in the early 70s. Owned by Maria Gloria Bicocchi, the 
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studio-based collaborative space became a reference for major video production artists , 
fostering and facilitating discussions about the medium, its implications, and its 
acceptance as art form. The very fact that video was unlimited, freed from institutional 
values, was a victory over speculation in art. It blurred the distinctions between the 
various branches of art and culture. By its heterogeneous nature, the medium of video 
coalesces art with several other disciplines and functions as a catalyst for the current 
transformation of ideas and energies into more general forms of expression. Video is at 
the forefront of artistic concerns, and its profound structural immediacy undoubtedly 
launches it into a vital position, here and now as well as in the future (in terms of 
reorganization of art activity and also communication about it). As Bicocchi suggests, “to 
bring our efforts to full fruition, dissemination must extend beyond the existing circuit of 
galleries and museums to create an open-ended system of cross-cultural exchange.”46 
Second, as previously stated, video is the answer to Heidegger’s question 
concerning technology. The essence of video is not video itself. Video as a medium not 
only allows for technological potentialities but also artistic expressions away from the 
traps of technological determinism. Video as the embodiment of technology and art saves 
us from the technological circular confines pointed by Heidegger—in this sense, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Alice Hutchison and California State University, Long Beach, Archivio storico delle arti 
contemporanee (Venice, Italy), Art Tapes 22: Video Tape Production (Long Beach CA: 
University Art Museum, 2009), 9. 
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technology allows anyone to be free and become an artist. The beauty of a video poetics 
lies not only in our freedom from technological entrapment but also in its paradox. In that 
sense, there is an eminent ambiguity in video as a double-faceted medium that has the 
potential for both danger or salvation: an either/or, per Heideggerian terms. In the 
backbone of Heidegger’s interpretation there is a systematic phenomenological 
methodology that yields surprising results. A starting point for Heidegger’s assumption is 
that the world is initially revealed through téchnē and does not preexist it in the form of a 
collection of mere present, at-hand things taken up by human technical activity in a 
contingent manner as standing-reserve, for example, on this or that occasion to fulfill this 
or that passing need. Every aspect of being he uncovers in the study of téchnē is thus 
originally posited by téchnē. 
Heidegger’s question concerning technology is, in other words, simply a question 
concerning the truth of technology, and for him, truth is unconcealment. In thinking of 
truth as the unconcealedness of beings, Heidegger’s goal is to pressure that which is 
concealed. Such an ambiguous condition of truth as unconcealment reveals what is, while 
at the same time concealing itself, which brings us to the familiar Heideggerian issue as it 
relates to video: That which is—the particular being—rises in Being. The truth of 
technology is the address of truth, the inherently ambiguous domain of the happening of 
truth. The danger of modern technology, enframing [Gestell], is the covering of truth and 
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human freedom conceived as resolute attention and openness to the realm of destining. 
This is precisely the danger that stresses the truth of technology and the truth of 
revealing: “the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so 
captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come 
to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.”47  
Heidegger is not promoting a return to the pretechnological world. He simply 
wants us to be aware that there is a way we can still maintain our technological 
contrivances and yet remain true to ourselves. In order to recognize how this might be 
possible, we just need to understand a key distinction between technology and the 
technological understanding of being. To make this dissociation, Heidegger holds, one 
must rethink the history of being in the West. Then one will see that although a 
technological understanding of being is our destiny, our fate—that is, “although our 
understanding of things and ourselves as resources to the ordered, enhanced, and used 
efficiently has been building up since Plato and dominates our practices, we are not stuck 
with it” 48—it is not necessarily the way things need to be. 
 Heidegger writes, “Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding sway of 
truth.”49 This, then, is the extreme danger of enframing. Yet Heidegger also says that this 
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very blocking, the excluding of ambiguity that belongs to the essence of technological 
precision, is, because it is the danger inherent in a destining of revealing, also the saving 
possibility. 
Lastly, as I advance in my argument throughout the phenomenological method, I 
strip away one more layer in search for the unit of the word and arrive at its Latin root, 
videre: “I see.”50 But let us not just focus on the singularity of its subject-verb unit, 
limiting such definition to its scopic function only, but also to a much more complex act. 
The implosion, hence deconstruction, of the word suggests new questioning: who or what 
do I see? Or who or what is seen? Or, how I see? Notice the present tense of its unit: “I 
see,” not, “I saw.” Do I see in the sense of revealing, a form of seeing that goes beyond 
the ocular sense? Being there before but concealed? The ambiguity of the medium is 
characterized by its heterogeneous nature, placed in between, where a gap exists in place. 
Most dictionaries make little semantic distinction between the words “see” and 
“perceive,” and common usage usually renders them effectively synonymous. For my 
research I have chosen the term seeing mainly for its etymological resonance.  
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This “seeing” becomes an unresolved hermeneutical category. In The Age of the 
Image of the World, Heidegger articulates that the visual’s modern convergence of 
science and technology around a notion of truth as the certainty of representation is 
perhaps ending definitively. Seeing in the technological world is continuously coexistent 
with doing. In a Bakhtinian perspective, it is the process of seeing that becomes 
important.  
In The Architectonics of Answerability, Bakhtin’s thoughts demonstrate that “each 
of us occupies a unique time and place in life, an existence that is conceived not as a 
passive state but as an activity, an event,”51 our being is intrinsically shifting in relation to 
the other, to the space it occupies in a natural world. He examines the law of placement 
and the implications for the physical sense of sight in order to use visual categories as a 
means for discussing the elusive concept of the self. Being conscious generally means 
being conscious of something. Bakhtin argues that to be conscious means “to see 
something.”52 The Bakhtinian theory of an endless contextuality, freeing literary works 
from their formal limitations, opens the possibility of a new practice opposed to a closed, 
self-reflective discourse of art. He states that, “any utterance is a link in a complex chain 
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of communication.”53 The closed object and the closed text thus start to become an open 
practice, a continued, active, simultaneous understanding. Bakhtin emphasizes 
interpretation as the origin of the text, which is equal to the creation of a text. Therefore, 
the viewer is equal to the author: actively participating, as later will be the case with the 
observer creating the artwork by interaction and bodily presence. Bakhtin’s demand to a 
subjective observation is partly found in a shift embodying what Foucault calls “the 
threshold of our modernity.”54 When the camera obscura was the dominant model of 
observation, it was a form of representation that made possible knowledge in general. 
The corporeal subjectivity of the observer, which was a priori excluded from the concept 
of the camera obscura, “suddenly becomes the site on which an observer is possible.”55 
The human body, in all its contingency and specificity, generates “the spectrum of 
another color and thus becomes the active producer of optical experience.” Architectonics 
is largely important in Bakhtin’s work and in video theory because it emphasizes action, 
movement, energy, and performance. Such a concept assumes life as event-presuming 
selves who are active performers. 
This is evident in Bakhtin’s early work, where one realizes he is concerned with 	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the act rather than the word. Therefore, he rejects a theorization of traditional ethics and 
its construction of universal concepts, propositions, and laws in favor of a description or 
phenomenology of the world that situates each performed act or deed within its unique, 
concrete context. For Bakhtin, each “self” who performs an act or deed holds a unique 
place within the architectonic whole of Being.56 Important to a Bakhtinian theory applied 
to video practices is the concept that, since I occupy such a unique place, and because my 
uniqueness is both given and yet to be achieved, I must activate my uniqueness. In doing 
so, I collectively participate with a unity, or rather a uniqueness, of an actual, once-
occurrent, and never-repeatable whole.57 Bakhtin calls such an imperative “my non-alibi 
in Being,” which requires that I act out my unique place within a complex unity, “once-
occurent ought of the answerably performed act.” This remains implicit in Bakhtin’s later 
works on communication and helps to explain the persistent theme of unity in the middle 
of differences in contemporary appropriations of Bakhtin.58  
Applying Bakhtin’s theories to video art would actually ensure the continuity of 
“unfinished” art, an ever-changing, ever-becoming activity where consciousness is never 
completely coexisting with the world; its activity fundamentally transforms what is 
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already there. This principle is clearly present in Dan Graham’s videos, which are great 
examples of Bakhtin’s basic preoccupation with invisibility of authorship and with 
categorically organizing the world in time and space in order to shape a perception of 
self. 
Video’s technological capacity of simultaneously capturing and displaying images 
offers an immediacy constructed ready at hand: a presentness of here and now in 
opposition to cinema’s there and then. Such phenomenological flow of images is evident 
in Graham’s time-delay installations. Graham invites us to inevitably include our 
corporeal perceptions and thoughts of that immediate presentness, however brief, in 
which a real phenomenon happens to be quasi-motionless, in front of our eyes. In his 
close attention to the process and experience of visibility, he moves beyond questions of 
representation toward a poetics of seeing and becoming. Graham’s video installations are 
emotional and evocative. They bring the viewer into correlation with the object being 
viewed and at the same time suggest the apparition of unseen presence. He challenges the 
viewer to interrogate the very process of vision that brings video’s objects toward us—
and the process through which vision is made. So video might offer a point of access to a 
world where consciousness functions to produce awareness of presence in space and time 
simultaneously. Here we see experience, subjectivity, and presence combined in an 
inexorable, profound, and palpable investigation of the world. This view of video 
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technology not only shows us the movement, the never-ending repeated variation of 
images, but also the time-matter from which the images are made (hence the latent 
electromagnetic waves). Video technology as a mechanical assemblage establishes a 
relationship between a significant flow of events and a significant flow of images that 
differs from the filmic process. Video puts forward a tempo-perceptual condition—when 
a person passes in front of the camera and sees him/herself in the video monitor, he/she 
perceives the immediate present image at hand.  
In this sense, Graham’s video installations always repeat the projected body back 
to the mind of the viewer who sees; this parallels what Bergson calls the dureé; or what 
Lacan calls the tuché—the occasion, the encounter, the real.59 Lacan elaborates his 
concept by reference to Aristotle, who used it in his search for cause and chance. “What 
is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs—the expression tells us quite a lot 
about its relation to the tuché—as if by chance.”60 For Lacan, the element of chance is 
important because it shows the conscious reaction to refusing the unconscious, an 
immediate mode of apprehension of the real. In the experience of the observed and that of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Here I borrow from Barthes as he relates the terms to photography in his book: Camera Lucida 
– Reflections on Photography. I also adapt ideas from Lacan, based on his seminar and 
particularly from The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Chapter 5, “Tuché and 
Automaton.” (New York: Norton & Company, 1998.) See Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: 
Reflections on Photography, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981). 
60 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1st ed. (New York: 
Norton, 1978), 54. 
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the subject observing, one instantaneously makes another posture for himself, 
transforming himself in advance into an image; this transformation is an active one. 
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II.I WHAT IS VIDEO AND HOW IS IT DISTINCT FROM CINEMA? 
 
Although film theory is not at the core of my research, a close investigation of 
video practices inevitably requires us to look at the past and leads us to first observe the 
development of moving pictures, their topology, language systems, and particularities. 
Specifically, we will look at the enclosure of the cinematic frame and its ambiguity, that 
is, the dimensionless boundary that separates the image from the spectator, the separation 
between inside and outside the filmic image, the physical edge of the projection screen 
which disconnects both sorts of image from the everyday and from everything else in that 
singular space. The cinematic frame is rectangular, inherited from Renaissance easel 
paintings and photography. As a cinesemiotic sign the frame functions as a pluralistic, 
juxtapositional surface where montage or narrative occur, requiring meaning and 
interpretation.61 The cinematic frame is also, at times, used as unit of time: displayed at 
twenty-four frames per second, it fuses both time and space; its duality makes it possible 
for the frame to become the edge of separation between inner and outer realities, the 
perimeter of the projected scene which could be seen as the windows in post-and-lintel 
architecture, or as the proscenium of the theater. The frame also connotes both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The term cinesemiotics is widely used in reference to semiotics of cinema. It also refers to the 
works and studies of French film critic Christian Metz, particularly in his book Film Language: A 
Semiotics of the Cinema. 
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complete single image on the filmstrip or on a projection screen, the image-itself. Here I 
argue that film, looking at itself as the total machine that is cinema, rephotographs and 
reprojects its own image, simply reiterating to unmodified infinity its radiant rectangle, 
asserting with perfect redundancy its edge, or perimeter, which has become an icon of the 
boundary between the known and the unknown, the seen and the unseen, what is present 
and possible to consciousness and what is absolutely elsewhere and unimaginable.  
In cinema, the reproduction and then projection of images at twenty-four frames 
per second functions as an imitation of the real world. In his seminal work, Film Form, 
Sergei Eisenstein suggests that the “dominating indications of two shots side by side 
produces one or another conflicting interrelation, resulting in one or another expressive 
effect (I am speaking here of a purely montage effect).”62 Throughout such assertion, 
Eisenstein suggests the reworking of the shot based on his conception of montage. For, in 
fact, each sequential scene is perceived not next to another, but projected on top of the 
other, resulting in a juxtaposition replacing the previous one. For the idea (or perception) 
of movement occurs from such process of superimposing on the temporarily retained 
impression of the object’s first position due to our natural retinal persistence, a newly 
visible placement of the object. In light of this, if we contrast this manipulation of 
montage as the viewing window, with Gilles Deleuze’s incorporation of the time-image 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Eisenstein, Film Form: Essays in Film Theory, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1949), 64. 
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into the cinematic frame, we can fully appreciate the vast gap separating the 
postcinematic (video) aesthetic from any attempt to restore the cinematic artistic legacy. 
What is crucial here is the notion of the interval, which executes a cut between sequences 
and “at any point whatever of the plane an interval appears—a gap between the action 
and the reaction.”63 For Deleuze, such a function of the cut and of framing to which it is 
immediately related is perfectly in relation to cinema. Time-image can be understood as a 
realization of cinema’s capacity to instance the ongoing flux of images. Today it would 
seem that the situation of cinema is not exactly what it was for Deleuze in 1984, any 
more than for Benjamin in 1934. Cinema is no longer alone; it no longer has the main 
role that fell to it between silent film and television. It forms a part of a larger complex of 
images and spaces, where it discovers new roles to play, geared to altered geographies, 
heterogeneous spaces, and practices, and responding to new forces on a global scale. 
But where does the frame actually take place in cinema today? The interrogation 
of framing is continually a matter of boundaries and bisections. Thus, to raise the 
question about frame is already to impose one: a theoretical framework of aesthetics over 
and around the screen. In The Truth in Painting, Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s 
work—precisely of the third critique—suggests that aesthetics, which usually is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), 61. 
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elaborated around questions concerning what is inside a work of art and what remains 
outside, is constantly a discourse regarding the frame. He writes: 
 
A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, the work 
done [fait], the fact [le fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it 
touches and cooperates within the operation from a certain outside. 
Neither simply outside nor simply inside.64 
  
In light of this, Derrida’s project is to rework the framing effects of its structure 
and displace it under the name of the parergon. For him (as he borrows the term from 
Kant) the parergon is any supplement to the work of art. A system of differentiation 
(hence his concept of différance) of the frame makes the parergon supplementary to the 
work or art. For Derrida, such a critical approach to art must be pushed against the work 
itself and its representation. Confined in the logocentric project of returning the original 
meaning to the art object, the critical act becomes an act of violence, a circularity, an 
entrapment. Borrowing from Derrida’s conception of the parergon, in predetermining the 
filmic frame exclusively as an object of theory, of experience, critical discourse becomes 
trapped in its own conflicting position: it seeks to emphatically control from the outside, 
along with its inner meaning, what can be properly called reality, and resolves to define 
specific boundaries and limitations through binary oppositions. However, it can achieve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1987), 54. 
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such a task only by turning itself inside the work, eliminating its exteriority, and violating 
the very limitations it claims to normalize. It is this structure, this frame, that Derrida 
argues has regulated all of the bleak oppositions critical theory has historically imposed 
upon art. 
Consequently, Derrida’s ideas have also undermined other borderlines when he 
took his way of employing philosophy into politics and culture and actively engaged in 
many other social issues. His writings are, in a sense, a radical critique of philosophy; 
they question the deepest sense of traditional notions of truth, knowledge, and 
metaphysics of presence. Conceivably more than any prior philosopher, and from his 
earliest beginnings, Derrida has called attention to philosophical discourse—its modes of 
composition, its rhetoric, its metaphors, its language—not in order to assimilate 
philosophy to literature but rather to recognize the complex links between the two, “and 
to investigate the ways in which the institutional authority of academic philosophy, and 
the autonomy it claims, rests upon a disavowal with relation to its own language.”65 
Although deconstruction seems to be an ambiguous term, it can be understood as 
a “kind of internal conceptual critique in which the critic implicitly and provisionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In Trifonas’s introduction, “The Humanities in Deconstruction,” he says that Derrida’s 
deconstruction is a practice of reading and writing, a mode of analysis and criticism. He further 
states that Derrida’s doctoral thesis, “The Ideality of the Literary Object,” questioned 
philosophical styles. See Peter Trifonas, Deconstructing Derrida: Tasks for the New Humanities, 
1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 5. 
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adheres to the position criticized.”66 But deconstruction also functions as a form of 
“questioning structures, technologies, formal devices, social institutions, and metaphors 
of representations.”67 In that sense, it is clear that deconstruction concerns both history 
and theory; it is rooted in postmodern visual culture, and it can be used as an approach to 
critical thinking, which is performed across a range of disciplines. Nonetheless, 
deconstruction is also an attack on structuralism and phenomenology.  
In light of this, structuralism justified that culture, society, and individual thought 
were composed of linguistic “structures.” Relative autonomy from these structures was 
considered mere banality, as structuralism seemed to dissolve the subject into the larger 
forces of culture, whereas phenomenology was understood as the philosophy of 
consciousness, metaphysics of presence, and “the study of essences.”68 In his reading of 
Derrida’s Genesis and Structure, Christopher Norris argues that “structuralism has its 
own special dangers, … the concept of structure can easily be immobilized by assuming 
it to possess some kind of ‘objective’ or self-validating status.”69 Norris then suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 209. Derrida’s earliest deconstructions argue against the possibility of an 
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67 Ellen Lupton, Design Writing Research: Writing on Graphic Design (London: Phaidon, 1999). 
68 See more on phenomenology in Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 665. 
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“structuralism and phenomenology are locked in a reciprocal aporia from which neither 
can emerge with its principles intact, but on which both depend for their moments of 
maximum insight.”70 And yet, despite the magnetic pull of the extremes of the many 
dualisms in the mainstream of deconstruction, certain ideas have dominated—and 
continue to dominate—the belief system of what is key to Norris’s argument: that 
phenomenology “helped to lay the ground for structuralism by focusing attention more 
keenly on the ways in which consciousness perceives and makes sense of the world.”71  
In other words, phenomenology subscribed to a philosophy of language—through 
particular concepts, thoughts, and ideas—that formed the main notions of implied 
structures, and because meaning was perceived as an interaction between the text and the 
reader’s search for understanding, to an interaction between the sign and its signified. 
This approach to a classical Husserlian phenomenology centers around a practice 
characteristic of treating as true whatever can be agreed upon in the course of free 
discussion, a reference to content toward an object.  
Phenomenology, as a critique of metaphysics, tries to avoid the subtlety of 
dualistic views such as empiricism and idealism by rejecting any preconceptions about 
the relationship between mind and world. It aims to rethink the essential distinction 
between subject and object, and to go beyond epistemology to describe once again how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid., 51. 
71 Ibid., 52. 
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consciousness relates to the world of phenomena. Derrida first criticized Husserl’s 
concepts of phenomenology in his paper “Genesis and Structure,” published in 1959. 
Derrida’s theory points out that Husserl’s contradictions arise from the attempt to 
determine the objectivity of the object. Husserlian phenomenology has been used by 
Derrida to show that presence cannot preserve itself against absence, and he “argues for a 
reversal of priorities.”72 Truth and subjectivity do not exist in a realm prior to language, 
they depend on language for their existence. For Derrida, phenomenology fails, “for there 
can be no return to things-themselves, because the thing-itself is always concealed.”73 
Self-presence and ideality have been infinitely deferred. Différance becomes the key 
concept for Derrida, it is precisely what prevents and replaces self-identity: 
 
Différance is not only irreducible to any ontological or 
theological/ontotheological—reappropriation, but as the very opening 
of the space in which ontotheology—philosophy—produces its system 
and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it 
without return.74 
 
A remarkable aspect of Derrida’s work is that deconstruction not only functions 
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as a form of critique in communication and language, but also possibly enlightens 
theories of cultural and ideological thinking: how individuals formulate and exercise 
ideologies in sociopolitical discourse—how one comes about his or her own identity. 
Although Derrida’s work is not predominantly about the epistemology or the “sociology 
of knowledge,”75 his work has tremendous impact on these disciplines and those of 
philosophical-political spectrum. Derrida’s deconstruction has raised general questions 
about authority, hierarchies, law, rights, and identities—philosophical questions charged 
with social-political implications. Although Derrida never aimed to resolve the 
differences between structuralism and phenomenology, his theories opposed the 
assumption that these structures of meaning were stable, universal, or ahistorical; rather, 
he points out their instability—and that is where a Derridean concept of undecidability 
resides.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 As developed by Karl Mannheim, sociology of knowledge attempts to find the social causes of 
belief as contrasted with the reasons people have for them. Mannheim seemed to believe that this 
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roots are in German philosophy and social theory (especially Marxism) and earlier in the thought 
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II.I.i Video Undecidability 
 
Insofar as I have previously discussed a small sample of Derrida’s contribution to 
a video theory, deconstructed readings not only conduct one to the discovery and 
possibility of meanings of a text, but also set up the stress in the sign and reveals that the 
meaning of the text is undecidable. Thus, we can conclude that the true meaning of a text 
is specifically the result of undecidability, and by considering any meanings of texts (or 
signs) as “undecidable constructs, Derrida’s concept helps redefine ‘video’ itself.” 
Undecidability fills a void between possibility and impossibility, between presence and 
absence, life and death, cinema and television. Undecidables trouble the comforting sense 
that we live in a world conducted by decidable and stable categories. If we always think 
in terms of binary oppositions, our decisions then, would not be—as Derrida suggests in 
his book Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice—“a free decision, it would only be 
the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process.”76 Undecidables 
interrupt any oppositional logic structure. They slide across both sides of oppositions but 
do not necessarily fit, either. For Derrida, “the undecidable has never been the opposite of 
decision: it is the condition of decision wherever decision cannot be deduced from an 
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existing body of knowledge as it would be by a calculating machine.”77 They are more 
than the opposition can allow, and because of that, they question the very basic principle 
of “opposition.”  
After a stage of reflections and considerations has passed, then the decision has 
again become or turned itself into a rule, and is no longer presently “just.” We can 
conclude by this assertion that there is—it seems—not a single moment during which a 
decision could be called currently and completely just. In this sense, Derrida also argues 
that “all that depends, at every instant, on new assessment of what is urgent in, first and 
foremost, singular situations, and of their structural implications. For such assessment, 
there is … no preexisting criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew 
every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge.”78 
 What is important for Derrida is that under such injunctions imposed by 
“calculability,” the condition of “action, decision, and political responsibility” should not 
be reduced from an existing body of information, and the decision should not be made as 
by a “calculating machine” but as a question of avoiding cultural signs and texts with 
clear, decidable meanings.79 Therefore, what we might consider “just” in our culture—to 	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class struggle. Pages 239–240. 
79 Sprinker and Derrida, Ghostly Demarcations, 240. 
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a certain degree—is achieved by the way we read and perceive signs, since meanings are 
not in the texts themselves but in the way that our modes of comprehension and reading 
produce meaning out of texts. Reading then in reality becomes a personal construct in the 
social and cultural struggle.  
In fact, I would argue that the challenges we face are the possibilities of critiquing 
the ubiquity of power, undecidability of concepts of truth, and presence of différance that 
destabilize meaning, hierarchies, and therefore ideology in every aspect of our culture, 
identity, and knowledge. Fredric Jameson, one of the most respected Marxist thinkers 
today, suggests that ideology leaves marks on criticism as it proposes unbroken 
continuity between the social relations and narrative forms of society and cultural objects. 
He then concludes, “for Marxism, on the contrary, it is the radical break between the two 
social formations which must be stressed if we are to begin to grasp the degree to which 
capitalism has effectively dissolved all the older forms of collective relations, leaving 
their cultural expressions and their myths as incomprehensible to us as so many dead 
languages or undecipherable codices.”80 
But social formations, according to Derrida’s theories, aren’t just a matter of 
collective relations; they become the underpinning notion of a whole philosophical 
tradition: a notion that will, from this time forth, provide spoken language or its 	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correspondents (presence, origins, meaning) with the value of a positive and self-
authenticating truth. Writing will appear in the opposite role: as a supplement, an 
accessory or substitute sign, twice removed from source and therefore a prey to all 
manner of dangerous misunderstanding. “Writing is not merely a second-best recourse 
but an accident that somehow befalls language and threatens its very wellbeing. For 
writing, though defined as the ‘supplement of a supplement,’ has a way of intruding upon 
that privileged relation between truth and speech.”81 
 
II.I.ii Supplement 
 
Derrida formulates a deconstructed hierarchy of meaning, perception, presence, 
and speech over writing through the logic of supplementation. The concept of supplement 
was originated by Rousseau, who describes writing as a “supplement to speech.”82 The 
concept suggests that writing is supplementary to speech in that it represents speech; truth 
and subjectivity are not latent prior to language, and they rely on language for their 
existence. The “natural” condition of language is spoken; writing is simply added later, 
and it ultimately reveals that even the spoken language is not natural but structured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Christopher Norris, Derrida (Cambridge,  MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 66. 
82 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 144. 
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retroactively through writing. Writing deflects the presence of thought to speech into 
representation.  
 
This recourse is not only “bizarre,” but dangerous. It is the addition of a 
technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when 
it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the 
language ….83 
We can conclude if we considered that speech operated on presence and that 
writing was merely the representation of speech, then speech, too, is only a mediation of 
something else. Thus, like writing, speech considered as signifier becomes a supplement 
as well. And like a signifier, it supplements what it signifies. This new result, the signifier 
which was supplemented, must in turn affect what it signifies, which represents 
something further, and so on until the end result is a series of supplements. Derrida 
argues that “if the texts that interest us mean something, it is the engagement and the 
appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in the same tissue, the same text. The 
same is here called supplement.”84 Speech only seems to acquire presence or a direct 
connection to the mind of the speaker, because as human beings, we have being given a 
chance to speak and think simultaneously. In reality, however, like writing, speech is a 
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mediation of thought, a postponement through representation. It is for that reason that 
writing can supplement, or take the place of speech.  
The supplement has a strange structure, but it is nonetheless an undecidable, an 
unsettled concept. Supplement makes impossible any difference between the inside and 
outside of an identity, as it becomes a replacement for something else that is unable to be 
present. The distinctiveness of a social identity makes the issue of citizenship cultural, 
rather than purely political, but the exclusion of certain groups from the legal status of 
social classes is undeniably political.  
The supplement anticipates certain aspects of the concepts of social relations, 
particularly the way certain concepts are subject to self-limitation. Thus, we see a new 
meaning of the term dangerous supplement. Writing is indeed a dangerous supplement, 
not because, as Rousseau feared, it might infect the purity of speech, but because the 
supplementary capacity of writing demonstrates that speech already possesses that which 
we dislike about writing. It is as if one met a lover's relatives and saw for the first time 
unpleasant qualities common to the whole family. 
At the same time, however, Derrida’s theories subtly rely on the notion of truth. If 
the basic claim is that a signifier only imperfectly represents the thing it signifies, then 
Derrida implies that there is a truth to be signified, and even a conceivable way to 
represent that truth. Paul de Man persuasively argues that language “posits and language 
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means, but language cannot posit meaning; it can only reiterate (or reflect) it in its 
reconfirmed falsehood.”85 By this, I believe De Man means that the “iterability” of 
language logically precedes its spontaneous performance. 
As previously stated, through history we know that cinema has already 
demonstrated how the world reveals itself in a flow of images and how this world of 
images is in a state of continuous change and transformation. In the past, the borderline 
separating film and video was easily identifiable, in part due to technological differences 
and the use of completely unique visual techniques. Even today film has still managed to 
remain distinct from video. Early experimental emphasis on the conceptual, formal, 
image transmission-reception aspects of video technology separated it completely from 
the moving image medium of cinema. Artists who identified the use of video as a 
communication tool for social action and documentary were attracted to it because of its 
flexibility, immediacy, and its low cost in comparison with the use of film. Cinema offers 
us a world beyond our reality, elsewhere, whereas video offers us a means of structuring 
cultural and personal conditions on a daily basis. Recall that cinema, by its very nature, 
functions at a separate time from our actual experience of it; the images we see on the 
screen are of events that took place at a time when we were not present. Video, as 
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medium, is linked to the recreation of immediacy to an extent that film and earlier 
technologies are not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
The Blair Witch Project (Santa Monica, CA. Artisan Home Entertainment, ©1999) 
 
For a visual reference to such assertions, I shall point to the faux-documentary 
The Blair Witch Project (Figure 2).86 Employing the codes and traditions of documentary 	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as a documentary pieced together from amateur footage, filmed in real time. The film was 
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genre, the film presents the story of three student filmmakers who go missing in the 
Maryland woods while making a documentary about the myth of the Blair Witch. This 
horror film constructs a world sufficiently plausible for the audience to be confused as to 
its ontological temporality. As has been the case with several other faux-documentary 
productions, The Blair Witch Project caused major confusion as to its epistemological 
status with some of the audience members assuming that the film was a real documentary 
due to its raw form of movie making (shaken handheld camera, filming what seemed 
unscripted dialogue, etc.). In general, faux-documentary frequently succeeds as hoax 
because viewers fail to read cues that reveal the films’ fictional status. But the film also 
does well as a hoax because it was manufactured as such by the filmmakers, to look like 
real recovered video footage.  
The same can be said for the more recent production of Cloverfield (Figure 3).87 
The film is also presented to look as if it were a video file recovered from a digital 
camcorder by the United States Department of Defense. For that matter, the film actually 
begins with a disclaimer stating that the following footage is of a case designated 
“Cloverfield” and was found in the area that was formerly known as Central Park. While 	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Monica, CA  :: Artisan Entertainment,, 1999). 
87 Bad Robot (Firm); Paramount Pictures Corporation. ;Paramount Home Entertainment (Firm) 
and Jeffrey Abrams, Cloverfield (Hollywood, CA: Paramount Home Entertainment,, 2008). 
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watching films like these, we are reminded by a gravitational necessity that there must be 
a reality outside fiction; as a matter of fact, with any film the viewer has to ignore the 
reality that he or she is viewing a two-dimensional moving image on a screen and 
temporarily accept it as reality in order to be entertained.  
 
 
Figure 3 
Cloverfield (Hollywood, CA. Paramount Home Entertainment, ©2008) 
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In Cloverfield and Blair Witch Project, such tropes are even closer to a suspension 
of disbelief emphasized by the stance that itself depends on handheld cameras, 
recognizable non-exotic settings and an absence or removal of standard continuity editing 
and background scoring. The careful editing of images captured through the eye of the 
camera serves to catalyze the abstraction of events of all kinds to be presented as moving 
photos on a flat plane. Recent advances in digital technology profoundly expand the 
capability of cinema to push the limits of the willingness of an audience to suspend 
disbelief. This psychological rejection of the technological apparatus is what supports our 
immediate experience of reality. But the question should not be centralized as whether or 
not the film is hoax, whether or not such events really took place. Instead, we only accept 
such possibilities (of their actually happening) due to a video technology. At some point, 
one believes it possible, and only video causes that. 
Early video artists neither used the camera as objective observer nor clearly 
separated the videomaker and the subject. In their work these were interlaced and the 
artist performed for the camera using it as a mirror.  
As we investigate the phenomena of video technology, we shall keep in mind that 
photography, one of video’s precursors, is already a technology that crystallizes time, 
because the image is bound to the shutter speed and, therefore, to the ability to “freeze” 
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time.  
On the other hand, film makes the still image kinetic, thus causing the “illusion” 
of movement. The shot is the movement-image, as it continuously ensures circulation.88 
This ongoing sequence of shots (or frames as understood by video technologists) is what 
inherits the movement and duration on time-based media or video sequence. This is the 
movement-image that André Bazin contrasts from his point of view with photography, 
that “cinema is objectivity in time ... the image of things is likewise the image of their 
duration.”89 But I would like to consider the transcendental condition of time and 
placement so we can say, with Currie, that “there is no illusion of movement in cinema; 
there is real movement, really perceived … film does, or can, represent space and time 
realistically,” and that “time, or the passage of time, is one of the things film 
represents.”90 Thus we must conclude that the conception of time in time-based media, 
implies a succession of binary events in an extrinsic relation of now and then, present and 
past, before and after. 
Indeed we can agree with Deleuze, and here I am quoting from Thomas 
Wartenberg’s conclusions: “What is distinctive about cinema is that it enables us to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 20. 
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Readings, ed. Thomas Wartenberg (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005), 60. 
90 Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, U.K.  
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 34, 79. 
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reflect on time and movement as a whole: this is because cinema allows us to imagine 
movement and time itself.”91 In other words, our perceptual experiences reflect a 
continual variation of successive perceptions and sensations. Yet video technology 
captures movement itself: not something moving in space, but the pure oscillations of 
light.  
Angéla Melitopoulos suggests, “for video, light is movement. The movement lies, 
above all, in the structure of the video image. It is often stronger in the structure of the 
image than in the object that is depicted and moving through the space.”92 Video is 
directly bound to light, because video transforms and codes light through a technology. 
Movement is produced with the electronic structure of the image, frames, its lines, grid, 
and granulation. Movement, frequencies, atoms, and energy exist in the objects. Video 
technology makes these energetic objects, and thereby also another reality, visible. 
As previously stated, video technology not only shows us the movement, the 
never-ending repeated variation of images, but also the “time-matter” from which the 
images are made. As we have already stated, video technology  mechanically links a flow 
of phenomenon with a flow of images, thereby promulgating a phenomenology of time 
and perception. We perceive an image of ourselves in a video monitor, as relayed by a 
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camera, and we experience the image in the present, even though it was created in the 
past. We thus experience a time-delayed interruption between past and present.  
In time-delay installations, Graham invites us to inevitably include our corporeal 
perceptions and thoughts of that instant, however brief, in which a real phenomenon 
happened to be quasi-motionless, in front of our eyes.  
Although the issue of time has widely been explored in video theories, space 
seems to be left out of the equation. In Chapter Three, I would like to investigate in detail 
the facets of temporality and space in video. However, for the purpose of this research, 
time is premised on the following tri-factors: (1) chronological time, space-time 
continuum per Einstein, the physical time. (2) Lived time, duration, heterogeneous time 
according to Bergson, and lastly, (3) I shall return to Heidegger’s thought on being and 
time. 
This reinvigorated discourse on apprehension suggests that representation of 
reality in general is divided in two directions that differ in kind, into two pure presences: 
that of perception that puts us into the object apprehended, and that of memory that 
places us into consciousness.93 In other words, it signifies that my own duration, for 
example, serves to reveal other durations beating other tempos that differ in kind from 
mine. In video technology, duration can be associated with the location, the horizon, and 
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the environment of differences in kind, another tessellation of sorts, of their continual 
totality and heterogeneous multiplicity. Bergson had no difficulty in reconciling the two 
fundamental characteristics of duration: continuity and heterogeneity. In this sense, 
through the differentiation, he defines the immediate data of consciousness as being 
temporal—as the duration (la durée). In the duration, there is no juxtaposition of events; 
therefore there is no mechanistic causality. It is in the duration that we can speak of the 
experience of freedom. As we study the origins of these ideas, duration is not merely 
lived experience; it is also experience enlarged or even gone beyond the condition of 
experience. 
What is the impression of reality produced by the video apparatus? At this 
point, as an attempt to address such a question, I would like to turn my attention to 
Roland Barthes’s formulation on the rhetoric of the image. Barthes particularly dedicates 
some attention to this issue, but only as it relates to photography. When we look at a 
photograph, says Barthes, we do not see a presence “being there”—for this definition is 
too loose and can be applied to any copy—but a presence that “has been there.” We 
therefore have a new category of space-time: place immediately present but time 
immediately past—so that in still photography there is an illogical conjunction of here 
and then. This explains the photograph’s quality of “real unreality.”94 The portion of 	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reality is to be found in an earlier temporal position. Or as Metz posits, “in still 
photography there is an illogical conjunction of here and then.”95 The image in video is—
to some extent—a carrier of such dichotomy between space and time, also similar to the 
photographic image. Such a conjunction explains both the photograph’s and video’s 
quality of the portion of reality that is to be found in an immediate temporal position.  
Changes in video technology, reliability, miniaturization, and advances in 
electronic imaging systems, synchronization, and computer control devices have also 
influenced the potential for video installation and image display. The equipment itself 
had also become increasingly compact, less costly, and more readily available. This 
significant emerging technological possibility has offered a wide variety of uses and 
experimentations, from broadcast television to remote sensing and imaging, from the 
proliferation of security and surveillance cameras in the urban environment to various 
artistic influences. Graham suggests a particular possibility or presence at hand rather 
than a necessary outcome of such technologies: 
 
Video is a present-time medium. Its image can be simultaneous with its 
perception by/of its audience (it can be an image of its audience 
perceiving). The space/time it presents is continuous, unbroken, and 
congruent to that of the real time which is the shared time of its perceivers 	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publication: Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press). 
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and their individual and collective real environments. This is unlike film, 
which is, necessarily, an edited re-presentation of the past of another 
reality/an other’s reality for separate contemplation by unconnected 
individuals. Film is discontinuous, its language constructed, in fact, from 
syntactical and temporal disjunctions (for example, montage). Film is a 
reflection of a reality external to the spectator's body; the spectator's body 
is out of frame. In a live video situation, the spectator may be included in 
frame at one moment or be out of frame at another moment. Film 
constructs a "reality" separate and incongruent to the viewing situation; 
video feeds back indigenous data in the immediate, present-time 
environment or connects parallel time/space continua. Film is 
contemplative and “distanced”; it detaches a viewer from present reality 
and makes him a spectator.96 
 
According to Scott McGuire, in Graham’s work, “he used this possibility to 
undertake series of experiments into space, architecture, perception, and memory.”97  An 
important consideration for Graham’s approach to video in architecture was that it 
functioned semiotically, speaking as window and mirror simultaneously, while 
subverting the effects and functions of both. Windows in architecture (similarly to the 
filmic frame) mediate separated spatial units and a conventionally defined self-reflective, 	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spatial and ego enclosure. Architecture defines certain cultural and psychological 
boundaries, but video may intercede to replace or rearrange some of these boundaries.98 
Architectural space in its recourse to geometrical space is always subordinated to 
the possibility of some event in excess of pure physical space and in excess of the merely 
human, too, but in which one finds his or her proper placement. Graham’s recent works 
are comparable to the earlier ones in the sense that they use the medially heightened 
physical presence of the (virtual) protagonist to transpose a gripping sense of action to the 
(real) spectator, and also use physical, psychological, and institutional framework 
conditions to imply real-life situations. With an emphasis on presence and place, the 
immediate presence of both performers and spectators was originally the prime 
characteristic of these art forms. In Graham’s video art, truth is doubled, put to work in 
the work, revealed; we can observe a shift from a phenomenological use of the medium, 
referring to real-time bodily experience. 
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 For him, the constructed rooms and architectural, interstitial spaces that staged 
contrasts between direct perception, mirror reflections. Live video and delayed video 
involve the audience in psychologically charged narrative structures and fictional 
sequences of phenomenal immediacies. The role of the spectator thus oscillates between 
that of a passive viewer and that of potential active viewer. This form of spectatorship is 
based on a particular idiosyncratic psychology of reception with a performative 
disposition that recalls early documentary videos. Philip Hoffman’s documentaries are in 
some sense exemplary. In All Fall Down, (Figure 4) Hoffman juxtaposes two techniques 
of spectatorial experiences. In one approach, the viewer’s attention is held by an array of 
stylistic features (notably, the imagery’s rhythms and structure). This viewing experience 
can be characterized in terms of the emotional responses experienced in the moment of 
spectatorship. All Fall Down was produced as an experimental documentary. Its starting 
point is a nineteenth-century farmhouse in Canada. In it, Hoffman addresses the question, 
“What has been here before?” The film interpolates a complex temporal structure 
overlapping across two hundred years the lives of two main subjects: one historical, 
Nahneebahweequa (a nineteenth-century aboriginal woman and land rights activist), and 
the other a contemporary character (an expat drifter and father of the filmmaker’s 
stepdaughter). Hoffman’s film depicts these characters through a sequence of images and 
a variety of archival scenes, diaries, landscape paintings, photographs, heritage films, 
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poems, phone messages, maps, historical reenactments, and sounds that express the 
complexity of time and the politics of land. While watching the film, one shifts from the 
indexical as the referent and dominant feature to arrive at a construction with elements of 
the expressive, the poetic, and the rhetorical.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
All Fall Down (© Philip Hoffman, running time: 95 min., format: black and white and Color/HDCAM, 
rating: 14A, 2009) 
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The film is structured through Hoffman’s extraordinary landscapes of southern 
Canada, which make the temporal fabric sparkle, leading the viewer toward a meditation 
on childhood, nature, and love. This suggestive emphatic shift underlines the nebulous 
boundary between documentary and fiction, making the spectator the primary referent, as 
opposed to a perceived historical world. 
The opposed approach consists of visual engagement as well, but it also seems 
composed to compel intellectual contemplation. This holds for Hoffman’s works in the 
same sense it holds for Dan Reeves’s experimental documentary videos. This is similar to 
some of the enterprising videomakers of the early 1980s, producers like Skip Sweeney, 
Edin Velez, and Bill Viola, to name a few, who blended the aesthetic strategies of video 
art to produce personal essays and autobiographies that pushed the limits of the 
documentary genre.  
Dan Reeves’s autobiographical essay on his wartime experiences in Vietnam 
further stretched the boundaries of documentary video. In his powerful videotape based 
on his experience, Reeves intertwines myth with the reality of organized violence as seen 
through the eyes of a soldier and the imagination of a child. His collage of audio and 
visual images borrowed from the collective data bank of television and popular music 
come to a climax in a (re)creation of an ambush at the Cua Viet River in Vietnam in 1969 
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that had haunted him ever since its occurrence. Weaving together childhood dreams of 
military glory with adult nightmares of horrific death, Smothering Dreams (Figure 5) was 
a cathartic reenactment, an antiwar statement, and a devastating analysis of mass media’s 
role during the 80s. Troubled by his memory of a gruesome ambush, Reeves’s motivation 
was to locate the sources of violence in American culture. His autobiographical 
documentary concerned the folklore and verisimilitudes of violence represented through 
the imagination of a child and the eyes of a soldier. By juxtaposing various compositions, 
cuts, and constructions, Reeves’s documentary takes the spectator through an intricate 
topography between the torments of war and the renewal of technologies in order to 
create individual and collective experiences. His work advocates the imperative to 
constantly reinvent formal languages and structures for visual exploration, deploying 
technology not as obsession but as an attempt to recover ruptured memories. In 
Smothering Dreams, Reeves’s goal is clearly to overlap art-making practice with art-
reception throughout a historical perception and methodology, thus a personification and 
inscription of history upon the mind of the spectator. The work was broadcast on PBS in 
1981. 
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Figure 5 
Smothering Dreams (© Dan Reeves, 1981) 
 
In 1997, celebrated Iranian film director Abbas Kiarostami released Ta'm-e gīlās 
(Taste of Cherry), a film that among other difficult concepts such as loss and suicide 
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explores the deepest human emotions in the most ordinary events in life.99 The film is 
particularly interesting for our discussion, because it also explores the boundaries 
between cinema and video, differences between narrative and documentary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Taste of Cherry by Abbas Kiarostami, 1997 “Mr. Badii” (Homayoun Ershadi). © Zeitgeist Films 
 
In the final sequence, Mr. Badii (Homayoun Ershadi) lies in his grave, and after a 
long fade from black, the shift from film to video happens, changing from the narrative to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Zeitgeist Films, CIBY 2000 (Firm); Classic Collection (Firm); Janus Films.; Home Vision 
(Firm); Criterion Collection (Firm) and Abbas Kiarostami, Taste of cherry Taʹm e guilass 
(Irvington, NY: Criterion Collection), 1999. 
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a “making of” documentary scene. There we see Kiarostami and his film crew with filmic 
apparatus. In the film, the cinematic frame is filled by a long fade and psychologically 
prompts viewers to start feeling their own presence, a Cagean silence, a mirror for 
themselves. The differences between film and video are made visibly present by the 
technical differences in the two formats, visible by color change, image resolution and 
sharpness. However, in addition to the visual aesthetic changes, the shift also adds a layer 
of engagement to the film. It separates and distances the audience, creating a space for 
the viewer in the film. It is not an accurate statement to say that the differences between 
cinema and video are blurred without first determining if there has been a prioritizing of 
technology over aesthetics. Yes, the making of the moving images can be associated to 
both practices, but the perception experience of them differs from one medium to 
another. Kiarostami transforms the cinematic frame into a function of the larger process 
of spectatorial synthesis. Accordingly, rather than operating onto an extended reality—
the world beyond or before man—the cinematic shift becomes a mere vehicle for creating 
an impression of virtual totality that can be realized only through such aesthetic 
achievement.  
A leading German media theorist, Kittler, has provocatively employed the 
discussion of the implications of technological convergence and digitization. For Kittler, 
the digital revolution characterizes the final stages in the longstanding war between 
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technology and art; with digitization, the perceptual-aesthetic dimension of media 
becomes unified. With his understanding of the digital image as a challenge to cinema, 
Deleuze asserts the priority of aesthetics over technology and thus indirectly contests 
what we also see in Kittler’s concept of digital convergence. I am not suggesting that he 
is contesting Kittler. One might conjecture that for Deleuze, the digital image is the 
culmination of a technical mutation that can be productive of a rebirth of the 
postcinematic moving image. As observed before, in the Kiarostami film, such transition 
from analog film to digital video imagery does manipulate the dynamic cut into the flux 
of the real, as it captures a block of documentary information.  
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II.II VIDEO PRACTICES 
 
The new media are not bridges between man and nature; they are nature. 
Marshall McLuhan 
 
II.II.i Understanding The Electronic Medium 
 
Medium is that which mediates something, a means for expression.  
As I have already indicated, the technological and aesthetic innovations of the 
moving image as an emerging technology derived from the visual presentation—
mediation—of movement, and later, the integration of such movement with sound. The 
moving image was frequently understood in accurate terms as a means of realistically 
representing an objective, apprehended world. The action of watching video is both a 
direct and a mediated experience. Heterogeneity, multiplicity (multiple potential 
meanings), possible lack of narrative, and perceived untaken paths intentionally evoke a 
responsive action from the spectator, as one perceives a world within the immediate 
apprehension. To this point, I argue that video theory presupposes that the video image is 
a viewed object, a mere vehicle through which meaning can be represented, presented, or 
produced: a visible object rendered in the TV monitor’s screen. However, video as it is 
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experienced, might be engaged as much more than just an object of apprehension, a 
possibility that has not yet been contemplated. 
But in order to see video phenomenologically—that is, as both method of inquiry 
and its connections and intentions—it is essential to move beyond the simplistic 
definition of medium. If we consider language, writing, and still images, for example, as 
media, we see that their mediality does not designate only one form of apprehension, but 
rather the function of language, writing, or pictures without actually being themselves. In 
this sense, the concept of medium becomes a neuter alternative for that which could be 
assigned just as well without it. A medium can be a bodily mediator to the external or the 
technological form of societal communication.  
Understood as a comparatively new electronic medium, video is also intermedial. 
Here, intermediality in essence is the contract theory of “interconnectedness,” the 
convergence of modern media technologies and social significance. 100 Conversely, such 
a medium appropriates the techniques and forms of other media and attempts to rival or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 I borrow the term “contract theory” from economics. As its terminology suggests, the meaning 
connotes a contract between parts. Essentially, contract theory involves the need for 
communication between an agent and a principal, so that there is a clear understanding of both 
the needs of the principal and the ability of the agent to meet those needs in a competent manner. 
Once this state is established, contract theory is then employed to ensure that the agent receives 
adequate rewards for his or her efforts. Applying it to the object of my research, we shall observe 
the interconnected aspects of technology and culture as pivotal to video’s intermediality. For 
more on contract theory, see the seminal text by Patrick Bolton. 
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refashion them in the name of the real. A medium in our cultural condition does not 
operate in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect and competition 
with other media. First, let me refer to Dick Higgins, who suggests that intermediality is 
“more or less universal throughout the fine arts, since continuity rather than 
categorization is the hallmark of our new mentality.”101 This holds for Higgins in the 
same sense that if the work is ever to become truly important to large numbers of people, 
it will be because the new medium allows for great significance, flow, and continuity, not 
simply because its formal nature or categorization reassures it of relevance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7  
Intermedia Chart, 1995. (© Estate of Dick Higgins)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Dick Higgins, Horizons: The Poetics and Theory of the Intermedia (Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1984). 
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Concentric and overlapping circles shown on Figure 7 appear to expand and 
contract in relationship to the “Intermedial” structure that circumscribes them. As means 
of representation and exchange, the various media depend on and refer to each other, both 
explicitly and implicitly; they interact as elements of particular communicative strategies, 
and they are constituents of a wider cultural environment. For video’s electronic medium, 
we can argue that its intermediality is located in the heterogeneous, hybrid interstitial 
space between (other) media, technology, and aesthetics (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Intermedial Video (Nil Santana, 2010) 
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 The concept of an interstitial space here connotes a heteromedial place in human 
relations which fits more or less harmoniously, as it suggests a place between beings, in-
betweenness, “in-being-tweenness,” in several different cultural, social, and political 
contexts. Architects refer to it as the leftover gaps between building walls, as neither 
inside any room nor outside the building.102 Medical doctors have used the term for years 
referring to a space within the human body that lies in between blood vessels and organs, 
or between individual cells.  
 In his interpretation of Renee Green’s writing, Homi Bhabha sees that “the 
stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity,” becomes the process 
of emblematic interactivity, the connective tissue that constructs the difference between 
hierarchies and binary oppositions.103 The temporal movement and passage that it allows 
prevents identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 An interstitial space is useful when the mechanical system of the building is highly 
sophisticated and changing the space on the primary floors is a distinct possibility. The heights of 
these spaces are generally six to eight feet and allow easy access for repair or alteration. If 
changes or maintenance need to be performed in the interstitial space, the primary space does not 
need to be shut down, which is important in buildings like hospitals where the equipment in the 
space must operate constantly. Unlike traditionally built buildings, where the mechanical space is 
located in the basement or on the top floor, the interstitial space needs few vertical penetrations 
and therefore leaves more open space on the primary floor. The entire floor plan of these 
buildings can be more open because there are fewer fixed vertical penetrations through the floor 
and walls. See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 
103 Ibid., 5. 
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interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural 
hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy. It is in the 
emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains of difference—
that the intersubjective and collective experiences of unhomeliness, community interest, 
or cultural value are negotiated. The representation of difference must not be hastily read 
as the reflection of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed plateau of tradition.  
 Interstice creates free spaces and time spans whose rhythm contrasts with those 
structuring everyday life, and it encourages interhuman relations; therefore, interstitial 
space is at the core of a relational aesthetic. For Nicolas Bourriaud—French curator and 
art critic—relational aesthetic theory consists of judging artwork on the basis of the 
interhuman relations it represents. Its theoretical and practical point of departure is the 
whole of human relations and its social context, rather than an independent, private space. 
In other words, relational art focuses not on the art object but on the kinds of social 
engagements and interactivities that occur around art and its interstitial spaces. Bourriaud 
posits that the “role of artworks is no longer to form imaginary and utopian realities, but 
to actually be ways of living and models of action within the existing real, whatever the 
scale chosen by the artist.”104 He believes that relational art is constituted when the artist 
dwells in the circumstances the present time offers him, so as to turn the setting of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Dijon: Les Presses du Réel, 2002), 13. 
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life—his links with the physical and conceptual space—into a lasting world. The artist 
“catches the world on the move: he is a tenant of culture.”105 
 Nowadays, modernity extends into the practices of cultural do-it-yourself and 
recycling, into the invention of the everyday and the development of time lived, none of 
which are less deserving of attention and examination than Messianic utopias and the 
formal novelties that recently typified modernity. Art becomes a space for intervention, 
the artist its agent. The possibility of a relational art (taking as its theoretical horizon the 
realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an 
independent and private symbolic space), points to a radical upheaval of the aesthetic, 
cultural, and political goals introduced by modern art. It is no longer possible to regard 
contemporary work as a space to be walked through. “The viewer’s movement in the 
exhibition space cannot be arbitrarily stopped because it is constitutive of the functioning 
of perception within the art system.”106 It is henceforth presented as a period of time to be 
lived through, like an opening to unlimited discussion. Once raised to the power of an 
absolute rule of civilization, this system of intensive encounters has ended up producing 
linked artistic practices: an art form with a substrate of intersubjectivity that takes being-
together as a central theme, the “encounter” between beholder and picture, and the 
collective elaboration of meanings beyond the architectural boundaries—a hypermedial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid., 14. 
106 Boris Groys, Art Power (Cambridge  MA: MIT Press, 2008), 88. 
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space.  
 For the sake of my argument, I suggest that video is also a state of the encounter 
and that video artists, along with nonartists, become ever-present as social and culturally 
engaged participants. In particular, if we look at Bhabha’s recent thoughts on hybrid 
interstitial space as a ground or stage where differences are somewhat equalized, there is 
nothing more absurd than the assertion that contemporary art does not involve any 
political project or that its aspects are not based on any theoretical (philosophical) 
foundation, which has just as much to do with working conditions and the conditions in 
which cultural objects are produced. In this general sense, video is intrinsically connected 
to social contexts and the changing forms of social life.  
 Historically, artists (and the arts) have always been actively engaged within 
linguistics, representation, communication, and media, making every effort to enlighten, 
inform, and promote a shared experience, and then later, to comment on the political and 
social collective and domestic individual condition. As Agamben correctly suggests, 
“what is certain, at any rate, is that the work of art is no longer, at this point, the essential 
measure of man’s dwelling on earth, which, precisely because it builds and makes 
possible the act of dwelling, has neither an autonomous sphere nor a particular identity, 
but is a compendium and reflection of the entire human world.” For him, art has now 
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built its own world for itself, consigned to the atemporal aesthetic dimension of the 
“Museum Theatrum.”107 
 Thus the artist’s task has gone from translating beliefs and ideologies to 
supporting a consensus; from producing traditional objects or images to facilitating; from 
artisan to craftsman or artist and philosopher; from artist to critic and commentator. This 
role change affects an ever increasing disassembly between subject and object, where 
making and doing art has metamorphosed into a social interstice. 
 One thing seems quite apparent: the architectural space where the installation (art, 
video art) occurs and its recourse to geometrical space is always subordinated to the 
possibility of some event in excess of pure physical space in which one finds his/her 
dwelling or proper place: a transitional home. One can be at home away from one’s 
home: feeling-at-home is not a function of being in one’s home, or in any home, but of 
being situated at the crossroads between being and beings, in this interstitial space, 
where, in a way, we always already are, but in such a way that this space never comes to 
presence as such. In art and in architecture, this hypermedial interstitial space is, as it 
were, materialized; truth is doubled or repeated—staged, put to work in the work—and 
unconcealed. Such is the beauty of art installations: to render tangible, to inscribe in 
three-dimensional space something interstitial— the invisible and intangible space of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Giorgio Agamben, The Man without Content (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
33. 
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difference between being and beings. 
In general terms, hypermedia refers to a logical extension of the term hypertext, in 
which graphics, audio, video, plain text, and hyperlinks intertwine to create a generally 
nonlinear medium of information. In their book Remediation: Understanding New Media, 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin discuss the relationship between immediacy and 
hypermediacy in visual culture. They give a cogent definition of the two terms as they 
apply in a digital environment: 
 
Hypermedia expresses itself as multiplicity. If the logic of immediacy 
leads one either to erase or to render automatic the act of representation, 
the logic of hypermediality acknowledges multiple act of representation 
and makes them visible. Where immediacy suggests a unified visual 
space, contemporary hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which 
representation is conceived of not as window on to the world, but rather as 
windowed itself—with windows that open on to other representations of 
other media. […] In every manifestation, hypermediacy makes us aware of 
the medium or media and (in sometimes subtle and sometimes obvious 
ways) reminds us of our desire for immediacy.108  
In the sense suggested by the authors, we accept the purpose of immediacy as 
simply to go beyond the medium throughout the objects of representation themselves: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000), 33–34. 
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Remediation did not begin with the introduction of digital media. We can 
identify the same process throughout the last several hundred years of 
Western visual representation. A painting by the seventeenth-century artist 
Pieter Saenredam, a photograph by Edward Weston, and a computer 
system for virtual reality are different in many important ways, but they 
are all attempts to achieve immediacy by ignoring or denying the presence 
of the medium and the act of mediation. All of them seek to put the viewer 
in the same space as the objects viewed.109 
Thus we understand immediacy as it denies the presence of the medium and the 
act of mediation. For instance, the traditional linear perspective of painting and film keep 
the viewer distant from what the spectator views. There is immediacy through 
hypermediacy—an immediacy that grows out of the recognition of the medium and is not 
based on the perfect visual re-creation of the world. We do not look through the medium 
in linear perspective; rather, we look at the medium or at a multiplicity of media. We do 
not gaze; rather, we glance here and there at the various manifestations of the media. 
Immediacy refers to the manner in which a medium desires to provide a window through 
to the live event, while hypermediacy’s concern with multiple media makes the viewer 
more aware of the different windows used to achieve the mediated experience.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid., 11. 
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II.II.ii FEEDBACK/FEEDFORWARD – TIME EXCHANGE 
 
In describing his work, Present Continuous Past(s), Dan Graham writes:  
 
The mirrors reflect present time. The video camera tapes what is 
immediately in front of it and the entire reflection on the opposite 
mirrored wall. The image seen by the camera (reflecting everything in 
the room) appears 8 seconds later in the video monitor […]. If a 
viewer’s body does not directly obscure the lens’s view of the facing 
mirror, the camera is taping the reflection of the room and the reflected 
image of the monitor […]. A person viewing the monitor sees both the 
image of himself, 8 seconds ago, and what was reflected on the mirror 
from the monitor, 8 seconds ago, which is 16 seconds in the past […]. 
An infinite regress of time continuums within time continuums 
(always separated by 8-second intervals) within time continuums is 
created.110 
 
In Present Continuous Past(s), the mirror acts as a reflection of the present time 
(Figure 9), while video feedback shows the viewer’s past action, an exchange between 
present-past and present. In so doing, the camera tapes the reflected image of the 
monitor, setting up an infinite revert loop of time continuums (always repeated by an 
eight-second delay). Conversely, the mirror at right angles to the other mirror-wall and to 
the monitor wall gives a present time view of the installation as if observed from an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Graham, in Buchloh, Video, Architecture, Television, 11. 
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objective vantage exterior to the viewer's subjective experience. The mirrors simply 
reflect present time.  
 
 
Figure 9 
Dan Graham, Present Continuous Past(s), 1974. Sketch (left), Dan Graham (right). © Dan Graham 
 
If the monitor in Present Continues Past(s) operates as a kind of mirror, it also 
performs a visual function that a mirror cannot: unlike a mirror, video feeds back images 
the same way round, as they are perceived, rather than as their reflective opposite. This 
further dissolves the perception of the self as something “other”, as object. The pervasive 
exploration of the linguistic and perceptual possibilities of video feedback is also evident 
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in a number of other works made Graham. And he does so by exploring a single notion, 
fairly well known and even, in some way, familiar to us by now: the notion of feedback. 
Following the same structural principle, Graham made a series of “time delay and 
feedback” rooms. In Time Delay Room 1 (Figure 10), viewers in room A could see those 
in room B live on one monitor and on an eight-second delay on the other, while those in 
room B could see audience A live and themselves on delayed feedback. Viewers could 
walk and interact between the two rooms, which was timed to take about eight seconds. 
These closed-circuit, time-delayed rooms constituted a series of quasi-psycho-
sociological experiments in which Graham explored live video as a tool to investigate 
self-perception.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
Dan Graham, Time Delay Room 1, 1974 © Dan Graham 
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Here, I entirely subscribe to the wisdom given expression by the majority of 
Graham’s works, in which one can realize that he was particularly interested in the 
“relationship of consciousness to philosophies of reflection and transparency.”111 His 
installations were designed to encourage a strong illusory conjunction between the real 
and the projected spaces. Interestingly enough, while Graham’s writings often seem to 
accept the equivalence of perception with self-presence, his experiments point 
elsewhere—to the continual implication of so-called direct perception—also known as 
Gibsonian perception, requires the incorporation of surrounding cues on the formation of 
perceptions—with the deferred effects of memory.112  
In so doing, Graham intersects phenomenology with a psychoanalytic stance. 
Rather than downplaying the centrality of the body, this nuanced practice expresses 
Graham’s crucial understanding of the complex link between space, image, and body. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See Scott McQuire, “Video Theory, Videor Series Online, Globe Visual Arts, Issue 9 
(Melbourne: Monash University), http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/issue9/smtxt.html 
(accessed February 29, 2012). 
112 One of the major principles of direct perception states that perception is immediate and 
spontaneous, therefore, it does not use any unconscious inference. For detailed accounts of such 
theory, see the seminal work by Claire F. Michaels, Direct Perception (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1981) or available at: http://ione.psy.uconn.edu/~psy254/MC.pdf (accessed 
February 23, 2012). 
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video installations specifically heighten the audience as the site of a bodily, but also an 
intellectual event. 
Graham's usage of video as part of a closed system or feedback loop was common 
to many video artists during the ’70s. At this point, those involved with theoretical (and 
practical) investigations in video art may recall that, as suggested by Gary Hill, “video's 
intrinsic principle is feedback.”113 Conversely, for the purpose of this essay, we shall 
understand feedback as follows: when output or information from an event or 
phenomenon in the past will influence the same event or phenomenon in the present or 
future. It is also related to the event that is part of a chain of cause-and-effect that forms a 
circuit or loop; therefore the event is said to “feed back” into itself.  
Feedback is what one acquires when he or she “feeds” the results of a machine’s 
actions back into the machine. The most familiar example is when sound produced 
through a microphone is channeled back through that microphone, resulting in audio 
feedback—which in some cases causes discomfort. However, in most other cases, 
feedback is desirable, as it makes adaptation possible for machines, rather than reliance 
on a fixed set of instructions. In video technology, feedback heightens the phenomenon 
of the images; it yields a pulsing movement that takes the form of repetition: post-
processed, returned.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Gary Hill, Gary Hill (Baltimore,  MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 290. 
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Feedback is one extremely important element of Wiener’s more general argument 
that machines and human beings handle messages in very similar ways.114 Accordingly, 
the feedback theory considers the possibility of a moment (even if infinitesimal) of 
exchange between past and present.  
 
Figure 11 
Feeback/feedforward (Nil Santana, 2011) 
 
In Figure 11, I attempt to illustrate the general phenomenon of 
feedback/feedforward exchange with Graham’s installations. A camera (not illustrated) is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 2d ed., rev. 
(Garden City,  NY: Doubleday, 1954). 
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responsible for sending the visual input from the viewer (in the present) that is converted 
into electronic pulses to an apparatus (past-present—thus for the infinitesimal time that it 
takes to convert signal into frames, and repeat them), which is then responsible for the 
feedforward, back to present. Notice that the “mirrored image” also belongs to the 
present-time. 
The pervasive exploration of the linguistic and perceptual possibilities of video 
feedback/feedforward is also evident in a number of other works during this period by 
other artists such as Bruce Nauman, Nam June Paik, David Hall, Brian Hoey, Dara 
Birnbaum, and Gary Hill. The slippage between what Graham calls the “just past” and 
the present—a temporal interstitial space—is evident in all his performances. In his 
installations, the camera feeds back the image of the viewer (present) that is fed forward 
by the TV monitor, in a continuum loop. 
Performer-Audience-Mirror was Graham’s most complex performance and was 
his last nontheatrical live work. The incorporation of a mirror into the space of the 
performance established an architectural element in his topological field of action that he 
had already explored fully in a series of live- and video-feedback room installations 
begun 1974.  
The video image is not an immovable still set in motion by a mechanistic 
configuration. Instead, it is a constantly reshaping profile painted by an electronic brush. 
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It takes its movements from the oscillations of matter, and it is composed of such 
oscillation itself. Video technology is a modulation of the feedback and feedforward 
flows—their image is nothing more than a relationship between flows. The video image 
is a result of contraction or dilation of the time-matter. 
 
In video, the arrangement of the shots is not what creates movements, 
but the movement of light… I not only work on the arrangement of the 
shots, but also on the movement of light and the molecular granulation 
of the video image. If the cinemagraphic patterns are too dominant it 
does not work. When I began working with video, I noticed that the 
movement of the images is not bound to the displacement of something 
in space … that first became clear to me while I was working with 
video … by slowing the video image down (dilating time) the 
movement did not lessen. Instead, it sped up through the movement of 
the granulation. In film, deceleration is due to a slower succession of 
shots—that has nothing to do with video.115 
 
The image presents itself to memory (the montage) not as an icon but as a chain 
of points and lines. The video image is a result of lines and intertwining. Different from a 
piece of woven material, the video image unceasingly weaves and intertwines with 
constantly new motifs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Angéla Melitopoulos, interviewed by Maurizio Lazzarato in “Vidéo, temps et mémoire,” 
Chimères, no.27, Winter 1996. 
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The concepts of feedback in Dan Graham’s works can be still further explored. In 
terms of the technical creation of images, the primary element of video still is the frame. 
With montage or techniques of overlapping, a further genetic element is introduced, a 
kinetic component.  
Video, as we have tried to suggest, is in “a past-present time.” From this point of 
view, time-based technology still lies in the transition period before the period of the 
general deterritorialization of flows.  
Time-based technology couples with the production of the photographic image 
(the impression of light on a carrier) to process the succession of images. The production 
of images by the machine is also not the result of an arbitrary electronic flow. It does not 
yet employ the endless variety of a significant figure. It does not yet submerge itself in 
the matter of the images. Video artists have already claimed the characteristics of video 
technology and its specific discrepancy with cinema in the ’60s. The film camera is too 
close to the illusion of perception and representation as the impression of images on the 
medium. This also marked a time when the idea of participatory art started to be 
channeled towards interactive art installations—a term which has been widely spread in 
the mid ’90s.  
In video works by artists such as Dan Graham, the presence of the audience—
whether as an image registered on a monitor, or as a sound event reproduced through an 
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electronic feedback system—began to play an increasingly important role in providing 
the content and shaping the experience of the differentiated art object. Any cultural object 
can be viewed from the perspective of its production, its audience, and its critical 
assessment. In the case of video, the work as text, as Derrida reminds us, is regarded as a 
container or dwelling place for meaning. Although such media production today is 
increasingly monopolized by the cultural industries, the replication and transmission of 
the productions selected for promotion excludes locally produced and nonprofit 
experimental cultural (visual) forms. And yet, in such situations, the multiplicity, 
heterogeneity, and plurality of audience interpretations of any given mediated text is 
often presented as indication that the audience is always wrestling with its own meanings 
rather than being a simple matter of media deception. By interacting with video 
installations, we can notice a shift from a cinematic language and structure to a 
phenomenological use of the medium, referring to real-time bodily experience and 
instigating conscious intentions from the audience. While these conscious intentions may 
well occur, the polysemy of mass media texts is a condition for their commercial success, 
especially in a culturally diverse world characterized by speculative transitional media 
flows. It does not go any distance at all toward proving that the audience is not hindered 
from wider social critique or action by the mass media.  
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The contemporary cultural ground evidences an incredible and remarkable duality 
with respect to the role of the postmodern audience: on the one hand, contemporary 
cultural theory has been concerned to argue for an expanded capacity of the audience to 
engage in active interpretations of mass media texts. Conversely, the notion that there is a 
plurality of audience interpretation of any text has come to play a key legitimating role in 
so far as it appears to render disputable the issue of the centralizing of media ownership, 
“the non-reciprocality of many contemporary media and the consequent constricting of 
access to cultural production”—the inability of those confined to being audiences to the 
heard amid the noise produced the mass media. To put it coldly and categorically, Ian 
Angus suggests that in order to develop a critical cultural theory of the mass media, it is 
essential to theorize the plurality of interpretations along with the constraint visited on the 
audience by the medium of communication.116 
In this light, Derrida’s investigation in the philosophy of language is exemplary, 
and the anatomical likeness within language, communication, and artistic production 
models is reinforced. For the hierarchical relation between speech and writing, 
deconstruction analyses and their determination to disjoint are traditionally illustrated in 
terms of that between an inside and an outside. “We shall therefore take language, 
discourse, speech, etc., to mean any signification unit or synthesis.” Speech is seized to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ian Angus, (Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics (London and New York: Verso, 2000), 
133. 
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continue self-contained—in a closed “speaking-circuit”117 characterized by the speaker 
and listener. On the other hand, writing, per result of faulty reasoning, finds itself outside, 
trapped by an unavoidable materiality, and its materiality guarantees that it will function 
beyond of the control of its author, from where it will always threaten the veracity of the 
hypothetical unbroken system of speech.  
But this static relationship once formulated by structuralists no longer allowed 
individual, personal contemplation of reality. Jean Baudrillard suggests, “True, as far as 
perception is concerned, [in] writing and pictures, one can use many kinds of reading: a 
diagram lends itself to signification more than a drawing, a copy more than an original, 
and a caricature more than a portrait. But this is the point: we are no longer dealing here 
with a theoretical mode of representation: we are dealing with this particular image that is 
given for this particular signification.”118  
Baudrillard argues that the space that reality previously occupied has now been 
inundated with “meticulous reduplication”119 to the point that the line between the real 
and the imaginary has become indistinct. He describes this hyperrealism and adds that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
Ltd., 1983). 
118 Quoted in Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1984). 
119 Jean Baudrillard, “The Hyper-realism of Simulation,” in Charles Harrison, Art in Theory, 
1900–2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2003).  
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is a progression from surrealism—obliged to redouble with the imaginary. “To escape the 
crisis of representation, reality loops around itself in pure repetition, a tendency that was 
already apparent, before the days of pop art and pictorial neorealism, in the nouveau 
roman.”120  
Baudrillard’s ideas seem to suggest that a banal reality, already replaced by 
hyperreality, is then experienced by aesthetic hallucination of reality. That is to say that 
real and imaginary no longer belong to the same metaphysical coin; they unfold 
themselves into a kind of “subliminal perception”—simulacra. Baudrillard is, in a way, 
relating this allegorical simulation of reality with Lacan’s mirrors. As he comments in his 
book The Ecstasy of Communication, “The description of this whole intimate universe—
projective, imaginary, and symbolic—still corresponded to the object’s status as mirror of 
the subject, and that in turn to the imaginary depths of the mirror and ‘scene’: there is a 
domestic scene, a scene of interiority, a private space-time (correlative, moreover, to a 
public space). The oppositions subject/object and public/private were still meaningful.”121 
Nonetheless, he sets forth dissolution of public space into simulated aestheticization via 
private “telematics”: each person sees himself at the controls of a hypothetical machine, 
isolated in a position of perfect and remote sovereignty, at an infinite distance from his 
universe of origin. Which is to say, he is in the exact position of an astronaut in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Ibid. 
121 Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1988), 126. 
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capsule, in a state of weightlessness that necessitates a perpetual orbital flight and a speed 
sufficient to keep him from crashing back his planet of origin This realization of a living 
satellite, in vivo in a quotidian space, corresponds to the satellitization of the real, or what 
I call the “hyperrealism of simulation.”122  
Redoubling reality—the combination between the sign, concept, and mechanical 
reproduction—becomes clearly evident when looking at photography, film, and some 
contemporary art works (such as those of Andy Warhol). Although hyperreality 
influences culture in its entirety, hyperrealism is promptly recognized in art because of its 
ability to “express the pure form of production.” If considered only in this aspect, one 
must limit art as physical phenomenon. “Whether verbal or visual: a photograph will be a 
kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; even objects will become 
speech, if they mean something.” 
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CHAPTER THREE: TIME AND SPACE IN VIDEO 
 
III.I. CHRONOLOGICAL TIME: ACCORDING TO EINSTEIN 
 
Video theory has been severely crippled by an emphasis on time only. Here, I am 
not attempting to dispute the inseparability of time and space, but to argue that a 
discussion on space is also relative to a video theory. So in video, presence can be spatial: 
e.g. proximity, nearness, or adjacency, and also immediacy—having actual or direct 
contact, lacking mediation, having no intervening material, object, or agency. And it can 
be also be temporal: it evokes the present as the single present moment, the now: 
occurrence without delay, lapse, or deferral. In the pursuit of such inquiry, the following 
question emerges: how does video in relation to time and space continue to inform us per 
the initial argument? What do time and space have to do with the essence of video? 
Although a technological visual medium, video is also intrinsically tied to 
concepts of time and space. To think in terms of time and space is also to think about our 
understanding or conceptions of the physical world. For the purposes of my essay, I 
would like to address both fields in the current and following chapters.  
A clear picture of the ideas of time have influenced physicists, but many have not 
attempted to define it, admitting the impossibility of a definition even while insisting that 
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this impossibility was not owing to our lack of knowledge but was due to the fact that 
there are no simpler concepts in which time can be defined. As Newton says: “absolute, 
true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without 
regard to anything external.”123 From Einstein we learn the laws of time in his theory of 
relativity. His groundbreaking theories were only possible because he was able to remain 
outside the pre-conceived ideas of his period, especially those previously stated by 
Newton. In a sense, without subscribing to metaphysical incongruities, or being affected 
by any kind of gravitational pull—pun intended—it is still possible to affirm that 
everything in the physical world is relative to an observer. According to Einstein’s 
theory, the rate of passage of time depends on the motion or place of the observer. Thus, 
to summarize Einstein’s theory of relativity, time is no longer uniform and absolute. The 
visible world of physical phenomenon has thus become a world of one’s perceptions. 
Einstein understood it well. However, such a notion, true or not, is not that embraced by 
what we know as the theory of relativity. Unfortunate misconceptions and false notions 
certainly have prompted scientists, philosophers, and even the uneducated population into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. (Chicago: Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 1955), 77. English translation by Andrew Motte.  
From its original, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica by Sir Isaac Newton: page 11 
I. Tempus absolutum verum & Mathematicum, in se & natura sua absq; relatione ad externum 
quodvis, æquabiliter fluit, alioq; nomine dicitur Duratio; relativum apparens & vulgare est 
sensibilis & externa quævis Durationis per motum mensura, (seu accurata seu inæquabilis) qua 
vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus. 
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bewilderment. They simply sustain the theory in order to prove that everything in the 
physical world is “relative.” But in contrast, the theory is entirely concerned to exclude 
what is relative and arrive at a statement of physical laws that shall in no way depend 
upon the circumstances of the observer.  
One of the most intriguing and simplified accounts of philosophical consequences 
of relativity can be found in the work of French philosopher, mathematician, and social 
thinker Bertrand Russell. His popularized scientific vision in ABC of Relativity brilliantly 
introduces the reader to comprehensible concepts of Einstein’s theory.124 It is true that 
these circumstances have been found to have more effect upon what appears to the 
observer than they were more formerly thought to have, but at the same time Einstein 
showed how to discount relativity’s effect completely. This was the source of almost 
everything that is extraordinary in his theory. 
Relative velocity in physical mechanics happened long before Einstein.125 In light 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Einstein's basic principles of  relativity have not changed since Bertrand  Russell first 
published his book for the general audience. The ABC of Relativity is Bertrand  Russell’s most 
brilliant work of scientific  popularization. Russell is able to steer the reader without knowledge 
of mathematicss  or physics through the subtleties of Einstein’s  thinking. 
 See Bertrand Russell, The ABC of Relativity, Rev. ed. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1958). 
 
125 See Bonnier Corporation, Popular Science (New York: Bonnier Corporation, 1914), 444. Jules 
Henri Poincaré introduced the modern principle of relativity and was the first to present the 
Lorentz transformations in their modern symmetrical form. Poincaré discovered the remaining 
relativistic velocity transformations and recorded them in a letter to Dutch physicist Hendrik 
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of this, for early philosophy, the most important bone of contention in the theory of 
relativity was already explicit, that is, the substitution of space-time for space and time. 
Per Newtonian theories, two unrelated events were divorced by two kinds of intervals, 
one being distance in space, and the other lapse of time. As soon as it was realized that all 
motion was relative, distance in space became ambiguous except in the case of 
simultaneous events, but it was still firmly believed that there was no ambiguity about 
simultaneity in different places. Next, Henri Poincaré, perhaps the most brilliant 
mathematician of his time, conceived the relativity theory with the endorsement of 
French science, and Hendrik Lorentz, of Holland, one of the most famous in a land of 
notoriously famous physicists, contributed substantially to the establishment of the 
subject. Particularly, the special theory of relativity proved, by new experimental 
arguments and by logical mathematical arguments that could have been discovered any 
time after it became known that light travels with a finite velocity, that simultaneity is 
only definite when it applies to events in the same place and becomes more and more 
ambiguous as the events are more widely removed from each other in space. However, 
when a body is present at two simultaneous events that are not in a single place in space-
time, the temporal order of such events is not imprecise, though the magnitude of the 
time interval will be different in different systems of measurement. The uniform velocity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lorentz (1853–1928) in 1905. Thus he obtained perfect invariance of all of Maxwell's equations, 
an important step in the formulation of the theory of special relativity. 
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of a body cannot be determined by experiments made by observers on that body. It 
follows that when two bodies are in relative velocity, like the sun and a planet, there is no 
such physical fact as the distance between the bodies at a given time, this alone shows 
that Newton’s law of gravitation is logically faulty. Fortunately, Einstein has not only 
pointed out the defect, but remedied it. His arguments against Newton, however, would 
have remained valid even if his own law of gravitation had not proved correct. 
Einstein’s discoveries are still making headlines in recent history. Shortly after he 
formulated his general theory of relativity (only published in 1915), Einstein applied his 
theory to a more complex hypothesis of the entire universe. He was surprised when his 
equations showed him that the universe was unstable—either collapsing or expanding. In 
his early attempt to formalize his theory of relativity in 1905, Einstein realized that it was 
not complete. Undoubtedly his theory provided us with a new understanding of space, 
time, and motion. 
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III.II. LIVED TIME 
 
During the years 1883 and 1887, the French Philosopher Henri-Louis Bergson 
wrote the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, or, in its English 
translation, Time and Free Will. In what is considered his major work, Bergson 
anticipates Einstein’s theory of relativity. He emphatically distinguishes between two key 
forms of our ordinary conception of time: pure time and mathematical time. Pure time is 
real duration, la durée. Mathematical time is measurable duration. Real time is 
continuous and indivisible. Mathematical time is divisible into units or intervals which do 
not reflect the flow of real time. For him “reality is not to be reached by any elaborate 
construction of thought. It is given in immediate experience as a flux, a continuous 
process of becoming, to be grasped by intuition, by sympathetic insight.”126 
According to Bergson, real time cannot be analyzed mathematically. To measure 
time is to try to create a break or disruption in time. In order to try to understand the flow 
of time, the intellect forms concepts of time as consisting of defined moments or 
intervals. But to try to intellectualize the experience of duration is to falsify it. Real 
duration can only be experienced by intuition. In the intellectual representation of time, a 
succession of distinct states or events is presented as a spatialized form of time. Time is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (G. 
Allen & Company, Ltd., 1913), vi. 
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conceptualized as an ordered arrangement of defined events, rather than as an endless 
flow of experience in an indivisible continuity. The intellect analyzes time as having 
measurable duration, but the flow of real time can only be known by intuition. 
Bergson says that reality has extension as well as duration. However, space is not 
a void or vacuum that is filled by reality where “there are two kinds of multiplicity: that 
of material objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable; and the 
multiplicity of states of consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without 
the help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is space.”127 
Things are not in space but space is in things, a juxtaposition of sorts. We are thus in time 
in a peculiar way, irreducible to the already recognizable division between subjective 
(lived) and objective (clocked) time. Heidegger had previously shown in the 1920s how 
time and the problem of inner sense were central to the Kantian model and to his own 
attempt to move beyond its still metaphysical enclosure. But Deleuze’s writings on 
difference in Bergson suggested a fresh way of taking up the question of time that moves 
away from Heidegger’s idea of a constitutive finitude or the Dasein of a Volk disclosed in 
and through the work of art. 
In video, we see such aesthetics of duration, and these new sorts of determinations 
of space and time have played a key role. As with Benjamin, there was an element of the 
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philosophy of Kant in this aesthetic field, but one that comes from Deleuze’s new reading 
of Kant, or his new idea of the sense in which we are still Kantian. In fact, the primordial 
distinction between time and movement elaborated in the books on cinema is first 
introduced in Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze proposes to see as central to 
Kant’s revolution the problem of a “time out of joint.”128 Kant had already taken space 
and time as forms of intuition, or as a priori conditions of an aesthesis.  
Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson’s concept of duration presents an 
understanding of memory in which time is no longer conceived of in a linear manner as 
the succession of the past by the present. Instead, past and present can coexist 
simultaneously. A recollection, for example, does not take us backward from the now to 
the then, it can only occur if we make an ontological leap into “pastness:” 
 
We have to put ourselves into the past in general, then we have to choose 
between the regions: in which one do we think that the recollection is 
hidden, huddled up, waiting for us, and evading us? We have to jump into 
a chosen region, even if we have to return to the present in order to make 
another jump, if the recollection sought for gives no response and does not 
realize itself in a recollection-image. These are the paradoxical 
characteristics of a non-chronological time: the preexistence of a past in 
general; the coexistence of all the sheets of the past, and the existence of 
the most contracted degree.129  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone Press, 1994), 
88. 
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The video image is a modulation-capture in the flow of the flow of time. If reality 
is always changing, then this variability contradicts the theory that every event is causally 
determined, and that every event must necessarily happen the way it does happen.  
 
My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which 
acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement, with, 
perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, within 
certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives.130 
 
However, if for Bergson reality is not a succession of static moments or 
motionless states of being, then there is a sense of indeterminateness and uncertainty in 
events that produces a freedom of creative possibility. Video perception is therefore 
similar to the dispositive Bergson described, much more than the physiology of the eye. 
And to apply one of Bergson’s expressions, the image of our perception—like the video 
image—is presented to our perceptions as “visual dust.”131 Video technology allows us 
access to something that belongs to the dimension of pure perception beyond the image, 
to the flows of light, to the flows of flux-matter. Video technology produces something 
reachable of real perception, which Bergson initially writes about in his book Dreams and 
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further explores in Matter and Memory. Pure perception exists only as abstraction for us 
because a filter that makes something visible is necessary for it to appear.132 
And as I pointed out earlier in this essay, in Graham’s work, the mechanism is 
dismantled. Through a videotape loop time-delay video feedback system, viewers can see 
their images replayed almost immediately on the monitor. Thus their self-images of their 
behavior are connected to their inner mental states of consciousness—to their intentions. 
This removes self-perception, as in the mirror image, from the viewing of a detached-
state image of self. Instead, feedback creates both a process of continuous learning and 
also the subjective sense of an endlessly extendible present time in flux, and interior time 
connected to an unfixed future goal and continuous re-experienced immediate past.133 
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III.III. BAKHTIN’S SPACE-TIME 
 
Before I turn my attention to time in accord with Bakhtin, I shall undertake a brief 
overview of other important Bakhtinian ideas that are pertinent to our discussion on 
video.  
For Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin considers that all aspects of human life are rooted 
together in language. Thus dialogism is a “translinguistic” philosophy of language.134 
Factors outside words such as age difference, social rank, public speeches, and personal 
conversations influence understanding of language. What men are and the ways in which 
they express themselves depend on where and how they live. That fact suffices to 
fabricate one irremediable result: man produces the means of his own subsistence. How 
he does this depends on his physical organization and on what he finds available to him. 
What he does and how he does it depend in large part on the conditions determining his 
productions. Fundamentally, the conception of translinguistic dialogism encompasses an 
understanding of the alternation between self and other. Thinking and ideas are 
developed together, rooted with human activity and life—“I am a man, nothing human is 
foreign to me.”135 Life is an utterance; it becomes a common unity, and therefore nothing 
in discourse is unfamiliar. And according to George Smith, for Bakhtin “the location of 	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consciousness is not inside the Freudian mind, but outside, in the same exterior, societal 
space that the body occupies.”136 What is important for Bakhtin is not that a word is a 
stable and always self-equivalent signal, but rather that it is an always changeable and 
adaptable sign. As Bakhtin sets out two major premises on which he based all his 
works—the role of signs in human thought and the role of utterance in language—he also 
establishes a theory of relativity in a relationship between self and society as two poles of 
ideology.  
For Bakhtin, discourse is an activity, an action; a dialogue is a piece of 
information from experience that can serve as a theory encompassing more global 
dimensions, signifying the impossibility of conceiving individuals in isolation and the 
primacy of social conditions at a particular point in history in shaping consciousness.137 
What Bakhtin does, in fact, is to show in a preliminary way that the rise of the 
novel as the primary expressive form of Western literature depends in large part on its 
ability to accurately reflect the myriad voices of such a dialogic sphere, which he refers to 
as heteroglossia. These prevalent styles of discourse find their critical source in an 
ancient carnivalesque sense of the world, in which informal modes of language served to 	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Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011). 
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subvert and undermine the official seriousness of authoritative discourse.138 In a similar 
fashion, Bakhtin’s dialogics seeks to overturn what he calls “monologic” views of 
language that stem from earlier rationalist philosophies prevalent in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
Since Bakhtin’s social view of language places equal importance on the speaker 
and the listener, his ideas have also influenced and counteracted one of 
poststructuralism’s central battlefronts—the so-called death of the author. In this light, 
reader reaction and language are observed as the central forces of textual understanding, 
while authorial purpose and meaning are superseded in favor of theories that are both 
distancing to most readers and seem foreign to the everyday experience of language.  
  Bakhtin’s greatest role in contemporary literary criticism may be his reassertion 
of both author and reader’s creative and communicative power. As a result, his 
philosophy of language has developed a new thrust in theoretical debates that fluctuates 
beyond the continuing skepticism of deconstruction and the classical model of rhetorical 
theory. In doing so, his thoughts in literary criticism have validated how a dialogic 
examination of language helps lead the way toward a unified theory of the social 
constructivist view of language. 
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And in contrast to deconstruction, which views language and texts as nothing but 
the free play of signifiers, Bakhtin considers that all individual expression is ultimately 
the polyphonal product of voices that are uniquely linked to one another through the 
socially constituted fabric of language. We learn our language by contemplating and 
assimilating the voices of others, and we speak back to our community of peers through 
re-externalized modes of discourse. Thus far, as we have shown, this philosophy, known 
as dialogics, is supported by Bakhtin’s concept of metalinguistics, in which the individual 
utterance is seen as the intersection of a speaker’s specific intent and the listener’s active 
response, which are in turn linked to one another through stable, yet often unconscious 
genres of speech. 
In Bakhtin’s Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, he demonstrates 
what could be called his final stage of philosophical development. In this essay, Bakhtin 
relates the space-time continuum of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity to literary criticism, 
particularly as a sort of metaphor for the different ways in which the whole of literature—
everything from the Greek romance to the European novel—has used various temporal 
and spatial features to express a wide variety of worldviews. It is a fact that Bakhtin 
borrowed the term chronotope—literally meaning time-space—from the work of Soviet 
physiologist A. A. Uxtomskij, whose lecture on the chronotope in biology Bakhtin 
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attended in 1925.139 While Bakhtin’s discussion is intriguing, what is most interesting 
about this essay is its conclusion, which he wrote in 1973 and in which he serves up the 
chronotope as a bridge, not a wall, between the mind and the world: “without such 
temporal-spatial expression, even abstract thought is impossible. Consequently, every 
entry into the sphere of meaning is accomplished only through the gates of the 
chronotope.”140 
 In literary criticism, the chronotope is used to determine genres in the novel and 
how they historically embody specific ideas of what means to be human: how they 
respond to experience and change. Although Bakhtin’s framework is literary, we can 
borrow his concepts of chronotope and apply them to a critique of video, comprehended 
as an area where the event of time and space coexist, and to how we understand a 
participatory viewing experience. On the other hand, the important aspect here is that 
chronotopes have the capacity to bring together different temporal and spatial 
dimensions: both representing a social reality, which we could relate to. This implies that 
certain spaces—through time—will gather different strata of meanings and significations. 
In video, such spaces and particular surroundings will be ascribed the potential to 	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accumulate and expose in different ways the dynamically kinetic notion of time—
although not necessarily in a chronological manner. Fragments and segments of meanings 
may surface and be comprehended at the same time.  
 Moreover, the different social actions are also attributed by a variety of kinds of 
fused time and space: the rhythms and spatial organization of daily lives, workspace, and 
even conversation differ noticeably. It follows from the multiplicity of chronotopes that 
they may change over time in response to current needs; they are in fact, and in potential, 
historical. As senses of the world, they may implicitly dispute (or agree with) each other. 
That is, the relation of chronotopes to each other may be dialogic. Chronotopes are not so 
much visibly present in activity as they are the ground for activity. To use one of 
Bakhtin’s favorite distinctions, they are not represented in the world, they are “the ground 
essential for the showing-forth, the representability of events.”141 
 Bakhtin sees the novel’s fictive universe and the created world as interconnected 
to what we consider as the world of realities. It is the author—in our case, the video 
artist—who is the mediator between these two worlds, making specific spaces and 
material objects to stand out with more substantial meaning than other spaces. This is so 
because the same spaces through time have animatedly collected different meanings and 
different stories related to the events of history according to the fabric of time. As result, 
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some video works will be regarded as more significant for my line of reasoning than 
others. For argumentation, I look back at the precursor of the moving picture, not cinema 
per se but photography, and I suggest a kind of chronotope present in early photographic 
narrative, in particular the portrait—a photograph in its actuality becomes a physical 
evidence of space-time interconnectedness. 
Clark and Holquist stressed, “Anyone who invents a concept takes leave of 
reality. But chronotope is a way not to take leave of reality; it is precisely the opposite, 
a concept for engaging reality.”142 For centuries, humans have collected and organized 
the world of their immediate experience into a number of different world pictures. On 
the side of the visual arts, the development of the photographic portrait corresponds to 
an important phase in the social development of Western Europe. This took place 
during the rise of the middle classes when, for the first time, fairly large segments of 
the population attained political and economic power. To meet their resulting demand 
for goods, nearly everything had to be mechanized and produced in greater quantities. 
“The portrait was no exception: by having one’s portrait done, an individual of the 
ascending classes could visually affirm his new social status both to himself and to the 
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world at large.”143 To meet the increased demand for portraits, art itself became more 
and more mechanized. The photographic portrait was the final stage in this trend 
toward mechanization.  
Although portraiture may not—at least on the surface—seem to be in line with a 
Bakhtinian trope, it is reasonable to find similarities between early photographic 
portraiture and how dialogism functions in his concept of (auto)biography. For Bakhtin, 
“at this heart we have a scheme with well-defined rubrics, beneath which all biographical 
material is distributed: social life, family life, conduct in war, relationships with friends, 
memorable sayings, virtues, vices, physical appearance…”144 To put it coldly and 
categorically, dialogic is not a synthesis of multiple points of view. On the contrary, it is 
resistant to conclusions, subjective, a tabula rasa of sorts. Therefore, Bakhtin contests 
dialogic to following a single path and monologic dialectics. Dialogism emerges here as 
another configuration of logic, which contrasts with both formal logic and dialectic logic 
and their monologic perspectives.  
Sontag’s essay On Photography suggests that the photographic portrait is also a 
self-portrait, “for every portrait of another person is a “self-portrait” of the 
photographer—promoting “self-discovery through a camera.”145 For us, in this 
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ontological revision, photography is no mere technical matter. The photographic self-
portrait in particular promises to convey the artist to us directly; the maker apparently 
becomes the subject/object depicted in the image, a subject who is, in turn, interpreted by 
us through processes of identification and/or projection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
Hippolyte Bayard: Self-Portrait as a Drowned Man  (Direct Positive Print , 1840) 
 
It is apparent that the man pictured here (Figure 12) is supposed to be dead, not 
merely asleep. The touching yet dignified pose, the carefully draped material, and the 
relieved, almost triumphant facial expression, all mimic Christ’s descent from the cross. 
In order to avoid blurring due to the long exposure time still necessary at that time, 
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Hippolyte Bayard kept his eyes closed as he took this self-portrait. The image was 
made by his sensational process of non-negative paper photography—épreuve sur 
papier. Inscribed on the reverse of one of the three existing variations of the print are 
the words:  
 
The corpse which you see here is that of M. Bayard, inventor of the 
process that has just been shown to you. As far as I know this 
indefatigable experimenter has been occupied for about three years with 
his discovery. The Government, which has been only too generous to 
Monsieur Daguerre, has said it can do nothing for Monsieur Bayard, and 
the poor wretch has drowned himself. Oh the vagaries of human life! He 
has been at the morgue for several days, and no-one has recognized or 
claimed him. Ladies and gentlemen, you'd better pass along for fear of 
offending your sense of smell, for as you can observe, the face and hands 
of the gentleman are beginning to decay.146 
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This carefully written text is signed “H. B.” and dated 18 October 1840. Was 
Bayard’s staged image of himself after death an expression of the true feeling or was it 
merely intended ironically to mislead the observer?  
Such relations between space and viewing are undone as the description of 
space frees itself from the presumption of a single objective viewpoint and the form of 
narration frees itself from the domination of a single narrative voice, as if in a free and 
indirect style. The extent to which Bayard has hypostatized the narrative and its 
multivocal, interconnected language may be seen by contrasting his account with the 
theory set by Bakhtin, who also sees the narrative as a set of discourses. Bakhtin 
proposes the principal novelistic tradition as dialogic or heteroglossia: “the novel is the 
expression of a Galilean perception of language, one that denies the absolutism of a 
single and unitary language.”147 Instead of attempting to provide an unmediated literary 
representation of reality, in this case, the novel tends to criticize discourses that reduce 
reality in univocal ways. Thus, after an intimate investigation of the history of the 
novel, Bakhtin shows that the realist tendency, which the novel takes as pervasive, 
unitary, and of long duration, actually emerged from a particular literary polemic about 
reality and was by the beginning of the nineteenth century widely criticized and 
parodied. For Bakhtin, “the narrator’s interventions in the work of Tolstoy or Eliot 	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constitute heterogeneous attacks upon various predefined conceptions of reality: in 
these novels, visions of the world struggle in open battle.”148 
The relation between the represented and experienced world is also of 
importance. A photograph may also be a picture, for example, of the photographer’s 
past, interests, and ideologies. Concerning the viewer, the pictures may pass on 
different impressions which we may identify ourselves with, as well as dreams and 
fantasies. The viewer will also take part in the process of creating new imaginations of 
the reality.  
Conversely, video is not too far from being a hybridized form of photography 
(the same would be true for cinema). McLuhan suggests that television has the ability 
to “amplify” reality. In a shift from our previous reliance on an account of current 
affairs in the form of spoken narratives or written texts, we are now able to cross-
reference—hypertext—a number of different accounts that appear as a first-hand 
account. The combination of color photography and broadcasting has brought us a 
perception of reality that is played out as eyewitness reports. The image has become 
accepted as proof in a version of reality where the closed circuit television picture 
(CCTV) cannot be contested. What is considered “real” no longer relies on actual first-
hand experience, but on a photographic representation. We seem to trust pictures more 
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than people. From the political intensity of the first moon landings to the banality of 
parking fines, the argument is settled with the image. Reality can be experienced as a 
spectacle of images, accessible every morning in the newspaper and at any time on a 
screen. The arrival of the new phenomenon of communication technologies has brought 
us the so-called “globalization” of culture. This phenomenon is creating a different kind 
of meaning, not only in personal life but also in the way culture as a whole is produced 
and experienced; this is seen as the linking of types of activity as well as geographical 
regions. There are number of definitions that suggest that such a phenomenon is not a 
single process but a combination of different elements. It stretches social and political 
activities across world regions, intensifies our interdependence, speeds up transport and 
communication, and ultimately means that distant events are able to have a much 
greater impact on our everyday experience.  
Consequently a confusion between spatial and temporal boundaries has 
occurred through exposure to high technology, collapsing it and sometimes erasing the 
conventions that formerly distinguished fantasy from reality. Instead of “relying on a 
sense of reality gained from direct experience and belief in a single authoritative 
system,”149 we depend on a variety of communicated information. We alternate and are 
suspended between the reality of daily life and the representation, or edited copy, of it 
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that we respond to via television. This shifting response contributes to an assault on the 
concept of the self as the center of a single reality with a single viewpoint. Moments of 
reality appear to take on epic proportions as they materialize in our homes amongst our 
daily experience. The most emotional and effective responses appear to have a direct 
relationship with the strongest combinations of visual signs.  
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III.IV.  TIME: ACCORDING TO HEIDEGGER 
 
In his seminal work Being and Time, Heidegger begins with the question: what is 
time? However, in the quest for the answer, he gradually shows us how the investigation 
mutates into the question of who is time. So the question of “what is time” precedes the 
very nature of the phenomenon of which he inquires by being in time: 
 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we 
really mean by the word “being”? Not at all.… Our aim in the following 
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so 
concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible 
horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.150 
 
A meditation on fundamentals concerning the realm in which we are moving 
becomes necessary whenever we speak the word being in a way that is not altogether 
vacuous. For without insight into these contexts we lack all the prerequisites for 
understanding the point where all the indirect routes of Heidegger’s ontological thought 
clearly converge. Here too we seek in vain when we look for an essential definition and a 
fundamental explanation of the meaning of time. Heidegger argues that our traditional 
relationship to time as that which is counted and defined by the use of clocks has its 
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origins in Aristotle’s interpretation of time in the Physics. However, in order to count 
time, one always supposes that a travelling pointer is present. For Heidegger, this 
chronological accounting for time demonstrates that since Aristotle, it has been accepted 
that it is what shows itself in making present. 
At this point, the pursuit of facts for Heidegger was to amplify the issue of Being, 
as he loudly did: that is, his aim was to make sense of our ability to understand the 
essence of things. Heidegger’s study was of a specific type of Being, the human being, 
referred to by him as Dasein, which literally means Being-there. Heidegger said that 
angst reveals to Dasein the opportunity of fulfilling itself in a fervent “freedom towards 
death.“ This freedom has been released from the delusions of the “they” to become 
accurate, certain of itself, and anxious. Being-toward-death is not an orientation that 
brings Dasein closer to its end, in terms of physio-corporeal death, but is rather a 
condition of being. The temporality of Dasein is solidified by the overwhelming certainty 
that all Being is a Being-toward-death, and, the potential end of “Being-in-the-world” is 
death. As Heidegger wrote: 
 
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over 
in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing 
less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-
longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this 
possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-
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Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other 
Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at 
the same time the uttermost one.151 
 
Thus, per Heideggerian terminology, Being-toward-death refers to a process of 
living through the world where a certain foresight guides the Dasein towards gaining an 
authentic—finite—perspective. Such perspective is provided by fear of death. Living in 
complete recognition of our finitude is crucial to being authentic; it is primordial to 
authentic being. 
Here, in the analysis of time, it is revealed as a threefold condition of Being. 
Time, both the present and the notion of the “eternal,” are modes of temporality. 
Temporality is the way we see time as the possible horizon. For Heidegger, it is very 
different from the mistaken view of time as being measurable (hence Einstein’s 
relativity), or understood simply as a linear series of past, present, and future. This is 
ground for argumentation since we know that for Heidegger’s horizon, he takes into 
consideration that humans are born, live, and die. Instead he sees it as being an ecstasy, 
an outside-of-itself, of futural projections (possibilities) and one’s place in history as a 
part of one’s generation. Possibilities, then, are integral to our understanding of time; our 
projects, or thrown projection in-the-world, are what absorb and direct us. Futurity, as a 
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direction toward the future that always contains the past—the has-been—is a primary 
mode of Dasein’s temporality, its presentness. 
For the sake of our current discussion, suffice it to say that video expresses the 
interconnectedness of media technology and death. Consequently we have understood 
that in order to define the essence of technology, Heidegger draws on the term “gestell,” 
or enframing. He uses the term enframing not in the sense of a physical framework or 
structure of some sort. In fact, enframing is actually the work of technology. When the 
Rhine River is dammed up for the purpose of generating hydroelectricity, enframing is at 
work, and as I have argued, when a human being is recorded on videotape, enframing is 
also at work. Technology has then not only challenged us per Heideggerian terms, but 
also has made us more human, not the other way around. But in contrast, these facts 
suffice to produce one irremediable result. According to Heidegger’s fear, technology 
causes us to forget our finitude, the fact that we are all going to die, and fully abandon the 
understanding that our finitude is the essence of being human.  
In his famous quote—“If I take death into my life, acknowledge it, and face it 
squarely, I will free myself from the anxiety of death and the pettiness of life—and only 
then will I be free to become myself”—Heidegger is suggesting a mode of thinking that 
asks us to discipline ourselves, bringing ourselves to awareness of mortality, of how we 
feel every day, of what we do: 
	  	   140 
 
Holding death for true (death is just one’s own) shows another kind of 
certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to 
entities encountered within-the-world, or to formal objects, for it is certain 
of Being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not demand 
just one definite kind of behavior in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in 
the full authenticity of its existence.152 
 
At this point we can see that there is a very brief way of elaborating on how 
Heidegger approaches an understanding of death: since death is not something one can 
experience or live through, there is really nothing at all to say about death itself. In light 
of this, death is not—it does not exist for any person to experience. But since death, in the 
sense of the termination of all potential, possible experience—at least as we presently 
know it—is inevitable, a given fact of human existence, we can say a great deal about the 
attitudes we do have, as well as the attitudes we ought to have, about this quintessential 
aspect of human existence. Julian Young, in his interpretation of Heidegger, thinks he 
“wants to stress that to die, to be capable of death as death, is a defining feature of human 
beings. While animals merely perish, human beings are capable of approaching death 
with an understanding of what it truly is, namely, the shrine of the Nothing, the mystery 
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of being itself.”153 From Heidegger’s fourfold view, humans are mortals. In his own 
words, “they are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death 
as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth.”154 We 
can say that what is important is not death itself, but the assumption of dying, the manner 
in which the human being lives as he aims toward death. Thus death, as our being toward 
it, is the focal point of Heidegger’s analysis. The old saying that as soon as we are born 
we are old enough to die, Heidegger notes, is not something we can ignore, for how we 
live in light of this fact makes all the difference. Concerning the threshold of death, we 
are engaged here toward a certain possibility of the impossible. In Heidegger’s writing on 
Nietzsche, he suggests that “the essence of art is grounded in itself, clarified, and 
articulated in its structure only to the extent that the same is done for will to power.”155 
According to Heidegger, human bodies are merely a standing reserve to be wrenched 
from their present and/or historical contexts and used up in the frenzied race to continue 
to sustain technological systems. A noninstrumentalist deployment of technology within 
an aesthetic video environment would allow modern technology to reconnect with téchnē, 
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Heidegger’s reworking of the ancient Greek relationship between technology and 
technique or craft. 
To put in a different, blunt way, as we closely observe the history of technological 
innovation, we also observe how it is brimming with accounts of death and war. 
Although I do not support any kind of armed confrontational engagement, we know that 
from the Crusades to Modernity, from Da Vinci to Einstein, most of the technological 
development we see today were initiated during wars. It is a fact that technological 
development played a crucial role in determining the outcome of World War II. Much of 
it occurred during the war years of 1940–1945, some in response to lessons learned 
during the war and some as the war ended. The massive research and development 
required by the war had a great impact on many areas, but especially in the scientific 
community. A broad array of technology was employed, as different nations and different 
armies found themselves equipped with different levels and types of technology. Once 
the Second World War—and for the same matter, the Cold War—was over, military 
technology developments spanned across all areas of industry and commerce. One simple 
yet extremely important example is the Internet. This is no mere coincidence if we take 
into consideration that all media technologies are either filtered down to us from the 
military or are immediately coopted by the military for the purpose of human destruction. 
Consequently, death and technology are familiar collaborators. But beyond this factual 
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crossroads between death and technology, there is also a philosophical or existential 
connection. Of course Heidegger’s argument, as he proposed, is that technology 
challenges us to be more than human, challenges us to overstep our possibility:  
 
The birch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony of bees dwells in 
its possibility. It is first the will which arranges itself everywhere in 
technology that devours the earth in the exhaustion and consumption and 
change of what is artificial. Technology drives the earth beyond the 
developed sphere of its possibility into such things which are no longer a 
possibility and are thus the impossible. The fact that technological plans 
and measures succeed a great deal in inventions and novelties, piling up 
each other, by no means yields the proof that the conquests of technology 
even make the impossible possible.156 
 
Today we tend to subscribe to a possible condition that technology in general 
already tempts us into believing that we are immortals, that we can replace our finitude, 
somewhat in a hyper-Cartesian makeover, cast off our bodies, live infinitely in silicon, 
upload the contents of our minds to a supercomputer, or even create a new, bodiless self 
in a virtual world. As it does with everything else, technology turns the human body into 
crude, raw substance, a flexible resource that is placed in standing-reserve, waiting to 
serve some technological purpose. In light of this, death is that possibility which is the 	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absolute impossibility of Dasein, its oblivion. And for Heidegger, one’s death is not an 
empirical event, it is Dasein’s ownmost—what makes Dasein individual. It is 
nonrelational (nobody can take one’s death away from one or die in one’s place, and we 
cannot understand our own death through the death of other Dasein, as it is not to be 
outstripped. Thus the main focus of Sein und Zeit is neither Being nor time but the 
phenomenon of the oblivion of Being.  
I have already suggested that as we closely look for an investigation of video, and 
so far, focusing on its primordial unit “videre—I see,” the essence of video also leads to 
the questions of “what do I see,” or “who is seeing?” Is the subject that from which we 
begin or that to which we come? And what is this subject supposed to see? To know?  
In 2007, Bill Viola created a new video installation to be presented at the Fifty-
second International Art Exhibition La Biennale di Venezia. Inspired by its setting—the 
fifteenth-century Venetian church of San Gallo—the work was entitled Ocean without a 
Shore: a three-high-definition-screen video and sound installation. Ocean without a Shore 
presents a cyclical progression of images that describes a series of encounters at the 
intersection between life and death. Located near the Piazza San Marco, the church of 
San Gallo was formerly a private chapel, and Viola directly incorporates its internal 
architecture into his piece, using the three existing stone altars as video screens. 
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Figure 13 
Ocean without a Shore (© Bill Viola, 2007) 
 
For Viola, Ocean without a Shore “is about the presence of the dead in our lives. 
The three stone altars in San Gallo become transparent surfaces for the manifestation of 
images of the dead attempting to re-enter our world.” 
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The video sequence describes the human form as it gradually coalesces from 
within a dark field and slowly comes into view, moving from obscurity into the light. 
Viola’s work deals with life, with survival, with the will to live, and hence also with 
death. 
“As the figure approaches, it becomes more solid and tangible until it breaks 
through an invisible threshold and passes into the physical world. The crossing of the 
threshold is an intense moment of infinite feeling and acute physical awareness. Poised at 
that juncture, for a brief instant all beings can touch their true nature, equal parts material 
and essence. However, once incarnate, these beings must eventually turn away from 
mortal existence and return to the emptiness from where they came.”157 
In an article on video as art published in a 1984 issue of the Journal of Film and 
Video, Viola came to quote the Persian sage Rumi on perception in a fashion that recalls 
the painter Klee’s more contemporary and more western contention that art does not 
reproduce what we see but rather makes us see:  
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New organs of perception come into necessity so that we may increase our 
perception. I believe that, for Viola, video is basically a device that can 
increase our sensory “necessity” in just such a precisely aesthetic manner. 
Such sensory increase has always been art’s primary purpose; hence the 
original, diachronic meaning of the term aesthetic as a scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae (as a “science of sensory cognition”).158 
 
For over thirty-five years, the work of Bill Viola has focused on universal human 
experiences. Viola’s production extends beyond the bounds of minimalism-structuralism, 
Ocean is exemplary in its ability to reveal clear links with technology and beingness. He 
is renowned for creating installations, videotapes, and sound performances that present 
manifestations of the human form undergoing various states of transformation and 
renewal. His work has been instrumental in the establishment and development of video 
as a contemporary artistic practice, while his writings and lectures have disseminated his 
ideas to a wide international audience. 
Kraus was right to point out how a video camera and monitor can function as an 
electronic mirror, in light of how this property was used and examined in a number of 
early videotapes and installations. However, her argument rests on equating the mirror 
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property of video with narcissism as such, using a definition of narcissism vaguely 
derived from Lacan.159 
We can also take a lesson from Foucault’s analysis of Las Meninas.160 The artist 
and spectator do not necessarily occupy the same position. Even if the artist is 
narcissistically performing for the video-mirror, the spectator of the image of this 
behavior is not. Conversely, if the spectator is performing for the mirror in a video 
installation, then the artist is not himself or herself seeking narcissistic gratification nor is 
the nature of the spectator’s interaction with the installation necessarily narcissistic.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: VIDEO, PHILOSOPHY, 
AND WILL TO POWER 
 
 
A work of art is an externalization of the artist’s consciousness; as if we could see his way of 
seeing and not merely what he saw. Whatever else art does, it has to feed into an ongoing 
discourse on the nature of art, or we will judge it trivial. 
Arthur C. Danto 
 
IV.I. WHY HEIDEGGER IN RELATION TO VIDEO? 
 
In this section, I shift from “what is video” to “why video”: Why video in the 
question of truth? How, per my initial argument, can video allow us to escape what 
Heidegger sees as the concealment precipitated by modern technology? Why consider 
Nietzsche and Heidegger in the question of video? What is video’s relation to a 
philosophy of aesthetics—not of beauty, but that of experience?  And as I advance such 
inquiries, I also continue to situate video in relation to the true and apparent world. 
Whereas in cinema, the distinction between reality and world is clear, in video such a 
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distinction is more complex. Nonetheless, I also suggest that the indeterminacy of video’s 
horizon is echoed by Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal return of the same.” 
The problematic relationship of technology and art in Western culture and our 
ambivalent perception of technology are fundamental reasons for the immature state of 
video theory and video’s difficult relationship to history. That this discourse has 
remained until now within the realm of modernist art discourse has also been a 
fundamental deterrent to a comprehensive theoretical discourse. The cultural paradoxes 
presented and represented must be considered within an art theory paradigm but must 
also be considered within a larger cultural context. The development of this particular 
medium at this particular time was no accident. Video’s problematic relationship to 
history can provide us with insight into the realm of beingness and the difficulty of 
history-making in postmodern culture. Yet, just like television, video is about present 
time, not about history. Video practice brings us close to our daily life and consciousness, 
a true creative consciousness.  
In the late twentieth century, we perceived most historical facts as that which has 
been recorded by a (photographic) camera. It has been noted by such theorists as Barthes 
that the photograph is always coded as the past, the what-has-been. The common 
understanding, or even mythical assumption, is that photographic images always present 
us with the literal object itself, or what Barthes calls the “being-there” of the object. 
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However, as Barthes makes clear, all images, no matter how they are coded, can be said 
to testify to the being-there of the object they represent. We suppose the being-there of 
the object of a still-life painting from life, no matter how stylized that painting may be. 
On the other hand, it is not that one accepts the photographic image as a better or 
unadulterated mode of representation comparing to drawing or painting, but rather, the 
photographic image has its uniqueness in the fact that it presents an image that once 
existed as it is represented. The photographic image, in this sense, bestows on us what 
Barthes refers to as the  “having-been-there” of the object. Therefore, the photographic 
image seems to have a denotative or literal “thereness,” but it is always in the past, before 
the time of its viewing.161 
Thus, if for Barthes photography is thus attached to the past as he suggests when 
he says, “the photographer’s second sight does not consist in seeing but being there,” 
could it be that for video we can then take it as “is there,” in the present?162 Cinema, on 
the other hand, while it represents a kind of movement into the present, has increasingly 
come to evoke history. However, the television image (video implicated within this 
definition) has a different set of cultural readings. Television is defined as transmission—
the image transmitted at the same time to innumerable TV sets—and this simultaneity is a 
major factor in cultural perceptions of it. “The television image is the copy with no 	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original”—it is many images everywhere at the same time. It is coded not only as live 
(there are many conventions in television that make it appear live when it is actually 
prerecorded) but also as continuous and immediate.163 
We will return later to the intriguing issue of temporality. Whereas video and 
television intersect, there is a genuine agonistic relationship. Youngblood says, “It is 
obvious that we are entering a completely new video environment and image-exchange 
lifestyle. The videosphere will alter the minds of men and the architecture of their 
dwellings.”164 In that particular chapter “Videosphere,” Youngblood traces a provocative 
evolution of cinematic language to speculate on the vast emergent possibilities in cinema, 
video, and video art. He examines the technological extensions of the medium as 
“instruments of creative living,” and follows by saying, “By creating new realities in 
video we create new realities in our lives.”165 He describes those technological extensions 
as they reshape physical, psychic, and social aspects of human communication. 
Youngblood writes: 
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Television is not primarily an aesthetic medium … it is neither an object nor 
“content.” Television is the art of communication itself, irrespective of message 
… the artist is concerned not so much with what is being communicated as with 
how it’s communicated and the awareness of this process. Thus television 
becomes the world’s first inherently objective art form.”166  
Youngblood argues that television makes us aware of our existence on a global 
scale by repeatedly showing us ourselves in a self-reflexive loop. 
This concept of the continuous immediacy of television (and of electronic culture 
in general) has broad implications for our cultural perceptions of the medium. Because of 
this aspect of television’s phenomenology, it is simply not seen as representing the past in 
the way that photography, film, or even painting do. Obviously, the ideology that resulted 
in the invention of television and video technology, as well as many aspects of computer 
technology, is one based significantly on the notion of immediacy. Video provides a 
snapshot of our daily activities, revealing the world that surrounds us. Thus, many early 
videographers were responding to precisely this aspect of immediacy, with the attitude 
that tape was ephemeral and instant, the “now.” In that sense, the very nature of 
television technology, in its materiality, acts as a negation of history, and this negation 
forces us to redefine and reconceptualize the notion of what constitutes the past. The 
history of video as an aesthetic discourse is one of a language of collage, in which 
strategies of image processing and recombination evoke a new visual language from the 
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multitextual resources of international culture. The spectacular history of the expanded 
forms of video installation can be seen as an extension of the techniques of collage into 
the temporal and spatial dimensions provided by video monitors placed in an intertextual 
dialogue with other materials. 
That video was formed with an a priori need for history reveals, in many ways, 
the precarious position of Western culture, and video’s role as a technological medium 
offers a challenge to contemporary discourse. Our future, like the preservation of our 
past, is irrevocably dependent on electronic technology. As it happened in the 1980s, 
such technology took on new cultural meaning, not of space progress and prowess but of 
careless space disaster; not of harnessing new energies but of uncontrolled nuclear 
contamination. And during this nuclear age, our vision of the future is more often tinged 
with anxiety than with optimism. At a period in time when the state of the world seems 
especially precarious, the need to establish the past reveals an attempt to reclaim the 
future.167  
Acconci’s Centers (1971) points to video’s immediacy and how the “now-ness of 
communication” is both opened and foreclosed in television. By pointing at the viewer in 
a virtual present, Acconci urges viewers to consider their own reflections within the 
paradoxical contradiction of televisual “now-ness.” For Acconci, “art video might be 
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placed as a subcategory of homemade video.”168 Or it might be placed on a sliding scale 
somewhere between homemade video on the one side and regular broadcast television on 
the other side. Making the choice to work with video, then, is the privilege of someone 
who participates in a power culture. Video is then considered as art’s last resort to retain 
heterogeneity. 
 As I have stated earlier in this essay, video as a medium not only allows for 
technological potentialities but also artistic expressions free from the concealing power of 
technological determinism. On the contrary, video as the encapsulation of technology and 
art frees us from the technologically circular confines pointed to by Heidegger—in this 
sense, such technology grants anyone creative and artistic license, revealing an 
immediate world, snapshots of our lives, or, as Heidegger says, letting what is coming 
arrive. At this point, such presupposition points us to Joseph Beuys’s concept of the 
social sculpture as fertile ground for his assertion that “everyone is an artist.” What can 
we borrow from this in relation to video? 
From Beuys we learn that “only on condition of a radical widening of definition 
will it be possible for art and activities related to art to provide evidence that art is now 
the only evolutionary-revolutionary power. Only art is capable of dismantling the 
repressive effects of a senile social system that continues to totter along the deathline: to 
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dismantle in order to build a social organism as a work of art.”169 We must probe (theory 
of knowledge) the moment of origin of free individual productive potency (creativity). 
We then reach the threshold where the human being experiences himself primarily as a 
spiritual being, where his supreme achievements (work of art), his active thinking, his 
active feeling, his active will, and their higher forms can be apprehended as sculptural 
generative means, corresponding to the exploded concepts of sculpture divided into its 
elements—indefinite—movement—definite, and then recognized as flowing in the 
direction that is shaping the content of the world right through into the future. This is the 
concept of art that carries within itself not only the revolutionizing of the historic 
bourgeois concept of knowledge (materialism, positivism), but also of religious activity. 
“Every human being is an artist who—from his state of freedom—the position of 
freedom that he experiences as first-hand—learns to determine the other positions in the 
total artwork of the future social order.”170  
Both Joseph Beuys and Eva Hesse had in their works a mutual relationship 
through Fluxus, an international artistic movement based on a connection between art, 
life, and the social space. According to Beuys, not only is every person a plastic artist, but 
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also an “artist who must determine things for himself.”171 Balance, reintegration, and 
flexible flow between the areas of thinking, feeling, and will, all of which are essential, 
are the objective of his Theory of Social Sculpture. The Theory of Social Sculpture was 
Beuys’ attempt to formalize his feeling that everyone was an artist, and society as a 
whole was the work. Art is a participatory process in which thought, speech, and 
discussion are core materials. Beuys believed that every human being was an artist who, 
from his state of freedom—the position of freedom that he experienced at firsthand—
learned to determine the other positions in the total art work of the social order. With 
self-determination and participation in the cultural sphere, a social organism as a work of 
art, every person should become a creator. 
Thought and speech should be seen as plastic in the same way that a sculptor sees 
an object. Representation happens in reciprocity; dialogism occurs in any conceivable 
internal and external circumstance: between work place, institutions, and street 
conversation; between the master and the apprentice, transmitter and receiver. For both 
Hesse and Beuys, the boundary between art and life is very fine. One thing seems quite 
apparent, though: Beuys’s pieces are not just about the body, but are also constructed by 
his own compulsive reaction to his body, the physicality of existence, and the many 
injuries he suffered during his life. 
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In such a work, the object is placed in a network that is social and political, not 
merely one of signs. Semiosis is always a social and political process. Thus, Beuys 
pointed to the fact that dwellers (and we include especially urban dwellers) have their 
own artistic techniques (techie) to create a home for dwelling. According to him, 
everybody is endowed with the ability to counter the overwhelming network of exchange 
relations, whether he or she is treated as a consumer or not. The investigation of how 
autonomous space can be created through aesthetics within urban life worlds, and how its 
respective values can be developed, is of prime importance. 
There is, however, an influential depth to Heidegger’s thought here, very much in 
line with and similar in a number of facets to Kierkegaard’s explanation of an 
existentialist subject: one who absorbs entire accountability in the face of seemingly 
impossible odds.  
French philosopher, professor, and author Jean-Luc Nancy retraces the 
topography of what can be understood as the originary ethics in Heidegger’s thought, 
locating dwelling right at the level of finite existence and revealing also the contradictory 
nature of an appeal to the infinite to ground ethical responsibility, writing: “Dignity is 
possible only if it measures up to finitude, and finitude… means the condition of a mode 
of being whose sense makes-sense as a ground and a truth. (Infinitude, by contrast, would 
be the condition of a mode of being that results in a sense being produced, acquired, and 
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related back to itself.) Schematically speaking, therefore: ek-sistence is sense; it has no 
sense.”172 Here, before continuing, it is necessary to introduce an issue of interpretation 
that will intrude from now on, concerning the word “dwelling.” Dwelling, according to 
Heidegger, is the way we human beings are on the earth: to remain in place and to be 
situated in a certain relationship with existence. “Dwelling is the basic character of 
Being, in keeping with which mortals exist.”173 This relationship is characterized by 
nurturing, enabling the world as it is, protecting it from thoughtless exploitation.174 And 
in Heidegger's own words, “to be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It 
means to dwell ... also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care 
for, specifically to till the soil to cultivate the vine.”175 Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the 
fourfold way in that with which mortals stay: in things.”176  
Nancy is asking the same questions as Heidegger in Being and Time: what is it to 
be human, or the being of human? What is the distinction between human and 
nonhuman? In Nancy’s ontological formulation, being is not to be thought as beingness 	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or constant presence, but is rather to be expressed as coming into presence or 
presentation. Thus being takes place in an infinitely finite way: being which “is” not, but 
which comes or is born (hence birth) into presence here-and-now in an infinite arrival.177 
For Nancy, history belongs to community, being-in-common. Tracing a parallel between 
Nancy and Lyotard, one can observe that Lyotard speaks of a resistance (Greek: téchnē ) 
to the hegemonic structures of the state and to the dehumanization of technology by 
means of a more archaic anxiety or extreme resistance that is itself resistant to the 
formation of representations. Nancy argues in various places that the name to be given to 
this resistance to representation is “community.” Nancy’s ontological formulations are 
heavily based on the idea of the sense of being. In the chapter “Abandoned Being,” such a 
state could be understood as an actual return to being, but when doing so, there are no 
expectations or categorizations—no hope for receipt of something. Nancy calls for a 
being passible for the world as sense.178 So to be passible is not just to be passive, but to 
act, to wonder before that which presents itself. For us to imagine a world is to 
contemplate the fact that there is only being, that there is something and only that—there 
is world, there is sense: thus we are. It is to wonder, to stand before what presents itself. 
What is real and true is that we wonder over what is presented and that we, ourselves, are 
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presented. Thus we are: being exposed, being abandoned, being singular, plural—being 
as relation.  
Being there, Being-in-the-world, means that the world is not an object I can 
represent, Nancy says. World is only worldly for those who inhabit it. Or similarly, as 
soon as the world appears to me, I take part in it and experience its internal resonances. 
What takes place does so in a world and because of this world. A world is a place of 
possibilities, of taking place. For him, a “painting, in this sense, is first of all the 
affirmation of a surface. Why paint the walls of a room? Not to ‘beautify,’ but because 
without paint the walls disappear, melt into a groundless ground, taking the dwelling with 
them.”179 Now, there must be a dwelling (demeure): sojourn, lateness, remaining, repose, 
and even reserve, delay: the present held back against the precipitation of time, the 
present extracted from time, spaced. Poetry, before being the name of a particular art, is 
the generic name of art. Téchnē poiétiké: productive technique. This technique—that is, 
this art, this calculated operation, this procedure, this artifice—produces something not 	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with a view to another thing or a use, but with a view to its very production, that is, its 
exposition. The production of the thing puts the thing forward, presents and exposes it. 
As I have already pointed out in earlier chapters, the Greek for “to bring forth or 
to produce” is tikto. The word téchnē , or technique, belongs to the verb’s root, tec. To 
the Greeks, téchnē means neither art nor handicraft but, rather, to make something appear 
within what is present as this or that: in this way or that way. Their conception of téchnē , 
producing, is in terms of letting appear what has been concealed.180 The essence of this 
entity (Dasein) lies in its “to-be” (Zu-Sein). Its Being-what-it-is, video’s essencia, must, 
so far as we can speak about it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existential)… as 
the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly the characteristics that can be 
exhibited in this entity are not properties present-at-hand… but instead, they are each 
time possible ways for it to be.181 So, following Nancy’s assertion, one concludes that the 
present of presence is not in time; it is ahead of time, in front of time. Or it is within it, 
not in its course, but in its most intimate heart or hollow. It is pure time subtracted from 
temporality: the space in which pure time opens out and exposes itself. Space does not 
represent time, like a line that would be the immobile figure of a mobile process, but 
space opens time, distends time, distending the very moment to expose this present that 
does not pass, and that is time itself, negativity imposed for itself. “Space is thus the 	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origin of time. It is simultaneously its point of nullity and the whole extension of its 
successivity. It is the opening of time, the simultaneity of its spacing.”182 
In his study of Nietzsche, Heidegger points out that the Greeks had no concept 
corresponding to our contemporary notion of “fine art.“ Both art and craft, along with all 
other modes of “truth-disclosure” were, for them, just téchnē . If we return, then, to 
thinking in a Greek way, we will understand the word “art” quite generally to mean every 
sort of capacity to bring forth truth, to understand it so that it corresponds to the Greek 
concept of téchnē . Young makes a good point here, as he also is quite keen for 
Heidegger’s thoughts on art. In his essay on Heidegger and art, Young helps us not only 
to become aware of Heidegger’s take on Hegel, but also of how Heidegger defines art. 
For him, the way Heidegger sees the distinctiveness of art in the modern sense is open to 
question (frage-wurling). “Artists, that is, are constantly challenging the accepted 
boundaries of art, constantly suggesting that we should accept as art works which lie 
outside of the domain and power of the ‘art industry,’ outside ‘the realm of tradition and 
conservation.’”183 Young bridges well, as he makes a Heideggerian point that art belongs, 
not in the museum as an object of “aesthetic connoisseurship,” but rather in the 
marketplace as a public “happening of truth.” In this regard, Heidegger’s revision of the 
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notion of art looks to be quite prescient, an anticipation of aspects of the current avant-
garde. From here, one can then conclude that art in its broad Greek sense is the 
“happening of truth.” The artwork is that in and through which truth happens. What does 
this mean? Heidegger’s first step in elucidating this provisional definition is to replace 
“happening of truth” with “opening up of the world.” The artwork is something which 
opens up a world. 
Heidegger’s work is notoriously difficult to penetrate but essential to a 
phenomenological method. For him, the importance of practical engagement is essential, 
even prior, to any relation to and within the world. It is important to recall Heidegger’s 
opposition to the idea that Dasein is in primordial confrontation with a world of objects in 
and of themselves, as understood by early Greek philosophers. Instead, he conceives 
Dasein as always involved in practical activity. This manner of being allows us to 
experience entities within-the-world on the basis of how they look. Dasein—defined as 
being, as each of us constituted by our own existence within time—sheds light and 
understanding on what it means to be in the horizon of time. As for Heidegger, time as 
the horizon of Dasein is the only way for us to understand Being. What then, would be 
the horizon of video technology?  
At first, this inquiry could be easily answered, as one might think time. However, 
as we further investigate the issue at hand, one’s conclusion could be that indeterminacy 
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is the horizon of video due to its continuous flux and movement: non-canonical, not 
framed by technology nor its apparatus. As we continue interlacing these ideas, one 
might say that a modern investigation of a subjective experience really begins with 
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Heidegger and Kierkegaard agreed to differ from 
Hegel, since they both seemed to undermine the separation between object and subject, 
and according to Kierkegaard, “the subject matter is an essential element, inasmuch as it 
is one factor, but it is not the absolute, since it is only one element.”184 He criticizes 
modern philosophy for devoting too much attention to “essences,” supposedly, the 
metaphysical underlying realities and universal laws of the world. He rejects the idealistic 
belief that good and bad have some objective or essential reality. They are rather 
“subjective truths,” thus they cannot be proved or extended to others as being the sole 
basis of individual actions. Kierkegaard sees “cathartic spiritualizing” of art that 
functions both in formal and historical terms. An evidence of this is most obviously seen 
in his essay “The Tragic in Ancient Drama.” There he contrasts Antigone—in her secret 
and pain—with a fictional modern equivalent. The ancient Greek Antigone, as he points 
out, rests in her sad fate; she is an individual whose fate is submerged in that of a 
common destiny and is the carrier of the significant values of her society, specifically of 
family obligations. On the other hand, a modern Antigone, Kierkegaard suggests, would 	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be a different kind; her drama would be one of pure inwardness, not outward, but 
subjective and spiritual: “So it is with our Antigone. She is proud of her secret, proud that 
she has been selected in a singular way to save the honor and glory of the lineage of 
Oedipus.”185 Perhaps her tragedy would be that, as the daughter of Oedipus, she alone 
would know the truth of her ancestry. Her drama is thus the drama of an individual inner 
trial of conscience: should she conceal or reveal this terrible secret? She dedicates her life 
to sorrowing over her father’s fate. The greater degree of reflection that characterizes 
modernity, however, means that there is little role left for fate. There was a school of 
aestheticians who, because of a one-sided emphasis on the significance of form, were not 
without guilt in occasioning the diametrically opposite misunderstanding. It has often 
struck me that these aestheticians were as a matter of course attached to Hegelian 
philosophy, inasmuch as both a general knowledge of Hegel and a special knowledge of 
his aesthetics give assurance that he strongly emphasizes, especially with regard to the 
aesthetic, the importance of the subject matter. 
Dreyfus, in his essay on Heidegger, nihilism, and technology, says, “Kierkegaard 
argues that our primary access to reality is through our involved action. And he defines 
the self as a relation that relates itself to itself, meaning that who I am depends on the 
stand I take on being a self… how I interpret myself is not a question of what I think but 
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of what I do. Thus, the self defines itself by taking up its past by means of present actions 
that make sense in terms of its future.” For Kierkegaard, the self can be understood as a 
temporal structure. His whole work was devoted to the question: how can we get 
meaning and commitment back into our lives once we have gotten into the passionless, 
reflective attitude we are now in?186 For Dreyfus, this is essential for our understanding 
of the practices containing an understanding of what it is to be a human being, those 
containing an interpretation of what it is to be a thing, and those defining how society fits 
together. Social practices thus transmit not only an implicit understanding of what it is to 
be a human being, an animal, or an object, but, finally, an understanding of what it is for 
anything to be at all. What interests us is only what can be the matter of reflective, 
responsible decision. At this junction the categories of ethics follow upon those of 
aesthetics. Once we are engaged in judgments about whether a person was right or wrong 
to act in such a way, earlier tragedy cannot suffice: “in ancient tragedy…the ancient 
world did not have subjectivity reflected in itself.”187 For Kierkegaard the dialectic 
Either/Or centers on the conflict between aesthetic and ethical approaches to reality. For 
him, what we are is what we do. If we are truly to be, we must act, and our acts or values 
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are based on purely subjective and individual truths. Neither nature nor society can offer 
us certainty about good or bad, right or wrong. The ultimate meaning and value of our 
actions are always uncertain, and what it means to be human is to act in the face of such 
uncertainty. But how are our acting and perception related? What is the relation between 
aesthetics and consciousness? In order to address this inquiry, please allow me to fast-
forward a couple more decades and arrive at Nietzsche. He was greatly influenced by the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer; this is evident in his work, The Birth of Tragedy. According 
to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s system places the Kantian distinction between the real 
world of things as they are in themselves and the apparent world of things as they feature 
in experience, as the distinction between the Will and representations of the Will. 
The appearance/reality dichotomy is not between two logically differentiated 
worlds but one that falls within the ordinary everyday world of actual experience. Thus 
the world, in its essence, is Will: the blind force that continually strives for an 
unattainable resolution. Moreover, for Nietzsche, a great tragedy could be an essential 
part of a culture only if the members of that culture are psychically vital and robust 
enough to tolerate engagement with the truth which tragedy transmits (facing pessimism, 
masochist pain, suffering, and death). However, is this to say that as in Greek culture, we 
also need tragedy today? Nietzsche would say so. But he looks at tragedy—and the 
dialects between Apollonian poetry and Dionysian drives—and fails to see it as an 
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instance of a kind of self-sufficient Schein which confronts us with a deep truth about 
life, thinking it just a simple lie/illusion. That is not to say Plato’s Socratism is not itself a 
tissue of illusions. Nietzsche is following Schopenhauer’s steps and suggesting an answer 
to the question, “how should I live?” only after we have grasped “who am I, as a being, 
and what the world like in which I must live?” To understand the world is to know its 
concepts of structure, objects, and rules; but to know the world is also, by a rule of 
symmetry, to know myself as an individual. Nietzsche’s philosophy is unique for the 
fundamental role he assigns to aesthetic, as for him, life itself is an essentially aesthetic 
phenomenon.  
Aesthetic comprises all creation and imposition of forms, while the essence of life 
relies on spontaneous directions. Nietzsche’s investigations of metaphysics and ethics 
follow to the extent those activities are involved in the creation and imposition of forms. 
Perception is action. To perceive is to be conscious and engaged with our surroundings. 
Hegelianism promised to make absolute knowledge available by virtue of a science of 
logic. Anyone with the capacity to follow the dialectical progression of the purportedly 
transparent concepts of Hegel's logic would have access to the mind of God (which for 
Hegel was equivalent to the logical structure of the universe). Kierkegaard thought this to 
be the hubristic attempt to build a new tower of Babel, or a scala paradisi—a dialectical 
ladder by which humans can climb with ease up to heaven. Kierkegaard's strategy was to 
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invert this dialectic by seeking to make everything more difficult. Instead of seeing 
scientific knowledge as the means of human redemption, he regarded it as the greatest 
obstacle to redemption. Instead of seeking to give people more knowledge, he sought to 
take away what passed for knowledge. Instead of seeking to make God and Christian 
faith perfectly intelligible, he sought to emphasize God’s absolute transcendence of all 
human categories. Instead of setting himself up as a religious authority, Kierkegaard used 
a vast array of textual devices to undermine his authority as an author and to place 
responsibility for the existential significance to be derived from his texts squarely on the 
reader. 
All of this play with narrative point of view, disambiguated with contrasting 
works and with contrasting internal partitions within individual works, leaves the reader 
very disoriented. In combination with the incessant play of irony and Kierkegaard's 
predilection for paradox and semantic opacity, the text becomes a polished surface for the 
reader in which the prime meaning to be discerned is the reader's own reflection. 
Christian faith, for Kierkegaard, is not a matter of learning dogma by rote. It is a matter 
of the individual repeatedly renewing his or her passionate subjective relationship to an 
object which can never be known, but only believed in. This belief is offensive to reason, 
since it only exists in the face of the absurd (the paradox of the eternal, immortal, infinite 
God being incarnated in time as a finite mortal).  
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Kierkegaard's “method of indirect communication” was designed to sever the 
reliance of the reader on the authority of the author and on the received wisdom of the 
community. The reader was to be forced to take individual responsibility for knowing 
who he or she is and for knowing where he or she stands on the existential, ethical and 
religious issues raised in the texts. Heidegger is contra Hegel’s absolutism (idealism). He 
is opposed to Hegel’s idea of time in the Phenomenology of Spirit as pure concept annuls 
time (der reine Begriff tilgt die Zeit).  
Young gives us an interesting perspective here. For him, in everyday life, the all-
embracing horizon of experience is that of, in a broad sense of the word, 
equipmentality—a point emphasized in Being and Time. Because we are essentially 
practical agents and because we are given over to toil, we are, in a general way, workers. 
The object in front of me, for example, shows up not as a subtle symphony of delicately 
variegated whites reflecting off a semi-abstract, elongated sphere. This reduction of 
things to the single dimension (horizon) of equipment is reflected in a characteristic of 
the language of everyday communication: such language is normal, unambiguous, and 
one-dimensional. There is nothing wrong with horizons of disclosures in general, or with 
the horizon of equipmentality in particular. We could not engage in successful 
communication without them, could not survive as practical agents. For Young, this is a 
point that seems to be missed in the universal paranoia directed toward “epistemes” or 
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“regimes of meaning” displayed by Foucault and Derrida, the demand that they all be 
“deconstructed.” Young intends a horizon constituted by the language we speak. 
From his writing on Nietzsche, Heidegger elaborates on what a horizon might 
consist of, and with reference to the need for a schema and forming a horizon, something 
else may be said that complements and anticipates later considerations. The horizon, the 
scope of the constant that surrounds man, is not a wall that cuts man off; rather, the 
horizon is translucent. It points to what has not been fixed, what becomes and can 
become: the possible. The horizon pertaining to the essence of living beings is not only 
translucent, it is somehow also always measured and “seen through,” in a broad sense of 
“seeing and looking.” As an occurrence of life, praxis moves in such seeing-through, in 
“perspectives.” The horizon always stands within a perspective, a seeing-through to 
something possible that can arise out of what becomes, and only out of it, hence out of 
chaos. The perspective is a way of looking through, cleared in advance, in which a 
horizon is formed. The character of looking through and looking ahead, together with the 
formation of a horizon, belongs to the essence of life.188 As Heidegger already suggested, 
a boundary is not that at which something stops, but, as the Greeks recognized, that from 
which something begins its essential unfolding. That is the concept of horismos: the 
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is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is always granted and hence is joined, 
that is, gathered, by virtue of a locale—by such a thing as the bridge. Accordingly, spaces 
receive their essential being from locales and from “space.”189 
According to Francesc Torres, there has been a correlation between technological 
development and art making throughout history; inventions such as oil paint and linen 
canvas were agents of change comparable to the emergence of chemically based, and 
later electronically based image making. What this correlation implies is that artists have 
consistently, and not accidentally, worked with the tools of their time. Despite the tools 
available to art through technology, the art world hangs on to its conventional practices 
and aesthetic strategies. Thus technology-based art exists in a marginal area in a 
technology-based society. As already suggested, seen in light of this century’s history, 
science and technology are perceived more as deliverers of death and ecological crime 
than as purveyors of insight and well-being. Within this perceptual frame, technological 
art is seen in an unflattering light, while the traditional arts are viewed as a redoubt of the 
human spirit. However, technology-based art has a key role to play in clarifying the 
difference in the uses of technology that are harmful and ill-directed from those that are 
an expression of constructive and humanistic concerns.190 
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The four-fold four-tenets that we must look at for video are: 
1 - technology qua art (téchnē ),  
2 - phenomenological method 
3 - metaphysical 
4 - hermeneutics  
In his short essay, “Why a Philosophy of Photography is Necessary,” Vilém 
Flusser suggests that there are four cornerstones by which one can sum up the quality of a 
photograph, as they make possible a definition of a photograph: image, apparatus, 
program, and information.191 A media critic and philosopher, Flusser proposes a 
revolutionary new way of thinking about photography, suggesting that a philosophy of 
photography should be based on such a four-fold concept. However, he also alerts us that 
such a broad definition of photography is also a play, and is not to be taken as carved in 
stone. This, therefore, provokes one into a contradiction, and for Flusser, contradiction is 
seen as dialectics, as a spur for philosophical engagement. But what is important for 
Flusser is that a philosophy of photography is necessary for raising photographic practice 
to the level of consciousness, and this is again because this practice gives rise to a model 
of freedom in the postindustrial context in general. A philosophy of photography must 
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reveal the fact that there is no place for human freedom within the area of automated, 
programmed, and programming apparatuses, in order to finally show a way in which it is 
nevertheless possible to open up a space for freedom. The task of a philosophy of 
photography is to reflect upon this possibility of freedom—and thus its significance—in a 
world dominated by apparatuses: to reflect upon the way in which, despite everything, it 
is possible for human beings to give significance to their lives in face of the chance 
necessity of death. Flusser concludes his short essay by saying, “such a philosophy is 
necessary because it is the only form of revolution left open to us.”192 Although Flusser 
does not extensively write about the philosophy of photography, the informed reader sees 
the potential of such inquiry. What, then, would be a philosophy of video? I suggest that 
we should look at Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal return of the same” for this part. 
Appropriating Flusser’s four concepts of a photograph in parallel to video theory, one 
observes that they are all based on the “eternal return of the same.” Images are surfaces 
above which the eye circles only to return again and again to the starting point. 
Apparatuses are playthings that repeat the same movements over and over again. 
Programs are games that combine the same elements over and over again. Pieces of 
information are improbable states that break away again and again from the tendency to 
become probable, only to sink back into it again and again. In short, with these four basic 
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concepts, we no longer find ourselves in the historical context of the linear, in which 
nothing is repeated and everything has a cause that yields consequences. The area in 
which we find ourselves is no longer one of functional explanations. Any philosophy of 
video will have to come to terms with spontaneity, the ahistorical or posthistorical 
character of the phenomenon under consideration. 
When we define the interconnection of this doctrine with the fundamental thought 
of will to power, we bring Nietzsche’s philosophy to the fore as the final distinctive 
position in the history of Western metaphysics. Given such an insight, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy impels us toward the necessity of that confrontation in and for which Western 
metaphysics, as the totality of a history that has been accomplished, is consigned to what 
has been: to an ultimate futurity. Because of this character, the commencement surpasses 
everything that follows it, and hence is futural. The past as essentially unfolding: 
beingness projected in sundry ways as the veiled truth of Being. 
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IV.II. ETERNAL RETURN AND VIDEO FEEDBACK THEORY 
 
Dan Graham’s works already function as hard evidence of how “eternal return of the 
same” can be applied to the understanding of video. When observers see their image 
immediately, continuously replayed on the screen through videotape loops, their self-
images, by adding temporality to self-perception, connect their self-perceptions to their 
mental states. This removes self-perception, as in the mirror image, from the viewing of a 
detached, static image. The feedback creates both a process of continuous learning and 
the subjective sense of an endlessly extendible present time in flux, but without fixed 
future or past states. Here, Graham subscribes to the broad conception of feedback as it 
was defined by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in his General Systems Theory: as “a circular 
process where part of the output is monitored back, as information on the preliminary 
outcome of the response, into the input, thus making the system self-regulating… a 
feedback mechanism can ‘reactively’ reach a state of higher organization owing to 
‘learning’ information fed into the system.”193 A feedback mechanism can “reactively” 
reach a state of higher organization owning to the “learning” information fed into the 
system. In the situation of watching/being part of a video feedback loop, there is no 
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longer any split between observed (self) behavior and supposedly unobservable, interior, 
mental intention. When the observer’s responses are part of an influence on their 
perception, the difference between intention and actual behavior as seen on the monitor 
immediately influences the observer’s future intentions and behavior. Two models of 
time are contrasted in Present Continuous Past(s), the traditional Renaissance 
perspective: static present-time, which is seen in this work as the (self) image(s) in the 
mirrors and the time video feedback loop.194  
My goal here, rather than trying to unpack the mystery underlying eternal 
recurrence or to deal with it as a systematic principle, is to position it as a provocation to 
thought. To adapt an image from Gilles Deleuze’s 1962 book on Nietzsche, the thought 
of eternal return is “an arrow shot by Nature that another thinker picks up where it has 
fallen so that he can shoot it somewhere else.”195 Stambaugh makes a similar point when 
she states that any interpretation of eternal return is “forced to ‘go beyond’ Nietzsche’s 
writings, published or unpublished, on the subject… If one adheres strictly to what 
Nietzsche wrote about eternal return, it is impossible to ‘solve’ the enormous problems 
inherent in this thought.”196  
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At any rate, such speculative and experimental approaches to eternal return are far 
more in keeping with Nietzsche’s spirit than rifling through his personal papers in the 
hope of chancing upon a revelation. What has been liberates what apparently is merely 
past into its essence; specifically, it translates the commencement, which apparently has 
foundered once and for all, into its character as a commencement. Because of this 
character, the commencement transcends what comes after, and thus references the 
future. In its essence as unfolding—as the fact of Being variously projected as hidden 
truth—dominates perception of what is current and actual.  
“Eternal return of the same” is the way in which the impermanent (that which 
becomes) as such comes to presence; it comes to presence in the highest form of 
permanence (in circling), with the sole determination of securing its possibility to be 
empowered. The recurrence, arrival, and departure of beings, defined as eternal return, 
everywhere has the character of will to power. Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal 
recurrence of the same expresses the same essence of Being.197 
Caught in this vicious circle, modern instrumental rationality begins to turn on 
itself and, in the process, to turn itself into something else. Carried to its “rational” 
extreme, the extension of an instrumental enframing brings about its own mutations, its 
own unsecuring, allowing the unsettling techno-logic of reproducibility within it to come 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 212. 
	  	   180 
to the fore, no longer subordinated to an instrumental rationale. Although this mutation 
begins in modernist art’s abstraction of form from function, it only comes to be seen as a 
mutation when the rationalization of the cultural world reaches a stage where its 
technological reproductions become so numerous and the interactions among them so 
complex that they are no longer subject to rational prediction and control. At this stage, 
technological reproducibilility—taken in a general sense—can no longer be seen simply 
as instrumental, as a mean to an end. Instead, the reproduction, alteration, and reassembly 
of elements removed from their previous contexts becomes and end in itself. Stripped of 
both aura and instrumentality, these elements become “purely” stylistic or “aesthetic”—
empty signifiers that can be recombined in virtually any way. 
In other words, technological reproducibility becomes, like that artistic production 
and representation that Heidegger sees in the Greek téchnē , a form of poesis: an ongoing 
process of representation or production that both depends on a continual unsecuring and 
continually unsecures its own representations. Here, as Heidegger claims of the Greek 
téchnē , technology and art converge—not in the form of the living or aestheticized 
technology that haunts so much of aesthetic modernism, nor in the form of the entirely 
functional, technologized aesthetic imagined by the modernist avant-gardes, but in an 
unregulated, autonomous process of technological reproducibility. Technological 
reproduction becomes increasingly similar to artistic production, not only because artistic 
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production comes to depend more and more on technological reproducibility, but because 
the process or logic or technological reproducibility itself comes increasingly to be seen 
as “aesthetic,” as a matter of style. Then, according to Rutsky, technology, in short, 
comes to be seen as an “aesthetic” process, although this “aesthetic” lacks the wholeness 
of the aura. Thus it is that the conception of technology in high tech can be described as a 
kind of high téchnē .198 
Because culture has become so material that we are now in a position to 
understand that it always was material, or materialistic, in its structures and functions. We 
postcontemporary people have a word for that discovery—a word that has tended to 
displace the older language of genres and forms—and this is, of course, the word 
“medium,” and in particular its plural, “media,” a word which now conjoins three 
relatively distinct signals: that of an artistic mode or specific form of aesthetic 
production; that of a specific technology, generally organized around a central apparatus 
or machine; and that, finally of a social institution. These three areas of meaning do not 
define a medium or the media, but designate the distinct dimensions that must be 
addressed in order for such a definition to be completed or constructed.199 
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When a totalizing, homogenized understanding of things comes to seem so 
obvious that there is no longer any room for reflection about the being of entities, nothing 
is any longer genuinely at stake or at issue for a people. All the significance of what 
shows up in the world is bleached out. As the world becomes more constricted and 
inflexible, all that presents itself is a collection of fixed items on hand for us to use or 
discard as we like. This nearsighted preoccupation with entities understood as fixed and 
antecedently given, just there on hand for us to use, conceals both the “world” (defined as 
the open arena of possibilities in which a historical people dwells) and that which resists 
all human mastery, the “earth.” Where everything is leveled down to the familiar and the 
commonplace—the actual—things are no longer “possible” and challenging for us. 
The domination of ordering takes the form of “enframing” or “configuring” 
(Gestell), which reduces all entities, including humans, to the homogenized level of 
resources on hand to be ordered and used with maximum efficiency. This fascination 
with ordering for its own sake colors all our ways of understanding things. Heidegger 
characterizes this as “immediate graspability and usefulness:  serviceability. Self-
evidently constitute what is in being and what is not.” Entities “are presupposed as what 
can be arranged, produced, and fixed (idea).” The understanding of entities as whatever is 
at our disposal reinforces the self-certainty of the “greatness of the subject” in modern 
subjectivism. We experience reality as a “world-picture” set before (vor-gestellt) us, and 
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ourselves as subjects who can challenge and control whatever there is. The result of this 
abandonment of being is that “entities appear as objects merely on hand, as if being were 
not [als ob Seyn nicht wese]. Being—that which imparts focus, coherence, belongingness, 
and richness or possibilities to things—is blotted out of view. This withdrawal of being is 
evident in the objectifying procedure of modern natural science that conceals the 
“essential fullness [Wsensfulle] of nature, that is, the rich possibilities for cohering and 
belonging together harbored within things. When entities are treated as interchangeable 
bits cut off from any proper place or “region” to which they belong, they are “un-beings,” 
devoid of the kind of connectedness to contexts of meaning that could let them become 
manifest in their being. 
Heidegger calls that interpretive function “truth setting itself to work,” and 
anything that performs this function he calls a work of art. As his illustration of an 
artwork, Heidegger takes the Greek temple. The temple held up to the Greeks what was 
important, and so allowed meaningful differences such as victory and disgrace, disaster 
and blessing: Dasein’s relativity. The Greeks whose practices were manifested and 
focused by the temple lived in a moral space of gods, heroes, and slaves, a moral space 
that gave direction and meaning to their lives. In the same way, the medieval cathedral 
made it possible to be a sinner or a saint and showed Christians the dimensions of 
salvation and damnation. In either case, one knew where one stood and what one had to 
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do. Heidegger would say that the understanding of what it is to be changes each time a 
culture gets a new artwork. Then the different sorts of human beings and things show up. 
For the Greeks, what showed up were heroes and slaves and marvelous things; for the 
Christians, saints and sinners, rewards and temptations. 
The account of the working on the temple in the ancient Greek world shows how 
an “event of being” can bring to realization a world of a particular sort. Here it makes no 
sense to think of a world as something humans create, since it is this newly emergent 
world that first lets humans be the kinds of beings they are in this world. It is only in the 
light of the world opened by the temple that humans can understand themselves as—and 
so be—the builders and creators that they are. The world is described as “the self-
disclosing openness of a historical people.” In opening a world, the temple defines the 
“measure” (Mass) or standards that disclose how things are at stake for a people, what is 
yet “not mastered, something concealed, confusing” and so in need of a decision.  
Heidegger says that because truth always happens through being articulated or 
composed (condensed or bound together), all art is essentially “poetry” (Dichtung) in the 
broadest sense of this term. But poetry in the narrow sense as a linguistic art has a special 
position among the arts. Poetry draws on the background “saying” of a people—that is, 
their proverbs, anecdotes, and oral traditions, but also the tacit interpretations embodied 
in their customs, rituals, and festivals—and transforms that “saying” into a configuration 
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that articulates for a people their understanding of reality. A great work of art therefore 
can inaugurate a new beginning for a community. What before had been humdrum and 
self-evident suddenly stands forth as strange and challenging as a result of this 
reconfiguration of the world: the work contains “the undisclosed abundance of the 
unfamiliar and the extraordinary, which means that it also contains strife with the familiar 
and the ordinary. Through the work, the “dawning world brings out what is as yet 
undecided and measureless, and this discloses the hidden necessity of measure and 
decisiveness.” In this way the great poetic works of a historical community play the role 
of “founding” the existence of that community. The artwork is “founding” first of all in 
the sense that it is an endowment defining the tasks for the future “preserves” whose 
world has been opened by the work. In the poetic work, “truth is thrown toward the 
coming preservers, that is, toward a historical human community.” The work sketches out 
in advance “the concepts of a historical people’s essence, i.e., of its belonging to world 
history,” and it thereby transports “a people into [their] appointed task.” We can see this 
in the way the Gospels, by opening up new understanding of the point of life in the 
ancient world, thereby laid out in advance what is demanded of future Christians. But 
second, world-defining works are also founding in the sense that they establish a 
“beginning” (Anfang) understood not just as the first event in a sequence, but as an origin 
that, filled with promise, “already contains the end latent in itself.” A “genuine 
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beginning,” Heidegger says, “is always a leap forward, in which everything to come is 
already leaped over, even if as something disguised.” In this way, the possibilities of 
being a Christian are already anticipated in its beginning, though it is up to future 
Christians to realize and define what was implicit and “disguised” in that origin. By 
sketching out the endowment and tasks of a community, the work of art provides a people 
with a narrative schema that lets them weave their own lives into a wider, future-directed, 
and so life-orienting historical unfolding. For Heidegger, the founding beginning for the 
West occurred “for the first time in Greece. What was in the future to be called ‘being’ 
was set into work in a way which set the measure” for what was to come. Heidegger 
points out that insofar as the power of a beginning can never sustain itself, “decline” is 
inevitable, so that the beginning needs to be “repeated” or “retrieved” if its promise is to 
be brought to realization. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: VIDEO—THE DEMOCRATIZED MEDIUM 
 
Early in chapter one I suggested how video art and its more general popular 
practices undermine the tension between structures, between low and high art due to the 
flow of its content, and among ongoing everyday practices. Certainly, one can 
acknowledge the fact that the social and technological changes during the last couple of 
centuries have also led to a diverse proliferation of art forms and genres, from 
performance to installation art, from sound art to video.  
I have also indicated how video supports an inversion in the hierarchy of culture 
and values, such that anyone can become an artist without necessarily having formal 
training in the field. In chapter four, I demonstrated why a philosophy of video is 
indispensable, and following Beuys’s concept of social sculpture, where he suggested 
that every human being is an artist, I sought to demonstrate why this problematic issue 
makes video a fertile medium with deep concerns beyond its technological definition and 
how it is intrinsically tied to the question of creative freedom and expression.  
 In chapter five, I return to the dialogical and democratized potentialities of video. 
In contrast with that, I point to Tacita Dean’s recent commission for the Tate Modern 
Film (Figure 14) as such installation suggests an opposed reading to the claim that in 
video anyone can be an artist. In this last chapter I propose that in video, the viewer is 
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granted powers to move from the I see position to that of I create. That is also to say that 
the viewer potentially becomes an artist. Video, as one of the answers to Heidegger’s 
technological concern, transcends poststructural subjectivity as it relates to consciousness 
and representation. This shift in position also represents a metaphysical movement from 
the objective, technological definition of video to a subjective, personalized one. Such 
shift is also only possible due to the democratization of the medium, in other words, the 
democratization of technology itself, and the proliferation of the means of distribution. 
Yet, while I intend to explore the emancipatory potential of video, I seek not to lose sight 
of the cultural, historical and political forces that impact the individual use of it. 
Undoubtedly, due to the encouragement and proliferation of amateur video production, 
such medium has the capability to change the nature of media users, from passive 
audiences to active creators. 
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Figure 14 
The Unilever Series: Film.  
(October 2011 – March 2012) Tacita Dean at Tate Modern.  
(Photo: J. Fernandes, Tate Photography) 
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V.I. MONOLITHIC STRUCTURES 
 
In 2010 the Berlin-based artist Tacita Dean was commissioned to create an 
installation piece for The Unilever Series at the Tate Modern museum in London. 
Although primarily known for using 16mm film for her pieces, Dean studied drawing in 
art school, so in her films there is always a residual reference to drawings or paintings. 
However, for the specific commission, Dean conceived an eleven-minute silent film (the 
first time she worked with 35mm) projected onto a freestanding monumental wall located 
at the end of a darkened proscenium space of the Turbine Hall. The work was simply 
called, and appropriately enough, Film, and dealt with the typical nature of the 
disappearing, threatened analogue film in contrast to the encroaching digital image 
technologies. Tacita Dean’s Film is the first work in The Unilever Series that was 
devoted to the moving image. Projected from a stand specially built into the Turbine Hall 
bridge, Dean’s Film is about the specificity of the medium. She created Film as a portrait 
of the analogue, photochemical, non-digital characteristics of film. For Dean, both film 
and digital are pictures, perhaps copies of one another, but they are not the same things: 
one is light on emulsion and one is light made by pixel—smallest unit on digital image—
and they are also conceived, made, and seen differently.200 This was also the first time 
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Dean had made a vertical, anamorphic film projection (for the installation, the 
Cinemascope format projection is rotated ninety-degrees). Dean wanted “to show film as 
film can be, and use no post-production other than my normal editing process.”201 The 
images on film were created in-camera during the film shoot with classic techniques such 
as masking, mirroring, multiple-exposure, collage, and glass matte painting, which are 
also analogous to the tension between in-camera versus post-production effect, and the 
interior and exterior of film itself. 
 But the crux of the matter in Dean’s Film is that it touches on the controversial 
intersection points and disparities between analog and digital, between monological and 
dialogical, and between plurality and medium specificity. The time in Film is the time of 
film itself. Implicit in this is what film continues to hold over digital, and which digital 
needs to find for itself or else lose in an eternity of options: decision. Insofar, for Dean 
every element in the making of a film is decisive. “Film is therefore not fast and 
spontaneous, but slow and methodical and mulled over. To show a scene in real time of 
any length, one must always resort to fiction and illusion, for in film, real time is edited. 
With digital, of course, one can record continuous time without break.”202 At this point it 
is worthwhile to correlate her work with Bakhtin and say that for Dean film is only 
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possible throughout an “authorized” author, one who has been trained and granted the 
authority to produce.  
Firstly, Dean relies on montage in her work. For film theorist Sergei Eisenstein 
montage work inflects his use of, and perspective on the concept or art, drawing it away 
from considerations of beauty or disinterest and towards its role in galvanizing an 
audience in relation to the discontinuity in graphic qualities, and the creation of 
impossible spatial matches. Montage does not deal with the flowing depiction of a 
comprehensible spatial or temporal narrative. It draws attention to temporal ellipses 
because changes between shots are obvious, less fluid, and non-seamless. Only the 
moving picture of video surface, which actually denies the filmic identity of the shots and 
the practice of cinematographic montage, can demonstrate the iconic individuality of the 
shot and the discontinuity of montage itself. And only the combination of the mobility of 
video and its sound and musical background functions as the equivalent of the 
constitution of a place in the world. 
 As I have pointed to Eisenstein, on the other hand, Arnheim undertook a different 
and more academic approach, producing the most systematic pre-war treatise on film-as-
a-traditional art, Film as Art. Educated in Gestalt psychology, philosophy, and art history, 
his work is embedded with Kantian assumptions, especially the definition of art as 
embodying purposiveness without purpose: the notion that aesthetic objects are 
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distinctive because of the manner in which they are cut loose from practical ends.  
 Pertinent to our consideration of video, and of particular interest within what is at 
work in Dean’s project, is the argument relevant to how such beautiful artwork can be 
generated. In other words, the artist cannot create a beautiful work by simply learning and 
subsequently applying rules that determine when something is beautiful—for no such 
rules can be specified. Such an endeavor would be counterproductive to the artistic 
genius. Dean’s work is very Kantian in structure, as we learn from him that the artist’s 
activity must still be rule-governed, since “every art presupposes rules” and the objects of 
art must serve as models or examples: that is, they must serve as a standard or rule by 
which to judge.203 Such assertion is seemingly quite contradictory. Kant’s solution to this 
apparent paradox is to postulate a capacity, which he then calls genius, by which “nature 
gives the rule to art.”204 An individual bequeathed with artistic genius has an innate 
capacity to create objects that are appropriately judged as beautiful. In Kant’s thought, 
fine art is not produced through the collectiveness of a group of individuals building on 
one another’s concepts and work—unlike science—but can only be created by a single 
person. Genius can only exist in a sterile world, inert in its context. And only the 
individuality or isolation of a genius’s natural abilities can add rules to the otherwise 
indefinite production of the aesthetic ideas. 	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 Secondly, Dean is not opposed to digital technologies. Such rupture from video 
does not mean she is against the idea of technology as art—whether digital or analog. 
Film is indeed an homage to the development of cinema, it is about film itself. In that 
sense, her body of work is important because it can be a constant reminder that both 
video and cinema exist beyond the level of a collection of light signals into images, 
sounds, words, or shapes. Except that for Dean, emphasis is placed on form, when in 
video; such a rich medium creates a phenomenon that transcends simple descriptions. 
Video as both medium and practice opens up polyphonic spaces, and continues to raise 
ethical issues in relation its accessibility and means of distribution. 
 Finally, the emphasis placed on the montage of monolithic structure, dominance 
of the installation in the hall, suggests the viewer in forced hierarchical singularity, a 
monologic seeing of sorts. In Film Dean is the artist in charge, she is genius. The “I see” 
of the viewer is left out, or forced down by the artist’s own vision, “You see.” That is not 
to say that there is not intertextuality within film, as there is in video. However, as I have 
already stated video technology grants its productive power to anyone differently than 
film does, anywhere; every individual has access and can be genius. Kant himself uses 
genius, and how the work is produced—facere—as one of the means for defining fine art 
as a category. He does not strive for the term in any historical sense. Through genius, one 
has the ability to distinguish artistic creation from schematic production. That is achieved 
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through the power of presenting ideas. Works of genius, like all human creations, involve 
a determinate concept of what they are meant to be. Thus we can conclude that an 
aesthetic idea is a representation of a thing that far surpasses such determinate concept. 
At this point I return to the origin of the word videre (to see) and its relation to 
Dasein. In doing so we also arrive at the intersection where video abandons its unified, 
objective definition and morphs into the humanized, subjective expression. Thus, videre 
understood beyond the optical capacity of the viewer. Such move towards the origin of 
the word only reaffirms that video is dialogic, polyphonic in its nature—and resolute. In a 
Heideggerian context, “when resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and 
has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ 
as regards the situation which has been disclosed.”205 Such moment of vision is exactly 
what Heidegger refers to as the Augenblick—which literally means gaze of the eye. He 
appropriates the word (Øieblikket) originally used by Kierkegaard, which can be simply 
comprehended as a translation of the Greek kairos—the right or favorable moment. Such 
term marks the “intersection and interpenetration of time and eternity,” also a correlation 
between time and representation.206 Augenblick is elevated from the ordinary instant of 
time. And as Koral Ward suggests in her book Augenblick, “an event which occurs at the 
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right time and crucially, with the right man present in the correct attitude.”207 And here, 
such attitude from a Heideggerian perspective is one of harmony, resoluteness. This term 
although apparently not fully explored by Heideggerian scholars, is of extreme 
importance here, and what emerges in the moment of vision is the authentic Dasein—
what Heidegger calls resoluteness. 
This holds for Ward. In the same sense, it holds for Simon Critchley, as he also 
points out that such resoluteness is what “brings us to the present.”208 As he continues 
suggesting that for Heidegger, “the present is not some endless series of now points that I 
watch flowing by. Rather, the present is something that I can seize hold of and resolutely 
make my own. What is opened in the anticipation of the future is the fact of our having-
been which releases itself into the present moment of action.”209 In the series of articles 
written for The Guardian, Critchley suggests that Dasein is projected, forecast over in the 
future in its primordial ontological indebtedness. For him, this presents a complex 
thought: “in anticipation, I project towards the future, but what comes out of the future is 
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my past, my personal and cultural baggage, what Heidegger calls my “having-been-ness” 
(Gewesenheit). But this does not mean that I am somehow condemned to my past.”210  
It is also important to notice that when Kierkegaard originally speaks of the 
moment as the intersectional location from which the instance of past, present and future 
is projected, he consistently uses the moment in correlation with another Latin-derived 
term spatiere, for space. Therefore, echoing Kierkegaard’s thoughts, Heidegger is keen 
on such intense moments of awareness—the moment of vision—which he also sees them 
connected to another concept in his thinking, and emphasis on a philosophy of place, and 
in this current milieu understood as a topological construct of being.  
Without question, video is a medium of time, of temporality, but it is also a 
medium of space—of context. In his essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking,” Heidegger’s late thought is evident in his re-thinking of Aletheia, not so much 
as truth, but as the possibility of truth: unconcealment, clearing. In that text, Heidegger’s 
later thought—just over forty-years later—continues to investigate the initial postulations 
presented in Being and Time, but in a more elemental fashion. His intention was to 
continue questioning the point of departure of the primordial inquiry in Being and Time 
to an immanent criticism. In other words, it must be explicit to what extent the critical 
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question, of what the matter of thinking is, necessarily and continually belongs to 
thinking. 
In that text, he is pointing to the understanding of Being as mere presence, ground 
(arché, aition, principle), and therefore, in the confusion of beings with what makes them 
present, it matters little how those beings are subsequently investigated, that is, whether 
they are known philosophically or scientifically.211 Here we observe Heidegger’s concern 
whether science can constitute a problem or threat for philosophy, and not only with that, 
but also whether the existentialist, positivistic stance of the modern scientific position 
truly epitomizes an improvement in apprehending beings as presence to the senses.  It is 
for such a reason that Heidegger speaks in this context as reversed Platonism, and that he 
maintains that the end of philosophy is the completion, or gathering into the most 
extreme possibilities, a place: an ethos, a place of dwelling. For him “a third, equally 
essential phenomenon of modernity lies in the process of art's moving into the purview of 
aesthetics. This means the artwork becomes an object of experience (Erlebens) and 
consequently is considered to be an expression of human life.” 212 In such a historical 
account, Heidegger was not necessarily the first to have seen the role of artistic 
articulation. Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche had already discussed the function of 
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the artwork in giving culture a sense of its identity. However, Heidegger is the first to 
have defined art in terms of its function of articulating the understanding of being in the 
practices and to have worked out the ontological implications. Thus, Heidegger could 
argue against Nietzsche and the Romantics that it was the artwork, not the experience of 
the artist that had ontological significance. The reason for this, surely, is the likelihood 
that, in either the spectator or creator approach, the essence of art will turn out to be a 
psychological state and that one's “philosophy of art will therefore degenerate into 
aesthetics.”213 Likewise, he could deny Hegel’s claim that philosophy was superior to art, 
since what art showed symbolically, philosophy could rationalize and so make explicit. 
Conversely, in The Age of the World Picture Heidegger also interweaves the 
fabrics of both fundamental vision of reality and metaphysical traditions, mapping each 
back to their common Cartesian origins. The short, provocatively titled essay delivered in 
1938 engages us in a way to defamiliarize ourselves with the label subjective and asks us 
to remodel it back onto the very foundations of the Western intellectual tradition itself. In 
similar fashion to his philosophical method, Heidegger leaves us questioning the crux of 
the matter in the objective epistemology so long dominated by the scientific method and 
pondering the common threads that run correspondingly through idealist philosophy and 
science. “That we are “in the picture” about something means not just that the being is 
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placed before or represented by us. It means, rather, that it stands before us together with 
what belongs to and stands together with it as a system. To be “in the picture” resonates 
with being well informed, equipped, and prepared.”214 Here, Heidegger’s insights 
concern one who positions himself within the context of a history of science and begins 
to view science less in terms of discovery and more in terms of fabrication. But what is 
even more troublesome for Heidegger is that in order to understand science in such a 
model one must grasp how man himself becomes a Cartesian construction by accepting 
the maxim, cogito ergo sum. Once this maxim is doubted and all preconceptions are 
ripped away, one descends into a line of questioning that rattles the very foundations of 
ethics, morality, and metaphysics itself—those intellectual footings upon which the ideal 
of scientific progress positions itself as a worthy cause. Worse yet, the consequences of 
not engaging in such questioning would be quite severe, and the ripple effects of it would 
for hundreds of years go on in the name of artificial identity. Understanding the sensorial 
as condition more real than the ideal and enabling technological employment of it is but 
the utmost possibility of apprehending of being as presence. The muddled struggle for the 
I see/am consciousness has a future potential for expressing itself through technologies 
capable not only of shadowing over being but worse of inexorably and irreversibly 
changing the individual. Heidegger points out that when, “however, man becomes the 
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primary and genuine subiectum, this means that he becomes that being upon which every 
being, in its way of being and its truth, is founded. Man becomes the referential center of 
beings as such.”215 And yet, although it may sound paradoxical, in Heidegger’s project, to 
map out being suitable to the world is still unclear, though he is clear that art offers a 
potential solution. Taking into consideration the development in media technology over 
the past few decades, today’s artists have an increasing array of tools with which to 
combat the complete transformation of man into subiectum, and coherent to his 
prediction, the saving power may very well be in technology itself. And since in 
“Nietzsche’s view the value of a thing is measured by what it contributes to the 
enhancement of the actuality of beings.”216 By value, Nietzsche intends whatever is a 
condition for life, that is, for the enhancement of life. Revaluation of all values means—
for life, that is, “for being as a whole—the positing of a new condition by which life is 
once again brought to itself, that is to say, impelled beyond itself.”217 Only in this way 
does life become possible in its true essence. If left to the empty receptacle labeled 
values, modern man will either despair at life’s lack of meaning and sink into the 
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nihilistic abyss, or he will seek to change himself by submitting to science itself and so 
succumbing to his own Faustian creation.  
Thus, Being appears and comes upon the one who is present, so man is the one 
who is looked upon by that which is; he is the one who is—in company with being 
itself—gathered toward presencing by that which opens itself.  To be beheld by what is, 
to be included and maintained within its openness and in that way to be borne along by it, 
to be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its discord—that is the essence of 
man in the great age of the Greeks.218 Therefore, in order to fulfill his essence, Heidegger 
suggests that the “Greek man must gather (legein) and save (sōzein): catch up and 
preserve what opens itself in its openness, and he must remain exposed (alētheuein) to all 
its sundering confusions.”219 As for him, the Greek man is as the one who apprehends 
that which is, and this is why in the age of the Greeks the world could not become 
picture. Yet on the other hand, the beingness of whatever is, “is defined for Plato as 
eidos: the presupposition, destined far in advance and long ruling indirectly in 
concealment, for the world’s having to become picture.” 220 
Bringing what is present at hand before oneself as something standing over 
against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into this 
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relationship to oneself as the normative realm. In light of these developments it would 
seem that modern humanity is progressing in its quest to understand things as they are. It 
would seem that science has allowed us, indeed required us, to approach the natural 
world with a passive disposition in order to account for its greatness in diversity and 
complexity. In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing, whose 
meaning the word repraesentatio first brings to its earliest expression, intends something 
quite different. “Wherever this happens, man gets into the picture in precedence over 
whatever is.  But in that man puts himself into the picture in this way, he puts himself 
into the scene, into the open.”221 Yet just like the illusion of diversity humanity enjoys in 
defining its own identity vis-à-vis a world picture it has created, so too do these variances 
in contemporary science only contribute to a unifying picture that has already projected 
itself onto the natural world. As for Heidegger, he believes that “to be a being means: to 
belong to a particular rank in the order of created things, and, as thus created, to 
correspond to the cause of creation (analogia entis) ... But never does the being's being 
consist in its being brought before man as the objective. Never does it consist in being 
placed in the realm of man’s information disposal so that, in this way, alone, is it in 
being.”222  
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Also, by forgetting the question of being culminates in what Heidegger describes 
as “the new fundamental science of cybernetics,” which is the theory that regulates “the 
possible planning and arrangement of human labor,” the transformation of language into 
an exchange of news, and the transformation of the arts into “regulated-regulating 
instruments of information.”223 What encompasses the fundamental principles of science 
are those which have been explicit to the scientific method throughout time—the initial 
projection of the nature of the phenomenon and the precedence of research methodology 
in ensuring that its study conforms to that realm. Methodology is clarifying on the basis 
of that which is clear, that is, on that which has already been identified as problem. No 
matter which ground plan in physics is considered, all of them have the character of 
exactitude in that they adhere to their respective hypotheses. Yet science poses its biggest 
threat not in terms of how it is used, but in its tendency to transform the agent that uses it, 
hence McLuhan’s realization that the medium is the message. Thus, lifting man from the 
burden of necessity in order to discover Being in the arts, science became a self-
perpetuating end in its own right. Heidegger too suggests this when he says that science 
transforms praxis. 
Video is a dynamic medium. Its inherently mechanistic technology is 
continuously changing, being transformed. Such technological devices and our metaphors 
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for them are continually being transformed, except one major component remains 
somewhat the same—the people using these tools. Video technology today is much more 
accessible than it was in the early ’60s and has enabled far more people to work in the 
medium due to its low-cost devices (smart phones, camcorders, etc.). The most recent 
developments have also eliminated the myth that was detrimental to the early stages of 
video art: that persons could only be considered video artists if they had the requisite 
equipment, which was limited in availability. “The medium is becoming more pedestrian, 
less mystical and glamorous.”224 With such development, however, the potential for 
individual creative expression is becoming greater. Yet such technology is neither a 
prosthetic for the eye nor a replacement of the hand. Heidegger suggests, “One of the 
essential phenomena of the modern age is its science.  A phenomenon of no less 
importance is machine technology.”225 We must not, however, misinterpret technology as 
the mere application of modern mathematical physical science to praxis, but bear in mind 
that this homology between human and machine perception becomes available for 
aesthetic exploitation only in the wake of the splitting of vision into properly machinic 
and human forms.    
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As in any technology, the conversion into practice is an independent process, a 
kind of conversion which demands the use of science.  For Heidegger, machine 
technology remains up to now the most visible outgrowth of the essence of modern 
technology, which is identical with the essence of modern metaphysics. “The being does 
not acquire being in that man first looks upon it in the sense of representation that has the 
character of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by beings, 
the one who is gathered by self-opening beings into presenting with them. To be looked 
at by beings, to be included and maintained and so supported by their openness, to be 
driven…”226 And according to Hansen, “if our perceptual process is like that of the 
computer in the sense that both involve complex internal processing, the type of 
processing involved in the two cases could not be more different: whereas vision-
machines simply calculate data, human vision comprises a body-brain achievement.” 227 
Whereas machine-vision systems abandon perspective entirely in favor of a completely 
realized modelization of an object or space, aesthetic experimentation with human visual 
processing exploits its large margin of indetermination not to dispense with three-
dimensionally altogether, but expressly to modify our perspectival constructions. 
Many possible concepts come to mind when we think of technology and its 
relation to the original Greek term téchnē and a democratized construct. Here I subscribe 	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to the ideas of Professor Arleen Dallery as she suggests that “as opposed to Aristotle, 
Heidegger argues that the process of téchnē is not more easily known than the process of 
physis simply because téchnē seems to originate in the governing phohaireton eidos of 
the maker.”228 Heidegger does not regard the products of téchnē as outside of the twofold, 
generating-degenerating movement of perishing and presencing. Against Aristotle’s 
claim that the work of téchnē must be thought of as freed from an essential relation to 
death, “Heidegger argues that no work of téchnē has a life outside of the self-surpassing 
motion of history and the renewing power of tradition that is animated by such works 
themselves. The work of art does not stand apart from time or history. This is especially 
clear in the case of art works and the way in which they can be said to found a world.”229 
 In this sense, a democratization of video also occurs in terms of téchnē. I am not 
however, suggesting that democratizing technology is something new. Aristotle, 
however, also defined man as the essence that is able to practice téchnē, and the 
possibility of art in technology. Art, for Aristotle, includes not only architecture and 
literature but also the simple skill of the craftsman. The Aristotelian artist is not really a 
creative man in the modern sense. Such creativity would contradict the basic trait of the 
selfsameness of essence, the meaning of which has already been demonstrated. As a 
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consequence of this basic trait, the change in essence, as well as the sheer coming-to-be 
of essence, is a movement wherein something basic persists. This excludes the possibility 
that the “Aristotelian artist is able to create something really new, something that has 
never been there before.”230 This does not mean that Aristotle did not regard téchnē as a 
way of poiēsis. The structure of poiēsis is shown to consist in the fact that, as the 
generating power (dynamis poitike), it allows to come forth in a patient suffering this 
generating an essence like that of the generating agent—this like essence having already 
been contained potentially in the patient. In the realm of téchnē the artist embodies this 
poetic force through which the generating occurs. The ousia of that which is generated is 
pre-given to the artist's soul in the form of an image—as edits without hype.231 Thus the 
ousia of a complete house is in the soul of the architect, the locus of the planning and 
executing measures of the poiēsis, the production of the house. Thus it determines above 
all the hype the matter of which the essence, the house, shall consist; it determines in a 	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conditionally necessary way that only these and no other kinds of brick, wood, or other 
building materials are suitable for this house. In these appropriate materials the house is 
already present in potentiality. In this sense the poiēsis of the architect generates out of 
building materials an essence that is not new but like the pre-given essence. 
 Seen in this fashion, the movement of poiēsis is completed in something basic that 
remains the same according to genus and is only the conversion of potentiality to 
actuality in an actuality already present. What concerns us here is merely to see that 
Aristotle understood the course of poiēsis as ousiologically determined. The artist can 
actualize the human potentiality for téchnē only within the fundamental forms and figures 
of essences and their order, always pre-given to him. His doing is not a creating but, in 
the sense described, an imitating (mimesis) of the already pre-given ousia and the logical 
order. 
It is not surprising that Heidegger holds this conception of the artist and the 
essence of the artist in terms of expectation to experience in his work something that has 
in principle never been presented before. This problem of art is one that stirs Heidegger. 
He therefore seeks to free himself from this traditional problematic as such and thereby 
also to overcome the Aristotelian comprehension of art as téchnē. The Aristotelian 
concept of téchnē, whereby humanity is only a servant of the ousiological order and does 
not emerge as the maker of new essences, let alone as their creator or co-creator, can no 
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longer satisfy times in which humanity has apparently shown that it can master nature 
and with the help of mechanical and atomic technology produce new beings of an 
essential character. This altered self-interpretation of a technological man and labor 
manifestly concerns Heidegger in a very particular way. Through an overcoming of the 
problematic into the essence of technology we may proceed to “determine anew the role 
in general of the essence of man in his relation to Being and essence.” 232 
 From Aristotle’s Metaphysics one concludes that the entire scope of his project is 
driven by an essential insight into the meaning of being, what a thing is: the thinghood of 
a thing. Although in his text one understands substance qua being, Heidegger suggests 
that the word was mistakenly translated into substance, and rather suggests a more fit 
translation by suggesting that being is ousia.233 For him “substance thought in terms of 
the history of Being, is already a blanket translation of ousia, a word that designates the 
presence of what is present and at the same time, with puzzling ambiguity, usually means 
what is present itself.234 Aristotle’s question then becomes: if ousia is the beingness of 
beings, how can beings be understood in terms of ousia? The problematic of the Physics 
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is entirely guided by this central question. The question of kinesis, therefore, is the 
question of how beings that are through ousia can have kinesis as their way of being—
their way of presenting.235  
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V.II. THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF VIDEO 
 
 People are always involved in technological development of any sorts. The 
impartial development of science and technology in the industrial age and followed by 
modernity is emblematic of an autonomous democratization. Such a parallel is not too far 
from the technological tsunami that precipitated the Protestant Reformation dominating 
the sixteenth-century European religious landscape—the printing press. Prior to the 
printing press, books were thoroughly drawn, written, and illustrated by hand. Scribes 
and monks working only by candlelight in scriptoria rooms preserved the majority of 
classical texts through the centuries. Priests were exclusively granted privileged access to 
sacred texts, and they would normally present them monologically, orally to an audience. 
Eventually, such access was undermined by the innovative mind of a German 
goldsmith—Johannes Gutenberg. His invention of the moving type made information 
accessible. A few centuries later, similarly within the moving picture, film could also be 
seeing as pre-reformation, where filmmakers were granted individualistic access to the 
camera. Fast-forwarding to present time, due to the portability and easy access of video 
cameras or camcorders, anyone is granted with technological powers to make movies; 
anyone has access to such technology—with or without mastering its domains.  
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However, what is at play here is not just the question that modernity is always 
characterized by technology but to speak of a democratization of video is also to speak of 
a democratization of technology itself. Just over forty years the videotape analog 
recording (Portapaks) initiated an independent video making movement amongst visual 
artists around the world. For Hermine Freed “the Portapak would seem to have been 
invented specifically for use by artists. Just when many artists were doing performance 
works but had nowhere to perform, or felt the need to keep a record of their 
performances.”236 In the hands of experts who followed only the internal logic of 
technological development, technology was a dominant force rather than a tool we could 
use and control—beyond the reach of political forces or actions. Since then, a new 
generation of video makers, artists and activists have engaged with video camcorders and 
other digital devices as tools used to record events beyond their own personal 
expressions; they have used them as social-political weapons, and become witnesses of 
changes in cultural and religious dogmas.  
Today’s video activism practice is somewhat a reflection of the fulfillment of a 
radical 1960s vision of creating a so-called people’s television. The role of the artist as 
individualist or alienated genius was slowly being eclipsed by a resurgence of interest in 
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the artist’s social responsibility, and as art became politically and socially engaged, the 
distinctions between art and mass communication started to dissolve. 
Two different views of video activism emerged from the historical development 
of the process of empowerment throughout video. The first named guerilla television 
with reference to a book by Michael Shamberg published in 1971, which places more 
emphasis on disseminating content for maximum available audience. 237  The second 
view, community video, also approached sometimes as participatory video, with the intent 
of promoting “self/other respect, a sense of belonging, a feeling of importance, a claim to 
an identity,” is more focused on the process of video making, a dialogue rather than 
simply emphasizing the product’s final aesthetic quality.238 When dealing with either 
approaches of video activism used to depict critical thinking, and elements of class 
struggles or cultural clashes, the latter is mostly used, since community video is quite 
often categorized within counter-hegemonic struggle. 
Thinking along these terms, it is safe to say that the surfacing moment for the 
Arab Spring—the uprising in the Middle East—was also possible throughout such 
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democratized technologies. I am not however, suggesting that this was the only motif, but 
here I am specifically pointing to the unmediated distribution forms of the Internet, the 
convergence between moving image technologies and mobile devices (smartphones with 
cameras), and the proliferation of social media. There are many more complex issues in 
place when one discusses the uprising movements in the Middle East. But pertinent to my 
project, focus will be placed on the discussion of video and distribution. While video art 
in early 70s developed a new class of the black cube in museums and gallery spaces, a 
whole group of producers were looking for new distribution paths and forms of influence. 
These forms exponentially involved the Internet, its means of public access, which is 
becoming an ever more important open meeting place for a whole new Internet Video 
expression scene as bandwidths and data transmission systems constantly expand.  
It is important to highlight that in all of the Arab countries, it is the empowerment 
of the youth, the demographic majority who brakes with indifference, rejecting apathy 
and inertia of their parents’ generation in order to mandate change; the youth who 
embraces new technologies and are willing to push forward their self-expressions. 
Popular uprising movements such as the ones happening in the Middle East today are not 
new. Our history books are filled with other examples such as the April Revolution 
(South Korea 1960); Thailand’s Democracy Movement (early 1970s); the ill-fated Iranian 
“Green Revolution” of 2009, and more.   
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V.III. CONCLUSION  
 
Egyptian Pavilion at the 54th Venice Biennale 
 
Bring a camera with you and don’t be afraid or weak. 
        Ahmed Basiony 
 
In 2011, the Egyptian pavilion at the Venice Biennale opened its space for a 
special honor to artist Ahmed Basiony, who died on January twenty-eight of same year 
during the uprising in the Tahrir Square, Cairo. The exhibit co-curated by Aida Eltorie 
and entitled “30 Days of Running in the Place,” consisted of a few video screenings of 
two projects by Basiony. One was a work also called “30 Days of Running in Place” 
(Figure 15), and the other was a footage he shot during the early days of the uprisings in 
Cairo.  
A combination of participatory video and performance, “Thirty Days of Running 
in Place” was produced through the act of running in a single standing point, with sensors 
installed in the soles of his shoes, and on his body. The body heat generated by Basiony’s 
running was then converted into an image, a visual diagram allowing viewers to witness 
the kinetic aspect of energy and physical activity becoming visible. 
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Figure 15 
Thirty Days Running in Place. (© Ahmed Basiony) 
 
For many, the video was not just the recording of an art installation or 
performance, but also an infusion of political, social, and cultural issues. Basiony died 
victim of anti-revolutionary police violence, so for that reason, the installation was 
presented with a heavy air, a somber tone, and made the earlier representation of his 
living body overtly emotional. Facing death, the notion of running in place as a stationary 
act is also rife with political overtones.  
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Particularly in Basiony’s conceptual work—its boundaries, its topography, and 
the space inside the narratives—suggest technology as art, and art as the becoming and 
happening of truth. Although “Thirty Days of Running in Place” depicts a performance 
by Basiony, he is not the genius in it, but one of the conclusions we could draw out of the 
concept is the collective portrait, the polyphonic voice of the various generations of 
protesters against impunity.  
In a short review written for the international online edition of Artinfo, Kate 
Deimlling was very keen to point out that given the “current complex moment in 
Egyptian history and the Arab spring and the role played by activists like him, the 
country’s choice of artist is both inspired and inspiring.”239 As she suggested that 
according to the pavilion’s statement, the Egyptian ministry of culture seeks to 
“recognize and honor the life and death of an artist who was fully dedicated to the notions 
of an Egypt that only too recently demanded the type of change he was seeking his entire 
life.”240 Basiony was an important constituent, an advocate as practitioner and educator to 
the use of new media technology in his artistic and socio-cultural research. In his 
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projects, Basiony designed each of his works functioning in their own terms, confronting, 
altering directions out of a multiplicity of spheres in order to expose a personal account 
experienced throughout the use of audio and visual content. But as Deimlling also 
indicated, “from a critical standpoint, the exhibition raised some questions, since the 
footage filmed by the artist at Tahrir Square was not a finished personal work but a raw 
historical document.”241  
In conclusion, it is clear that today’s media democratization occurs throughout 
Tweeting, Googling, mobile-texting, mobile-imaging, and YouTube-uploading, as they 
all become catalysts of changes and empowerment. Unfortunately violence still is exerted 
upon those whom partake in such popular movements, and for the youth who are brave 
for the uprisings find themselves confronted with their own limitations, and the harsh 
reality of regimes that can fight back with evasion, and an amalgamation of tactics that, 
more and more, include the instruments of terror that continues to reduce their families’ 
generation. Intentionally or unintentionally, what we see in Basiony’s work and other 
video artists are without a doubt valuable to considering video as powerful, accessible 
tool for artistic active expressions. In a profound personal and subjective approach, 
Basiony along with others, were able to fight Mubarak’s stronghold and suffocating 
regime in their moment of vision. 
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As already suggested in the beginning of this project, the question of video is not 
just a question about medium, but also an inquiry which leads into thinking the 
possibilities of the medium itself, its ontology, the possibilities of video aesthetic in the 
realm of technology, becoming, and truth. The question of video does not necessarily 
presuppose a simplified answer. The Heideggerian method made possible a different 
understanding and approach to video. His method led to the origin of the word, to an 
investigation into subjectivity, and layers of seeing. And although video practices and its 
paradigms are reformulated continually, one thing remains certain—the tension of its 
openness. 
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